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Abstract
This thesis looks at the effects of flexible working arrangements on workers’ labour
market outcomes. The particular type of flexible working arrangement analysed
in this thesis is called “flexitime”. This is an arrangement which gives workers
the freedom to choose when to start and end their work. Flexitime provides
workers with a new way to cater to their domestic responsibilities and in turn
may reduce the costs of participating in the labour market. Therefore, it is closely
connected with workers’ compensation structure, human capital accumulation
process, labour supply and job mobility. The effects of flexitime on workers’
labour market outcomes are analysed from three aspects: wage, labour supply,
and job mobility.
The first chapter gives an introduction and overview of the thesis. The second
chapter is a study on the compensating wage differentials associated with flexi-
time. In general I do not find convincing evidence showing the existence of com-
pensating wage differentials associated with flexitime. One possible reason might
be that flexitime brings additional benefits to firms (such as increased productiv-
ity and reduced turnover rate) so that firms may not necessarily need to reduce
actual wages in exchange for flexitime provision.In the third chapter, I develop a
model describing how flexitime may affect workers’ labour supply decisions. The
main finding of the model is that flexitime will increase workers’ labour supply
when the benefit associated with flexitime (increased child care production effi-
ciency) is high relative to the cost of wage reduction (prediction 1). Meanwhile,
the model also predicts that flexitime causes high human capital workers to in-
crease their labour supply more than low human capital workers (prediction 2).
Empirical findings show that flexitime is positively associated with working moth-
ers’ labour market hours, which confirms model prediction 1. However, there is
arguably insufficient empirical evidence verifying model prediction 2. The fourth
chapter considers the relationship between flexitime and workers’ job satisfac-
tion and job mobility. Flexitime is associated with high job satisfaction levels
for both male and female workers. It also reduces the probability of quitting for
female workers with young children. Male workers’ job mobility decisions are not
significantly affected by flexitime. The fifth chapter gives the conclusion of the
thesis.
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The past several decades have witnessed flexible working arrangements becoming
common practice among most developed countries (OECD, 1999). This thesis
looks into the effects of flexible working arrangements on workers’ labour market
outcomes. The particular type of flexible working arrangement analysed in this
thesis is called “flexitime”. This is an arrangement which gives workers the free-
dom to choose when to start and end their work. The usual practice for flexitime
is that employers choose a certain period of a day as “core hours”, during which
workers have to stay at work. For the rest of the time, it is up to the workers
themselves to decide when to work.
1.1 Flexitime, an International Perspective
With the increase of female participation rates in the past few decades and
people’s awareness of the importance of work and family balances, how to en-
hance the labour market flexibility has become an important issue on many de-
veloped countries’ agenda (Riedmann et al., 2006). Flexible working arrange-
ments, including flexitime, have been regarded as important elements in the
strategy to increase Europe’s employment rates (Riedmann et al., 2006). OECD
(2001) reviews the evidence that family friendly policies–including flexible work-
ing arrangements– are vital for increasing of the employment rates of mothers.
Chung et al. (2007) argue that in order for Europe to prosper in the future, it
has to face the challenge of creating a more flexible labour market environment.
In addition, providing workers with flexible working arrangements could also be
beneficial to firms. Golden and Altman (2007b) point out that flexitime can help
firms promote on the job attachments and workers’ commitment to the firms.
OECD (1999) reports that firms which provide flexible working practices such
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as flexitime tend to enjoy better financial performance and higher productivity
than those who do not provide those options. Compared to other types of flexible
working arrangements, flexitime is more welcomed by employers. OECD (2001)
looks into the family friendly policies in four developed countries–Australia, Ja-
pan, the United Kingdom and the United States– and finds that employers in
these four countries are more willing to provide part time working and flexitime
to their employees than other family friendly policies such as family leave bene-
fits. What is more, flexitime is one of the most welcomed and desired working
time arrangements among employees. Using data from Establishment Survey on
Working Time 2004 to 2005 (a survey which interviews the establishments about
their working time arrangements across 21 countries in the European Union),
Riedmann et al. (2006) report that the introduction or extension of flexitime
is on the top of employees’ “wish list” with regard to the future working time
policies. As reported by Riedmann et al. (2006), according to the survey con-
ducted by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions, as much as 26% of all employees representatives interviewed named
flexitime as the first priority or the most important measure that should be taken
in order to improve the balance between work and family responsibilities1 First
developed in Germany in the 1970s, the practice of flexitime now has spread
across many countries. Due to data limitations, cross country comparisons of the
popularity of flexitime practice are difficult2. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 display some
basic information on the incidence of flexitime from an international perspect-
ive. Table 1.1 reports the incidence of flexitime among employees across major
European countries over the period from 1995 to 1996 using data from OECD
(2001). According to table 1.1, the practice of flexitime is most popular in the
Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and less popular in
Luxembourg, Italy and Ireland. Although the incidence of flexitime varies across
countries, we can still see that a substantial proportion of employees work with
flexitime in those European countries. Even in countries with the lowest figures
such as Luxembourg, Italy and Portugal, around 18-19% of employees are working
with flexitime.
1Figure 27, page 50 of Riedmann et al. (2006) compares the desirability of flexitime with
several other flexible working arrangements. Flexitime (or working-time accounts) is the most
desired working time arrangement among employees, followed by general reduction in weekly
working hours, opportunities for phased retirement or early retirement, reduction of overtime,
opportunities of part time working, change from unusual working hours to normal working
hours, and long term leave options.
2To be more accurate, it is difficult to compare the flexitime incidence across different groups
of workers in different countries. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 only provide information on the incidence
of flexitime among all employees (or firms) in different countries.
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Table 1.1: The Incidence of Employees Working with Flexitime (Cross Country
Comparison), 1995-1996
















Source: the data listed in this table are taken form table 4.8, OECD (2001).
The figures displayed in table 1.1 may include certain proportion of employees
who work with flexitime that is designed to suit the employers’ needs. Un-
fortunately OECD (2001) does not have information on whether the reported
flexitime practice is beneficial to the employees.
Table 1.2 displays the percentage of firms that provide flexitime across major
European countries using data from the Establishment Survey on Working Time
and Work-Life Balance 2004 to 2005. From table 1.2 it can be seen that in 7
out of 15 major European countries, over half of the establishments interviewed
report that they provide flexitime to their employees. In Finland and Sweden,
more than 60% of firms offer flexitime opportunities. Even in Greece, where the
figure is the lowest, 29% of firms allow their employees to work flexitime.
In summary, both tables 1.1 and 1.2 show that flexitime is a popular practice
among many European countries. The United Kingdom ranks among the most
“flexible” countries in Europe. In 1995, around 32% of employees in the United
Kingdom were working with flexitime. In 2004, around 56% of establishments in
the United Kingdom reported that their employees can have access to flexitime.
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Table 1.2: Percentage of Firms that Provide Flexitime (Cross Country Compar-
ison), 2004-2005















United Kingdom 56 1507
Source: Establishment Survey on Working Time and Work-Life Balance, years 2004-
2005.
Figures in the second column are in terms of percentages.
1.2 Flexitime in the United Kingdom
The best way to provide workers with a more flexible working environment is a
problem which has also attracted much attention from the British Government.
Since 2003, the British government has put forward a legislation that helps work-
ers obtain flexible working arrangements. The Employment Act 2002 specified
that, starting from April 2003, all workers with children under 6 years old, and
parents who have disabled children under the age of 18 can request flexible work-
ing from their employers. Later on, the right to request flexitime was extended
to employees with children under 17 or those who need to care for other family
members. In 2010, the new government promised that they would endeavour to
find measures to help all employees work flexibly. This legislation encourages
more workers to ask for flexible working arrangements from their employers, and
flexitime is one of the most frequently demanded working time patterns. Holt
and Grainger (2005) report that 2 years after the 2003 flexible working legis-
lation, flexitime became the second most frequently requested flexible working
4
pattern3, with 28% of male employees and 19% of female employees requesting it
from their employers. This section displays some descriptive statistics on the in-
cidence of flexitime working using three British data sets: the British Household
Panel Survey, the Workplace Employee Relations Survey and the Labour Force
Survey.
1.2.1 Flexitime Incidence: Evidence From the British House-
hold Panel Survey
Figures 1.1 to 1.4 give some descriptive statistics on the incidence of flexitime us-
ing data from the British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007. These figures
give the incidence of flexitime among different groups of employees. Figure 1.1
displays the proportion of employees working with flexitime by gender. According
to figure 1.1, throughout all seven years, female workers are more likely to work
with flexitime than male workers. One possible reason for this gender difference
could be that female workers take the main responsibility for home production,
and they are more likely to choose jobs that provide flexitime practices.
Figure 1.2 compares the proportion of workers working with flexitime by
gender and parental status types in different years. According to figure 1.24,
working mothers are more likely to work with flexitime than childless female
workers. The difference in chance of working with flexitime among working fath-
ers and childless male workers is very small. This might suggest that only working
mothers use flexitime to help them with child care responsibilities. It is possible
that working fathers work with flexitime for reasons other than child care.
Both figures 1.1 and 1.2 reveal the gender differences in the usage of flexitime.
Specifically, flexitime seems to be more popular among female workers than male
workers. In addition, children seem to play an important role in female workers’
choice of flexitime. In other words, child care responsibility is a crucial element in
understanding how flexitime may have different effects on male and female work-
ers. The BHPS asks couples with children under 12 years old the question “who
is mainly responsible for child care?” There are four possible answers; mainly the
respondent, mainly partner, joint with partner, someone else. Figure 1.3 sum-
marizes the answer distribution of female workers and male workers respectively.
From figure 1.3, it can be seen that the majority of female workers answer that
3Part time work is the most frequently requested flexible working pattern, with 30% female
workers requesting it.
4In figure 1.2, “parents” means workers with children under 16, and “childless” refers to
workers without children under 16.
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Figure 1.1: Flexitime Status by Gender
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
Figure 1.2: Flexitime Status by Parental Status and Gender
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
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they take the main responsibility for taking care of the children. On the other
hand, few male workers take care of children alone. Even including the male
workers who report that they are jointly responsible for child care with partners
still accounts for less than half of the whole male sample with children. Given
the evidence showed by figure 1.3, it is reasonable to expect that female workers
may particularly need the help of flexitime since in most households, they take
the main responsibility for child care. Consequently, it is not surprising that we
observe that flexitime is more popular among female workers in figures 1.1 and
1.2.
Figure 1.3: Child Care Responsibilities
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
Figure 1.4 displays the proportion of workers with flexitime by their education
levels. It reveals a positive relationship between flexitime and education. We ob-
serve that highly educated workers work with flexitime more often than workers
with low education. This is one of the main features that distinguishes flexitime
from other flexible working schedules such as part time work. Manning and Pet-
rongolo (2005) find that most part time jobs are located in low human capital
occupations such as catering and hospitality. Considering that educational at-
7
Figure 1.4: Flexitime Status by Education Levels
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
“higher degrees” include postgraduate degrees, “college degrees” include first degree, hnd, hnc
and teaching degrees. “Other qualifications” include Cse qualifications, no academic qualifica-
tion at all.
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tainment can be regarded as a proxy for workers’ human capital or ability levels,
this positive relationship could be because high ability workers tend to have high
bargaining power when negotiating contracts with their employers. Meanwhile,
firms may also be willing to provide high ability workers with flexitime due to
their high productivity. High ability workers tend to do complex, multi-tasking
jobs involving high levels of human capital investments in job specific and com-
pany specific know-how and training. In order to protect sunk investments, firms
are more willing to accommodate high ability workers’ requests for flexitime and
help them with their family responsibilities.
In summary, the descriptive statistics of flexitime incidence among differ-
ent groups of workers suggests that flexitime is closely connected with workers’
demographic characteristics and their educational achievements. As a result,
those factors have to be taken into account when analysing the labour market
outcomes of flexitime.
1.2.2 Flexitime Incidence at Firm Level: Evidence from
Workplace Employee Relations Survey 2004
The above descriptive statistics are calculated using data from the British House-
hold Panel Survey, which is a national survey that interviews individual respond-
ents about their daily activities and labour market outcomes. However, workers’
flexitime status not only depends on their own decisions, but also firms’ choices.
Workers’ flexitime decisions are demand constrained. Currently in the United
Kingdom labour market, flexitime is still under-supplied (Golden and Altman,
2007b),meaning that there are many workers who would like to work with flexi-
time but do not have access to it. Firms may provide flexitime only to certain
types of workers, such as workers with high human capital, or workers with child
care responsibilities. The 2003 flexible working legislation also specifies that
firms can choose not to grant employees’ flexible working requirements for busi-
ness reasons. Unfortunately data on firms’ flexitime provision decisions are rare.
One exception might be the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 2004 (here-
after WERS 2004). It contains some information about firms’ characteristics
and whether firms offer flexitime opportunities to all their employees. Table 1.3
reports the proportion of firms that provide flexitime to their employees in the
United Kingdom.
According to table 1.3, among all the firms that have been interviewed, 43.05
% of them offer employees the flexitime opportunities. Big firms (firms with more
than 50 employees) are more likely to offer flexitime than small firms (firms with
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Table 1.3: Flexitime by Firm Characteristics
Firm type Percentage that
Provides Flexitime
No.of obs
All firms 43.05 2,295
Big firms (> 50 employees) 48.88 1,299
Small firms (≤ 50 employees) 35.44 996
Female-dominated firms (> 50%
employees are female)
44.56 1,205
Male-dominated firms (≤ 50%
employees are female)
41.14 1,038
Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, year 2004.
50 or fewer employees). One possible explanation for this might be that big firms
are more capable of absorbing the costs of providing flexitime than small firms.
For instance, additional employees may be needed to cover for the absence of
employees who enjoy the benefits of flexitime, or firms may need to adapt new
technology to accommodate the flexitime requirements. In addition, flexitime is
slightly more common among firms with many female workers. 44.56% of female-
dominated firms offer flexitime option, while the number for male-dominated
firms is 41.14%. This may be because female employees are self-selected into
firms that offer flexible working practices.
The Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (hereafter WERS 1998) also
contains information about the flexitime option in each establishment. However,
it only asks firms whether they provide flexitime to non-managerial employees,
and does not contain any information on the restrictions of flexitime options. I
have also looked at the incidence of flexitime option using WERS 1998. In 1998,
27.16% firms in the data set provide flexitime to their non-managerial employees.
Big firms (firms with more than 50 employees) are more likely to provide flexitime
than small firms (firms with 50 or fewer employees). 31.33% of big firms provide
their non-managerial employees with flexitime, while only 17.78% of small firms
have flexitime option. Firms with lots of female employees are more likely to
offer flexitime than firms with few female employees. The flexitime incidences
are 30.55% and 23.32% in female-dominated firms and male-dominated firms
respectively. In general, the qualitative relationship between flexitime and firms’
characteristics is quite similar to that of table 1.3.
It is worth noting that the descriptive statistics displayed in table 1.3 only tell
whether flexitime is available at firm levels. It does not mean that all employees in
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those firms which offer flexitime opportunities actually have access to flexitime.
In fact, in many firms, the flexitime option is restricted to only some of the
employees. The WERS 2004 asks firm managers whether the flexitime option is
only available to certain types of employees, and which groups of employees are
not allowed to work flexitime. The information is summarized in table 1.4.
Table 1.4: Flexitime Restrictions Within Firms
Whether flexitime option is restricted to some employees:
Answer Percentage No. of obs
All have the option 56.28 556
Restricted 43.32 428
Do not know 0.40 4
Total 100 988
Which employees are not allowed to work flexitime:
Employee types Percentage Frequency
Employees without young children 1.92 19
Employees without other caring opportunit-
ies
1.52 15
Part-time employees 3.24 32
Full-time employees 3.34 33
Managerial employees 10.12 100
Non-managerial employees 4.65 46
Employees with the establishment for short
period of time
3.54 35
Employees not on permanent contract 3.84 38
Any male employees 1.01 10
Other criteria 24.29 240
Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, year 2004.
The first panel of table 1.4 displays the proportion of firms that do not allow
all their employees to work flexitime. The total number of firms with flexitime
options is 988, and 43.32% of them only offer this practice to some of their
employees. The second panel of table 1.4 reports on groups of workers that
are not allowed to work flexitime. The first column displays employee types, the
second column reports the percentage of firms that do not allow the corresponding
type of employees to have flexitime, and the last column reports the frequency of
such firms. Apart from the criteria otherwise specified, employees that are most
likely to be excluded from the flexitime option are managerial employees. Around
10.12% of firms with flexitime options report that they do not allow managerial
employees to have flexitime. Possibly this is because in many firms managerial
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employees have multiple or complicated obligations, and it is difficult for firms
to offer flexitime to them. A further 4.65% firms with a flexitime option do not
allow non-managerial staff to work flexitime. Employees with short tenure and
those who do not have permanent contracts with the firms are also likely to be
denied the access to flexitime. The rationale behind this could be that firms
invest in employees with firm-specific training so that workers will accumulate
firm-specific human capital. In order to protect their sunk investment in workers,
firms are more likely to offer flexitime to workers with long tenure and permanent
contract. Therefore, those employees with short tenure and temporary contract
are less likely to have access to flexitime than their counterparts.
The above statistics are calculated using data from the managers’ survey of
WERS 2004. The second part of WERS 2004 asks each individual employee
whether flexitime is available to them. Therefore, it is also possible to look
into the relationship between the availability of flexitime at the work place and
employees’ characteristics. Figure 1.5 illustrates the percentage of employees that
can have access to flexitime by gender and parental status. Figure 1.5 shows that
female workers are more likely to have access to flexitime at the workplace than
male workers. In addition, for both genders, employees with children are more
likely to work in establishments that provide flexitime than employees without
children. This suggests that flexitime is closely related to workers’ child care
obligations.
Figure 1.6 displays the availability of flexitime by employees’ education levels.
It shows that the availability of flexitime at the workplace has a positive relation-
ship with workers’ education levels. Workers with higher academic qualifications
are more likely to have access to flexitime than workers with low academic qual-
ifications. Again, this pattern is similar to that of figure 1.4, which is calculated
using data from the British Household Panel Survey.
In summary, the descriptive statistics calculated by using data from the WERS
2004 show that many British Firms offer their employees flexible working oppor-
tunities. However, in many firms, the provision of flexitime is restricted to some
types of employees. This shows that workers’ flexitime options are demand con-
strained. It is not guaranteed that all workers can have access to flexitime working
when they want to. In addition, I find that the relationships between flexitime
and workers’ characteristics are similar to what have been found using data from
the British Household Panel Survey5.
5It is worth noting that the BHPS asks individuals whether they actually work with flexitime,
while the WERS asks whether individuals can work with flexitime at the workplace if they
want to. In other words, the WERS actually records whether employees can have the option
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Figure 1.5: Flexitime Availability At Workplace by Parental Status and Gender
Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, year 2004.
1.2.3 Flexitime Incidence: Evidence From the Labour Force
Survey
Another British data set that contains workers’ flexitime working information is
the Labour Force Survey. It is a national survey that interviews a sample of house-
holds living in the United Kingdom in each quarter. It contains comprehensive
information about workers’ labour market activities. Questions with regard to
workers’ flexitime status are asked in the Spring quarter (March to May) of the
survey. In the following, I show the flexitime incidence across different employee
groups using data from the Labour Force Survey. Since 2006, the Labour Force
Survey changed the survey time from seasonal year to calendar year. In order
to keep consistency, I choose years 2001 to 2005 so that the descriptives can be
compared to those of the BHPS.
Figure (1.7) shows the percentage of workers working with flexitime according
to their gender and parental status. Throughout all years from 2001 to 2005, flexi-
time is more popular among female workers than among male workers. Similar
to the findings of the other two data sets, working mothers (female workers with
of working with flexitime at the workplace. Therefore, the flexitime incidence differs between
these two data sets.
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Figure 1.6: Flexitime Availability At Workplace by Education Qualifications
Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, year 2004.
children) are more likely to work with flexitime than childless female workers. In
summary, the descriptive statistics in figure (1.7) suggests that flexitime is closely
related to workers’ child care responsibilities. It could be a helpful family friend
policy to female workers.
Figure 1.8 displays the incidence of flexitime within education groups. The
Labour Force Survey records the highest academic qualifications held by each
respondent. Though the survey divides workers’ education qualifications in a
slightly different way from the BHPS, the general pattern revealed by these two
data sets is the same. I find highly-educated workers are more frequently observed
to work with flexitime than workers with low-education. For one thing this might
be because that high human capital workers are more likely to choose to work with
flexitime than low human capital workers. For another this may also imply that
firms are more likely to provide flexitime for those high human capital workers
than for low human capital workers.
To conclude, combining the descriptive statistics from three different data sets,
I find flexitime is closely related to workers’ (especially female workers’) family
duties and their human capital levels (education levels). In addition, the provision
of flexitime is also demand-constrained. Many firms restrict the flexitime option
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Figure 1.7: Flexitime Incidence by Gender and Parental Status (LFS)
Source: Labour Force Survey Seasonal Datasets, years 2001-2005.
to only part of their employees for various reasons.
1.3 Overview of the Thesis
From the descriptive statistics presented in previous two sections we can see that
flexitime is an important working time arrangement for employees. It provides
workers with a family friendly working environment, reduces the costs of par-
ticipating in the labour market, and in turn may alter many other aspects of
workers’ labour market outcomes. So far studies on the effect of flexitime on
workers’ labour market outcomes are rare. The conventional approach in labour
economics focuses on the number of hours workers spend on market work and
home production when studying workers’ time allocation decisions. However,
most studies ignore the fact that workers not only care about how much time
they have left from market work to take care of family responsibilities, but they
also care when they are available to cater to family duties. Flexitime enables
workers to rearrange their time so that they may feel less conflict between work
and home responsibilities.
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by analysing a non-monetary
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Figure 1.8: Flexitime Incidence by Education Levels (LFS)
Source: Labour Force Survey Seasonal Datasets, years 2001-2005.
“other qualifications” include “other qualifications” and ”no qualification”.
job dimension–flexitime–to explain workers’ labour market outcomes using data
from a British survey. Flexitime provides workers with a new way to cater to
their domestic responsibilities and in turn may reduce the costs of participating
in the labour market. Therefore, flexitime is closely connected with workers’
compensation structure, human capital accumulation process, labour supply and
job mobility. The effects of flexitime on workers’ labour market outcomes are
analysed from three aspects: wage, labour supply, and job mobility.
Throughout all three chapters (chapter 2 to chapter 4), the data used are
from the British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007. The British House-
hold Panel Survey is a nationwide survey that follows the same individuals over
time. The data set contains comprehensive information about workers’ labour
market activities and their flexitime status. The survey was started in 1991,
and information about workers’ flexitime status has been included since 1999.
I choose to start in 2001 because in that year the survey extended its sample
size to include respondents from all over the United Kingdom, and a new cod-
ing system recording workers’ industry and occupation was also introduced. In
addition, the survey also started to separate workers’ labour income from their
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total income from year 2001. Therefore, waves (years) after 2001 provide more
accurate information on workers’ labour market outcomes.
The rest of the thesis is organized as the following. The second chapter is a
study of compensating wage differentials associated with flexitime. The objective
is to estimate the marginal willingness to pay for flexitime in the British labour
market. Estimation results using both cross sectional data and panel data are
presented. In the cross sectional dimension, when all workers are kept in the
sample, I find flexitime does not significantly decrease workers’ wages. However,
when I focus on high wage workers (top quartile) only, I find that flexitime is
associated with lower wages, as predicted by the compensating wage differentials
theory. A possible explanation for this is that assuming flexitime is a normal
good, then only workers with high incomes would like to sacrifice part of their
monetary pay-offs in exchange for it. Workers with relative low incomes may
be unable to “afford” to pay for flexitime even if they need the help of flexitime
for home production obligations. As a result, it may be that the compensating
wage differentials effect of flexitime is only present among high wage workers. In
the panel dimension, the workers’ wage equation is estimated by a fixed effect
model to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity. I also try to adopt an
instrumental variable approach to correct for the endogeneity of flexitime, since
workers’ wages and their flexitime status might be jointly determined. After con-
trolling for individual unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of flexitime,
I find working with flexitime is not correlated with any changes in workers’ wages.
However, the instruments chosen are only weakly correlated with the endogenous
variable so estimation results using the panel dimension data are only suggestive.
Several possible reasons from the demand side are proposed to explain the in-
significant relationship between wage and flexitime when all workers are kept in
the sample. Firms may be willing to provide flexitime to workers at a low price
if they can benefit from flexitime. For instance, flexitime may increase workers’
productivity, so the wage expressed by per efficiency unit of labour is lower, and
firms do not need to reduce the actual wage offer when providing flexitime. I also
test whether flexitime explains part of the gender wage gap. In most households,
female workers take the main responsibility of child care. They may need the
help of flexitime more than male workers. Consequently, they may be willing to
pay a higher price for flexitime than male workers. So the existing gender wage
gap may be narrowed if we take into account the fact that female workers may
sacrifice more wages in exchange for flexitime than male workers. However, the
estimation results suggest that it is not the case.
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In the third chapter, I investigate the effect of flexitime on workers’ labour
supply decisions. A simple model is developed and empirically tested to show
under what conditions flexitime will encourage workers’ labour supply decisions.
The static model has two predictions. Prediction 1 is that workers will only in-
crease their market hours if the benefit (increased child care production efficiency)
bought by flexitime is relatively large compared to the cost (wage reduction) of
working with flexitime. Prediction 2 is that the increased working hours under a
flexitime regime are more likely to be observed among high human capital work-
ers. The static model is also extended to two periods, where workers do not
have flexitime in the first period, but may have flexitime in the second period
if they are in the flexible world. I find that because of the human capital accu-
mulation process, flexitime may increase the marginal utility of working in the
first period if workers can derive high benefits (increased child care production
efficiency) from flexitime relative to the wage reduction associated with flexitime.
This suggests that flexitime may induce workers to increase their working hours
in both periods. Intuitively, anticipating that flexitime will induce some to supply
more time to the labour market, workers’ incentive to work in the first period
becomes stronger because current working experience will be translated into in-
creased wages in the next period. For some parameter specifications (if the wage
reduction cost of flexitime is high compared to the benefit brought by flexitime),
flexitime may decrease the marginal utility of working in the first period, which
suggests that workers who work with flexitime will supply fewer market hours
than those without flexitime. However, this is less likely to be the case for high
human capital workers than for low human capital workers. The two predictions
of the static model are also tested empirically. When testing prediction 1, I spe-
cify working mothers as the group of workers who can derive high benefits from
flexitime relative to the cost. In my second chapter I do not find any evidence
showing that flexitime decreases working mothers’ wages, which could suggest
that they do not sacrifice part of their wages in exchange for flexitime. In addi-
tion, they also benefit from working with flexitime because they usually take the
main responsibility for child care. Estimation results show that flexitime is pos-
itively associated with working mothers’ labour market hours. This result is also
robust to several econometric specifications. This confirms the model prediction
1. In order to test prediction 2, I include an interaction term of flexitime and
high human capital into workers’ labour supply equation. However, I do not find
strong empirical evidence suggesting that flexitime causes high human capital
workers to increase their working hours more than low human capital workers.
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Also, the empirical results need to be interpreted with caution for the correla-
tion between flexitime and workers’ working hours may be because firms set long
contract hours for workers as a form of compensation for flexitime. This may be
particularly true among workers whose flexitime requests have been agreed, such
as workers with high human capital levels.
The fourth chapter explores the effect of flexitime on workers’ job satisfaction
and job mobility decisions. Ordered probit analysis shows that flexitime increases
workers’ job satisfaction levels for both genders. Moreover, working with flexitime
also decreases female workers’ probability of quitting their job if they have chil-
dren at home. For male workers, though flexitime increases their job satisfaction
levels, it has little effect on their job mobility decisions. The gender differences
in their responses to flexitime may suggest that only working mothers treat flexi-
time as a family friendly practice that helps them with child care responsibilities.
Unlike female workers, male workers’ responses to flexitime seem to have little to
do with child care responsibilities. They appear to work with flexitime because
they are senior employees who can bargain themselves for generous compensa-
tion packages. Descriptive statistics on the allocation of child care responsibilities
and the occupation distribution of workers with flexitime confirms the idea that
flexitime means different things to male and female workers.
To conclude, this thesis provide some evidence showing that flexitime is closely
related to workers’ labour market outcomes. Flexitime may effectively increase
working mothers’ labour supply. In addition, among female workers, flexitime
also decreases the probability of quitting for those who have children to take care
of. The fifth chapter gives the conclusion and implications of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Flexitime: Do Workers Pay for It?
A Study of Compensating Wage Differentials for Flexitime
Abstract
In this chapter, I estimate workers’ marginal willingness to pay for
flexitime using data from the British Household Panel Survey. Estimation
results using both cross sectional and panel data are presented. In the
cross sectional dimension, I find a negative relationship between workers’
wages and flexitime when focusing on high wage workers. However, there
is not sufficient evidence suggesting the negative compensating wage differ-
entials for flexitime when all workers are kept in the sample. In the panel
dimension, workers’ wage equation is estimated by a fixed effects model
to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity. Meanwhile, I also try
to use an instrumental variable approach to correct for the endogeneity of
flexitime. The results in panel dimension suggest that working with flexi-
time is not significantly correlated with workers’ wages. Due to the quality
of instruments, the results are only suggestive. I also test whether flexitime
explains part of the gender wage gap and I find this is not the case.
Key words: High wage workers, flexible working arrangements, in-
strumental variables, gender wage gap
2.1 Introduction
The theory of compensating wage differentials suggests that jobs are not necessar-
ily ranked by their monetary payoffs. Non-pecuniary job dimensions also affect
workers’ labour market decisions. This chapter studies the relationship between
workers’ wages and flexible working arrangements (from here on “flexible working
arrangement” will be referred as “flexitime”). The first objective (objective 1)
of this chapter is to study whether workers receive lower wages when they are
working with flexitime. The second objective (objective 2) is to test whether
flexitime explains part of the gender wage gap, since male workers and female
workers may want to pay different prices to work with flexitime.
Initiated in Germany about half a century ago, flexitime is now the second
most popular flexible working arrangements in the United Kingdom, whereas
part time is the most popular. In this chapter, I will only focus on “flexitime”.
It is a practice which gives employees the freedom to decide when to start and
end their working time. The usual practice is that employers choose a certain
period of the day as “core hours”, during which workers have to stay at work.
For the rest of the time, it is up to the workers to decide when to work. Flexitime
plays an important role in balancing workers’ work and family responsibilities.
So far, little attention has been paid to the study of flexitime in economics. The
first objective (objective 1) of this chapter is to study workers’ willingness to pay
for flexitime using the British Household Panel Survey (hereafter BHPS), which
is a national-wide survey containing information about workers’ labour market
characteristics and their flexible working arrangements.
The theory of compensating wage differentials predicts that workers receive a
wage premium, or penalty, for various job characteristics. However, economists
often fail to find convincing evidence to prove the existence of wage premiums for
most job characteristics, except for the risk of death (Quintana-Domeque, 2011).
Borjas (2010) documents that tests for the compensating wage differentials theory
for almost all job characteristics get mixed results.
This chapter contributes to the literature in the following respects. First,
it is one of the few papers that investigates the relationship between wages and
workers’ flexible working arrangements. Second, I propose an estimation strategy
showing that the compensating wage differentials effect of flexitime is only present
among certain types of workers. Previous empirical studies on the relationship
between flexitime and wages find that flexitime is either positively or insignific-
antly correlated with workers wages when all workers are kept in the data set
(Gariety and Shaffer, 2001; Bell and Hart, 2003). Instead of pooling all workers
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together, I focus on the heterogeneity across groups with different income levels.
If we think flexitime is a normal good, then only workers with relatively high in-
comes would like to pay for it, or in other words, can afford to do so. For workers
with low incomes, even if flexitime is a helpful option, they may not want to for-
feit part of their wages in order to get it. Therefore, the expected compensating
wage differentials for flexitime may be present only among high wage workers. In
this chapter, I divide workers into four groups according to their income levels,
and estimate the top quartile workers’ wage equation. Results using cross sec-
tional data do in fact show that the main compensating wage differential effect of
flexitime is present among those high wage workers. When all workers are kept
in the sample, I find that the relationship between flexitime and wages are mixed
and inconclusive.
I have also tried to estimate the compensating wage differentials for flexitime
using panel techniques so that I can control for individual unobserved heterogen-
eity. A fixed effect model is applied to control for all time invariant factors that
may affect workers’ wages. The estimation results show that in this case flexitime
does not lead to significant changes in workers’ wages. Even among high wage
workers, flexitime has little effect on workers’ wages when individual fixed effects
have been controlled for. This makes the results reported in the cross sectional
section less convincing. I attempt the instrumental variable approach to correct
for the endogeneity of flexitime. However, it is difficult to find proper instruments
for flexitime. The instruments chosen to correct for the endogeneity of flexitime
are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variable flexitime, so the results
are only suggestive. Despite the weaknesses of the instruments, I conduct this
analysis to see whether taking into account the endogeneity issue can help obtain
a more accurate estimation of the compensating wage differentials associated with
flexitime.
Several possible reasons are proposed to explain the insignificant relationship
between wage and flexitime. Though flexitime is costly to provide, firms may have
incentives to provide flexitime free of charge if the benefits brought by flexitime
exceed the costs. For instance, flexitime may increase workers’ productivity, so the
wage expressed by per efficiency unit of labour is lower under flexitime. Firms do
not need to reduce the actual wages. In addition, flexitime could increase workers’
net working hours, and in turn increase the returns to firms’ specific human capital
investment. Further more, by providing flexitime at low prices, firms may achieve
lower turnover rates, so that they can protect their human capital investments
in workers. Given the potential benefits associated with flexitime, it is possible
22
that firms are willing to allow workers to work flexitime without experiencing any
wage reductions.
Objective 2 of this chapter is to test whether flexitime helps to explain part
of the gender wage gap. Flexitime gives workers the freedom to rearrange their
working time so that they can take care of their family responsibilities in a more
efficient way. Therefore, there might be gender differences in their willingness to
pay for flexitime given that female workers generally take the main responsibilities
for home production. I include the interaction term of gender and flexitime into
the wage equation to see whether or not this is the case. Unfortunately, the
results are mixed and inconclusive. However, according to estimation results for
high wage workers, it seems that they are the only group that would like to pay
for flexitime. Given that most high wage workers are male, it is suggestive that
taking into account flexitime will not narrow the current observed gender wage
gap.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I review the
related literature. Section 2.3 gives the empirical framework. In section 2.4, I
describe the data set and the definitions of variables used. Section 2.5 discusses
the empirical results. In section 2.6, I conclude.
2.2 Review of Literature
2.2.1 Literature on Compensating Wage Differentials
The idea of compensating wage differentials can be traced back to Adam Smith,
who suggested that all aspects of a job plays a role in the wage determination
(Duncan and Holmlund, 1983). Rosen (1986) then formalizes this idea and the
theory of compensating wage differentials was established. In the compensating
wage differentials theory, under perfect competition and full information, work-
ers receive wage premiums for various job characteristics. In equilibrium, workers
are sorted to jobs with different wage-(dis)amenities combinations according to
their preferences. The debate around this theory centers primarily on ways to
empirically test it: to use cross sectional or panel data, to use information at the
individual or industry level, whether or not to control for unobserved heterogen-
eity, and whether or not to control for the endogeneity of job attributes.
The first method for testing the compensating wage differentials theory is
to estimate a hedonic wage equation. The hedonic wage equation expresses the
workers’ wage as a function of various job amenities and the workers’ personal
characteristics. One class of studies focuses on the calculation of “Value of life”,
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which refers to the wage premium workers receive when working in an environ-
ment with fatal risks. Most studies in this area find convincing evidence of the
trade-off between wage and risk, though the quantitative implications vary across
different data sets and specifications1. Viscusi (1993) gives a comprehensive re-
view of the literature in this area.
Though the hedonic wage equation is a straightforward way to estimate the
relationship between wage and non-wage job attributes, there are many things
that need to be taken into account in order to obtain the accurate coefficient
estimates.
First, the estimation results highly depend on the data sets and specification
used. Due to restricted data availability, researchers often have to use industry
level data, assuming workers in the same industry have the same preferences. It is
also a common practice for researchers to calculate industry/occupation average
job attributes and match that to individuals (Hersch, 1998; Hamermesh, 1999).
This approach might be problematic because it does not take into account that
even within industries (or occupations), workers’ job attributes may be different.
Second, different measurements of the variable of interest are also a source
of the inconclusive results. In the “value of life” case, Hersch (1998) uses the
Current Population Survey data to calculate the gender-specific incidence rates.
He successfully demonstrates that female workers working in the dangerous en-
vironment receive wage premiums. He also shows that using different ways to
measure the “risk” variable does make a difference in the final estimation results.
In the case of flexitime, Lazear (2007) discusses flexitime in terms of percentage
of working time that is at workers’ disposal. However, the data on the exact
levels of flexibility workers have are generally unavailable. To my knowledge, all
empirical studies on flexitime treat it as a discrete choice.
Third, failing to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity (such workers’
innate ability, motivation, and productivity) also generates potential problems for
the estimation. Brown (1980) and Duncan and Holmlund (1983) have tried to
control for those unobserved factors by using fixed effects models. They were
able to find significant compensating wage differentials for some of the job amen-
ities (working conditions), though the results are still mixed and inconclusive.
Quintana-Domeque (2011) also focuses on the problem of unobserved individual
preferences and explains that mismatch of workers’ preferences and jobs will lead
to low productivity (low ability/productivity workers are also more likely to be
1Studies on the compensating wage differentials for on the job risk find conclusive evid-
ence that workers receive wage premiums for working under risky environment. For other job
attributes, the findings are mixed and inconclusive (Borjas, 2010; Quintana-Domeque, 2011).
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mismatched too), which spares little profit room for the compensating wage dif-
ferentials.
Another approach to test the compensating wage differentials theory takes the
dynamics of the labour market into consideration. Hwang et al. (1998) demon-
strate that the hedonic wage equation estimates may lead to a downward bias
even if individual heterogeneity has been included into the regression. He argues
that the hedonic wage equation approach assumes a static process of workers’ la-
bour supply decision, and ignores the fact that workers can adjust job attributes
to their preferences by moving between jobs. Gronberg and Reed (1994) incor-
porate an underlying job search model to estimate workers’ marginal willingness
to pay (MWP) for certain job attributes. Gronberg and Reed (1994) estimate
those parameters in a hazard function that expresses workers’ willingness to stay
at one job in terms of various job attributes (including wage) and personal char-
acteristics. They express workers’ MWP as “the ratio of the marginal utility of
one job attribute over the marginal utility of the wage”. The idea is that due to
firms’ cost heterogeneity, some firms are able to offer both favorable working con-
ditions and high wages, which will result in a longer stay of workers within those
firms. They construct a hazard function where workers’ length of stay in the firm
is represented by wage-attributes combinations and personal characteristics, and
find significant compensating differentials associated with many undesirable job
amenities. This starts a new generation of estimating compensating wage differ-
entials. Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) summarize that estimation results using
this approach suggest larger compensating wage differential effects than hedonic
wage equation estimates.
So far, it is still not agreed what should be the most appropriate method for
estimating the compensating wage differentials. Simply estimating a cross sec-
tional hedonic wage equation fails to incorporate the labour market dynamics and
individual heterogeneity. Models using fixed effects take into account individual
unobserved heterogeneity, but ignore the wage differentials across individuals.
The approach proposed by Hwang et al. (1998) assume preference homogeneity,
which is a strong assumption too.
2.2.2 Literature on Flexitime and Other Flexible Working
Schedules.
There are few studies in economics that investigate the effect of flexible working
schedules on workers’ wages. Golden and Altman (2007a) develop a theoretical
model to analyze the persisting excess demand of flexitime at work places. He
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argues that the technology constraint is the primary reason that leads to the
under-supply of flexitime. Gariety and Shaffer (2001) use cross sectional data
from the Current Population Survey to estimate the compensating differentials
for flexitime. They find that flexitime is associated with higher wages, which is
contradictory to the compensating wage differentials theory. They attribute such
a positive relationship to the high productivity associated with workers that have
flexitime. Glass (2004) finds that family friendly policies may have negative ef-
fects on female workers’ wage growth. However, she does not control for workers’
educational information. This may lead to inaccurate estimation results since
workers’ chances of working with family friendly policies are closely related to
their education levels. Bell and Hart (2003) study the relationship between an-
nualized hours and workers’ labour market outcomes using data from the Labour
Force Survey. They find that after excluding managers and professional workers,
workers on annualized hours contracts earn higher wages than workers who do
not work with annualized hours contracts. They also include workers’ flexitime
status as a control variable in workers’ wage equation, and find insignificant (or
positive) relationship between flexitime and workers’ wages.
There are also some studies on the effect of flexible working arrangements
on other aspects of workers’ behaviours in other disciplines such as sociology
and management (Hicks and Klimoski, 1981; Kostiuk, 1990; Dalton and Mesch,
1990; Golden, 2001; McCrate, 2005). Table A.1 in the appendix A.1 gives a brief
summary of such literature on flexitime.
Apart from flexitime, part time jobs are also popular flexible working sched-
ules. They can also be regarded as a type of flexible working arrangement. Man-
ning and Petrongolo (2005) investigate wage differentials between part time work-
ers and full time workers. They find that unconditionally, part time workers earn
lower wages than full time workers. However, most of these wage differentials
are driven by the occupation differences between full time and part time workers,
since part time jobs tend to concentrate in unskilled occupations.
2.3 Empirical Framework
The marginal willingness to pay for flexitime is obtained by estimating a hedonic
wage equation. The model can be written as:






δnPin + εi (2.1)
26
where ln(wage)i is the natural logarithm of employee i ’s wage, α is the constant,
Flexitimei is the respondent’s flexitime status. It takes a value of one if the
respondent works with flexitime and zero otherwise. Xim is the vector of indi-
vidual employee’s personal characteristics,m is the personal characteristics index,
denoting the mth personal characteristic controlled, Pin is the vector that denotes
workers’ job characteristics, and n is the job characteristics index, denoting the
nth job characteristic controlled. εi is the error term.
Most previous studies on compensating wage differentials estimate equation
(2.1) using cross sectional data. In this chapter, equation (2.1) is estimated using
each wave of BHPS data in turn. Several interaction terms of workers’ type
and flexitime are also added into the regression in order to control for workers’
preference heterogeneity. In addition, I also estimate equation (2.1) for workers
with different income levels.
One of the main arguments against estimating wage equations using cross
sectional data is that it fails to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity.
Duncan and Holmlund (1983) argue that fixed effects models help correct coeffi-
cients to the “right” sign as they control for individual unobserved heterogeneity,
but this only works for a few job attributes. The advantage of the fixed effects
model is that it controls for individual unobserved heterogeneity, and produces
statistically consistent results.
In this chapter, the wage equation estimated using panel data can be written
as:






δnPint + ζit (2.2)
where t is the time index, c is the constant term, ai is individual unobserved
heterogeneity, and ζit is the error term. ln(wage)it is the natural logarithm of
workers’ wage at time t. Flexitimeit is respondent i’s flexitime status at time
t, Ximt is the vector that denotes individual workers’ personal characteristics at
time t, and Pint is the vector that denotes workers’ job characteristics at time t.
The endogeneity of flexitime is also considered in the panel dimension. High
human capital workers may have a lot of bargaining power when negotiating
contracts with employers, and they may enjoy both high wages and flexitime as
a result. Employers may also be willing to offer flexitime to high human capital
workers to induce them to stay with the firm. Workers’ wages and flexitime
status may be jointly determined. To this end, flexitime should be treated as
an endogenous variable in the wage equation. In this chapter, following Garen’s
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(1988) technique, flexitime is instrumented by number of children aged between
0-2, 3-4 and the workers’ non-labour income. The choice of those instruments
will be discussed later. Equation (2.2) is estimated by Two Stage Least Squares.
The reduced form of workers’ flexitime equation can be written as:







µnPint + ψit (2.3)
where b is the constant term, di is the individual unobserved heterogeneity, t is
the time index, Nonlaborit is workers’ non-labour income at time t, Child02it is
the number of children aged between 0-2 in the household at time t, Child34it is
the number of children in the household aged between 3-4 at time t, and ψit is
the error term.
In most households, wives take the main responsibility for looking after chil-
dren. Therefore, it is possible that flexitime is more helpful to female workers
than to male workers. If female workers are willing to pay a higher price for flexi-
time than male workers, then the gender wage gap might be narrowed if we take
into account flexitime. In order to test this hypothesis, I include the interaction
term of gender and flexitime to check whether there are any gender differences in
their willingness to pay for flexitime.
2.4 Data and Variable Definitions
2.4.1 Data
Data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), wave 11 to wave 17 (year
2001 to year 2007), are used in the analysis. BHPS is a British national-wide
survey containing comprehensive information about respondents’ demographic
characteristics and labour market activities. In each wave, there are more than
10,000 individuals interviewed, and each respondent is re-interviewed in the fol-
lowing successive years if possible. Since wave 11 (year 2001), samples from all
over the UK are included, and respondents’ labour market activities are recorded
using the same coding system. Waves before 2001 use an alternative method to
measure workers’ job characteristics, which makes it impossible to make cross-
wave comparisons. Since 2001, the BHPS also separates workers’ labour income
from their total income, which makes it more convenient to examine the effect of
flexitime on workers’ wages in the compensating wage differentials context.
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The BHPS asks questions about respondents’ flexitime status only to wage
earners. In this chapter, the sample is restricted to contain only employed people.
Both unemployed and self-employed respondents are excluded. In addition, I only
include people who completed the interview themselves rather than those who let
someone else to answer the questionnaires. This is because data about people
who do not answer questions themselves often contain excessive missing values
and inaccurate answers. Part time workers are also excluded from the sample.
The effect of flexitime on part time workers’ wages is unclear, since part time
jobs can be thought as a flexible working practice. After clearing all the invalid
observations, there are around 6000 observations left in each wave.
2.4.2 Variable Definitions
Flexitime
The variable Flexitime is measured by a dummy variable which takes a value of
one if the respondent reports that they work with flexitime, and zero otherwise.
Ln (wage)
The variable ln(wage) is defined as the natural logarithm of workers’ real hourly
wage. BHPS separates workers’ labour income from their total income. For each
respondent, I divide their monthly labour income by the total number of working
hours (including over time hours) in that month to get the hourly wage. Because
BHPS only records each respondent’s weekly total working hours, I scale it up to
get the monthly working hours. After calculating workers’ hourly wages, I adjust
them for inflation to get the real hourly wage.
The BHPS only records workers’ monthly labour income, which includes over-
time payments. Therefore, when constructing the hourly wage variables, I include
the workers’ overtime hours in their weekly working hours. This method may be
subject to the criticism that workers’ weekly working hours may vary due to the
fluctuations in workers’ overtime working. However, the BHPS does not contain
enough information on workers’ overtime premium2, which makes it difficult to
calculate the exact standard hourly wage rates.
I also construct the real hourly wage by dividing workers’ weekly income by
their normal weekly hours (excluding overtime). Using this alternative measure of
2In the BHPS, some workers report that they work paid overtime while some other workers
report they work unpaid overtime, but there is no information about how much workers are
paid for each overtime hour. This makes it even more complicated to work out the standard
hourly wage rates.
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real hourly wage in regressions does not qualitatively change the estimation results
. Tables A.5 and A.6 in Appendix A report the estimation results of workers’
wage equations (2.1) and (2.2) respectively using the alternative measure of real
hourly wage3. It can be seen that the estimation results are almost identical to
those reported in tables 2.3 and 2.9. In addition, when estimating workers’ wage
equations in the panel dimension, year dummies are included as regressors to take
into account of aggregate time shocks that may lead to fluctuations in workers’
overtime hours.
Personal and Job Characteristics
There are 6 demographic variables included in the wage equation: Male, Union,
Children, Married, Age, Age squared. Male is a dummy variable which takes a
value of 1 if the respondent is a male and 0 otherwise. Union is a dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 if the worker has union membership and 0 otherwise.
Children is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the worker has children
under 16 and 0 if the worker does not have children under 16. Married denotes
workers’ marital status. It takes a value of 1 if the worker is married and 0
otherwise. Age records workers’ age at the interview. Age squared is the square
of worker’s age.
Individual’s educational information is also included. Education information
is measured by the highest qualification obtained by the respondent. BHPS
divides workers’ educational degrees into 7 levels; higher degree (postgraduate
degrees), first degree, hnd, hnc, teaching degree, A level qualification, O level
qualification, Cse qualification, and No qualification. Industries and occupations
are controlled at one digit levels.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Sample Statistics
Table 2.1 gives the sample statistics of the key control variables in workers’ wage
equations. For each variable, both the mean and the standard deviation (in
parentheses) are reported. For dummy variables, the mean of each variable can
be interpreted as the proportion of respondents which belong to the category
that is coded 1. According to table 2.1, the percentage of workers with flexitime
3It is derived by diving workers’ weekly labour income by their weekly working hours ex-
cluding overtime.
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Table 2.1: Sample Statistics of Variables in Workers’ Wage Equation.
Year 2001 Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007
Flexitime .22 .15 .18 .15 .16 .16 .17
(.42) (.35) (.37) (.36) (.36) (.36) (.36)
Male .57 .57 .57 .57 .57 .57 .56
(.49) (.49) (.49) (.49) (.49) (.49) (.49)
Wage 10.82 11.39 11.50 11.89 12.00 12.33 12.45
(5.85) (6.66) (6.41) (9.34) (6.62) (7.01) (7.28)
Married .54 .54 .54 .54 .53 .54 .54
(.49) (.49) (.49) (.49) (.50) (.50) (.50)
Children .34 .34 .33 .33 .33 .33 .33
(.47) (.47) (.47) (.47) (.47) (.47) (.47)
Union .34 .34 .34 .34 .33 .33 .33
(.47) (.47) (.47 (.47) (.47) (.47) (.47)
Age 37.63 37.93 38.30 38.58 38.58 39.00 39.14
(11.48) (11.59) (11.63) (11.78) (11.82) (11.83) (11.91)
No. of obs 6839 6095 5921 5716 5685 5406 5286
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
For each variable, both mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) are reported.
fluctuated slightly across all the seven years. In 2003, the British government
put forward legislation specifying that workers with children under 6 years old
can request flexible working schedules from their employers. This legislation was
first put in the Employment Act 2002, and became formal legislation in April,
2003. Manning and Petrongolo (2005) report, however, that the proportion of
people that have flexible working arrangements did not rise significantly after
the legislation. According to BHPS data, it seems that the legislation in 2003
had little effect on flexitime specifically. In 2003, a slightly higher percentage of
people had flexitime, but the percentages fell back to the pre-2003/2002 level in
2004. Figures 1.1 to 1.4 also suggest that the 2003 legislation did not change the
distribution of flexitime across different gender, fertility and education groups.
Other demographic information, such as the proportion of people that are
married, have children under 16, or have union membership stays relatively stable.
The mean and standard deviation of those variables almost do not change over 7
years. Average real hourly wage is increasing over the years, which is reasonable
because the survey follows the same individual.
In chapter 1, I have presented graphs that describe the incidence of flexitime
by different workers’ characteristics (figures 1.1 to 1.4). These graphs show that
workers’ flexitime status is closely connected to their gender (female workers are
more likely to have flexitime than male workers), parental status (working parents
are more likely to work with flexitime than childless workers), and educational
qualifications (there is a positive relationship between flexitime and academic
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qualifications). The popularity of flexitime among female workers and working
mothers could imply that flexitime is a useful family friendly policy which helps
employees with their child care responsibilities. The positive relationship between
flexitime and workers’ academic qualifications may suggest that high human cap-
ital workers are more likely to work with flexitime than low human capital work-
ers. This might be because well educated workers earn high wages, and they
are more likely to “purchase” favourable working conditions than low educated
workers due to the income effects (Garen, 1988 and Viscusi, 1993). What is
more, firms are also willing to grant flexitime requests from workers with high
human capital levels in order to protect their sunk firm-specific human capital
investment.
Other factors that may have an effect on workers’ flexitime status are their
occupations and the industries of their employers. Across all seven years, “admin-
istrative and secretarial occupations” are the most “flexible” jobs. What is more,
the distribution of flexitime over occupations also suggests a positive relationship
between wages and flexitime. Workers in high wage jobs, such as managerial
occupations and professional occupations, are more likely to have flexitime than
workers in low-wage jobs, such as elementary occupations and machine operat-
ives. Workers in different industries also have different probabilities of working
with flexitime. Among all the industries, people that work in public administra-
tion and defence are most likely to have flexitime, followed by people working in
financial intermediation industries.
In summary, the descriptive statistics suggest that both workers’ demographic
information and their job characteristics are related to their access to flexitime.
These factors are also widely acknowledged to have significant effects on workers’
wages. Therefore, they should be included into workers’ wage equations when
estimating the compensating wage differentials associated with flexitime.
2.5.2 Empirical Results
Cross Sectional Evidence
First, the relationship between flexitime and workers’ wages is examined using
cross sectional data. An important assumption here is that the flexitime is exo-
genous and uncorrelated with the error term. Admittedly, this is a very strong
assumption, and there are a few reasons why this assumption might not be true.
I will also discuss how the results may change after relaxing this assumption
later. If flexitime is in fact exogenous, the OLS estimator will be unbiased and
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consistent.
Table 2.2 displays the regression results using BHPS wave 15 (year 2005) data
only. This year is chosen randomly out of all 7 years. The objective is to show
how the flexitime coefficient evolves in the workers’ wage equation when I increase
regression controls.
Table 2.2: Estimation Results of Workers’ Wage Equation (2.1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Flexitime .09*** .07*** .01 -.02*
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Male .15*** .15*** .11***
(.01) (.009) (.01)
Children .008 .03** .03**
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Married .05*** .05*** .03***
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Union .16*** .11*** .12***
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Age .07*** .05*** .04***
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Age squared -.0008*** -.0006*** -.0004***
(.00004) (.00004) (.00004)
Education dummies yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes
Constant 2.35*** .74*** 1.34*** 1.33***
(.006) (.05) (.06) (.11)
R squared 0.0054 0.19 0.36 0.48
No. of obs 5599 5599 5599 5599
Source: British Household Panel Survey, year 2005.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of workers’ hourly wage (ln(wage)). The
wage equation is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
Beginning with the most simple specification in column 2 of table 2.2, where
the only explanatory variable is the flexitime dummy itself, there is a positive
relationship between flexitime and wage. When more individual demographic and
labour market information is added into the regression, the positive relationship
still persists, though the flexitime coefficient becomes smaller. After controlling
for the educational information, as showed in column 4, the flexitime coefficient
drops sharply and is no longer significantly different than zero. This could imply
that within the same education group, having flexitime does not affect workers’
wages. In the final column, where I add industry and occupation information
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into the regression, the flexitime coefficient became negatively significant at the
10% level.
The regression results in table 2.2 show that when little information is con-
trolled for, the positive productivity effect of flexitime on workers’ wages dom-
inates. Workers with high human capital levels may have high productivity and
thus earn high wages. At the same time, they are also more likely to work with
flexitime than low productivity workers. Therefore, it would be observed that
workers who work with flexitime also earn high wages. When more information
on workers’ human capital levels is taken into account, this positive relationship
between flexitime status and wages disappears. Estimation results in the final
column of table 2.2 suggest that workers who work with flexitime earn lower
wages than those who do not have flexitime, controlling for personal and job
characteristics. Intuitively, based on this single year data, there is a negative
relationship between flexitime and workers’ wage. This confirms the predictions
of the compensating wage differentials theory.
The results showed in table 2.2 give some evidence for the compensating wage
differentials effect of flexitime. However, when I estimate the complete version of
the wage equation specification (the specification displayed in the final column
in table 2.2) using other six year’s data, the results are mixed and inconclusive.
The estimated flexitime coefficients in the wage equations vary across different
years. They are either negative or insignificant.
Table 2.3 displays the the estimation results of equation (2.1) using all seven
waves of the BHPS data (year 2001 to year 2007). Combining results from tables
2.2 and 2.3, the compensating wage differentials for flexitime are negative in
years 2001, 2005, 2006 and 2007. Across the other three years, there is little
evidence suggesting that workers receive negative compensating wage differentials
for working with flexitime. All the other coefficient estimates of the control
variables are in line with the previous literature. Male workers earn higher wages
than female workers. Married workers earn higher wages than single workers.
Workers with children under the age of 16 earn higher wages than workers without
children under the age of 16. Workers’ wages also increase with their ages.
Previous studies on the relationship between flexitime and wages report either
positive or insignificant coefficient estimates of flexitime in the workers’ wage
equation (Gariety and Shaffer, 2001)4. As indicated by tables 2.2 and 2.3, in-
4They use data from the Current Population Survey, which is an American data set. Here,
I investigate the same research question using data from a British national survey. This may
explain why there are small differences between their estimates and mine. For example, I do
not find any positive relationship between wages and flexitime when all workers are kept in the
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Table 2.3: Estimation Results of Workers’ Wage Equation (2.1)
Year 2001 Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007
Flexitime -.02* .01 -.009 .001 -.02* -.03** -.02*
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Male .14*** .14*** .15*** .12*** .11*** .12*** .12***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Children .03*** .05*** .03*** .02** .03** -.0005 .01
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Married .03*** .02** .03*** .03*** .03*** .06*** .05***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Union .10*** .09*** .09*** .08*** .12*** .08*** .09***
(.009) (.01) (.01) (.009) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age .04*** .04*** .05*** .04*** .04*** .04*** .04***
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.002)
Age squared -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0004***
(.0003) (.0004) (.0003) (.0003) (.00004) (.00003) (.00003)
Education dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.57*** 1.95 *** 1.50*** .97*** 1.33*** 1.29*** 1.15***
(.07) (.10) (.12) (.12) (.11) (.15) (.16)
R squared .49 .50 .48 .50 0.48 .53 .52
No. of obs 6839 6095 5921 5716 5599 5406 5286
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of workers’ hourly wage (ln(wage)). The wage equation is estimated by
Ordinary Least Squares.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote
significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
vestigating the compensating wage differentials for flexitime using cross sectional
data may lead to mixed results.
Estimation results in both tables 2.2 and 2.3 do not provide convincing evid-
ence for compensating wage differentials associated with flexitime. The coefficient
estimates of flexitime vary across years. In many years, flexitime does not have
a significant effect on workers’ wages. There are several possible reasons (from
both the demand side and the supply side) to explain why working with flexi-
time might not reduce workers’ wages, as predicted by the compensating wage
differentials theory.
First, firms might be willing to provide flexitime “free of charge” because flexi-
time may increase workers’ productivity and bring firms additional benefits. With
the help of flexitime, workers’ production efficiency may rise as they suffer fewer
conflicts between work and family responsibilities. For instance, flexitime can be
used as a means of offsetting boredom and fatigue so that workers can be more
devoted to their jobs (Golden and Altman, 2007b; Gariety and Shaffer, 2001).
Quintana-Domeque (2011) also argues that workers’ productivity is lower if they
are mismatched with jobs which do not have the amenities they desired. Under
sample, though in 3 out of 7 years, flexitime is insignificantly correlated with wages.
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the flexitime regime, for each unit of labour input devoted to the production pro-
cess, the output may thus have increased. To this end, firms do not necessarily
need to reduce actual wages in order to provide flexitime, for even if they keep
workers’ wages at the original level, the wages expressed by per efficiency unit
of labour could be lower than before. Firms can have a share of the additional
output produced by workers with the help of flexitime. Though flexitime is costly
to provide, the increased production efficiency associated with it may mitigate
or even overcome the costs so that some firms would like to provide flexitime to
workers without reducing the actual wages. As a result, we may observe that
wages are insignificantly associated with workers’ flexitime status.
Second, the provision of flexitime may induce longer net working hours (see
chapter 3).In my third chapter, I find that flexitime consistently increases work-
ing mothers’ weekly working hours. This could improve firms’ returns to specific
human capital investments. Firms invest in workers with training that helps
them accumulate specific human capital. When flexitime induces workers to
work longer hours, firms also benefit more from their human capital investments.
In this scenario, the wage reduction associated with flexitime is also unlikely to
happen, for firms are already “compensated” by workers’ long working hours.
Similarly, flexitime may help firms reduce the turnover rates, so that firms can
protect their sunk investment in workers’ specific human capital. If firms invest
heavily in workers, they will suffer substantial losses if those workers with high
firm-invested specific human capital quit their jobs for family reasons. The re-
placement costs of those workers might be very high to firms. In order to reduce
the quit threats, firms may be willing to provide flexitime at low prices, resulting
in a insignificant flexitime-wage relationship.
Another possible reason could be that these mixed results are driven by the
heterogeneity among different types of workers. It might be the case that some
types of workers do not value flexitime much and therefore they are not willing
to trade part of their monetary payoffs for flexitime. Meanwhile, other types of
workers may place a high value on flexitime. They are willing to pay a high price
for it and firms are willing to accommodate their requests for flexitime. In this
case, when all workers are pooled together, the compensating wage differential
effects associated with flexitime are mixed and inconclusive. This concern is also
closely related to the second objective of this chapter; to investigate whether male
and female workers’ different preferences towards flexitime could explain part of
the gender wage gap.
The first type of heterogeneity considered is the difference across income
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groups. Assuming that flexitime is a normal good, the willingness to consume
flexitime increases with income. Consider a worker who earns minimum wage
and can barely feed her family, it would be unlikely that she would sacrifice part
of her wages in exchange for flexitime, even though she may have young children
to care for. On the other hand, workers who have decent incomes may choose to
work more flexibly at the price of lower wages. Such an income effect is verified
by the descriptive statistics which show that the proportion of workers working
with flexitime is increasing in educational levels. In addition, most workers with
flexitime concentrate in well-paid occupations. Very few workers in the element-
ary occupations work with flexitime. For workers with relatively low incomes,
the marginal rate of substitution between wages and flexitime is very low. There-
fore, the compensating wage differentials for flexitime should be more prominent
among workers with high wages.
In order to control for income heterogeneity, I divide workers into several
groups and estimate their wage equations separately. For each year, I divide the
sample into four equal sized groups according to their wage levels, and I run a
regression for the highest-income group. This should be the group of workers
that are most likely to be able to afford flexitime.
Table 2.4 reports the regression results for the high wage workers. From table
2.4, it can be seen that in all years except 2002, flexitime is negatively correlated
with workers’ wages. This suggests that among high wage workers, those who
work with flexitime receive negative wage premiums. Wage equations for workers
with relatively lower wages (the lower 75 percentile) are also estimated. The
estimation results are reported in table A.2 in the appendix A.2. From table A.2,
it can be seen that flexitime is either positively or insignificantly associated with
workers’ wages among low wage workers, and no negative relationship is observed
across seven years.
Given the flexitime coefficients displayed in table 2.4, we can calculate the
exact percentage of wage loss that workers suffer when they work with flexitime.
Keeping other controls constant, the percentage change in workers’ real hourly
wages resulting from flexitime status change can be written as:
%∆( ˆwage) = 100[exp(β̂∆flexitime)− 1] (2.4)
Since ∆flexitime is 1, plugging flexitime coefficient estimates into expression
(2.4)shows that flexitime decreases workers’ wages by 3.1%-7.2%5 for the different
5For small β̂, the coefficient estimates of flexitime approximately reflect the percentage
changes in wages resulted from having flexitime.
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years. Suppose a worker’s hourly wage is 14 pounds (which is approximately the
lower bound wage among top quartile workers) without flexitime, she will earn
0.42-0.98 pounds less per hour if she works with flexitime. Assuming she works 40
hours a week and four weeks a month, the annual cost of working with flexitime
is approximately between 806.4 and 1881.6 pounds. We can expect more extreme
results given that these numbers only represent the lower bound of compensating
wage differentials associated with flexitime among high wage workers.
Results in table 2.4 may be subject to the criticism that the possible income
effect is only partially present under a somewhat ad hoc test, since the way
I divide workers into subgroups seems to be arbitrary. In fact,I find that the
estimation results do not depend heavily on the way in which sub-income groups
are defined. I also tried dividing workers into two groups and three groups, and
the general pattern remains the same. There is always a negative compensating
wage differential effect associated with flexitime among high wage workers. Tables
A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A report the estimation results using workers at or above
the 67th and 50th percentiles, respectively. These two tables also show a negative
relationship between flexitime and workers’ wages among high wage workers. To
some extent, they confirm the idea that the compensating wage differential effect
associated with flexitime is more likely to be observed among high wage workers.
The results reported in table 2.4 show a negative wage-flexitime relationship
among high wage workers. On worker’s side, those with high labour incomes
behave differently than workers with low labour incomes. The marginal rate of
substitution between wages and flexitime are different between high income and
low income groups. If all workers are pooled together, the negative relationship
between wages and flexitime found among high wage workers might be mitig-
ated by the insignificant/positive relationship between wages and flexitime found
among low wage workers. Among low wage and mid-wage workers, flexitime
is often associated with good jobs. As a result, the overall effect of flexitime
on workers’ wages is mixed and inconclusive when all workers are kept in the
sample.In addition, on the demand side, firms are more willing to offer high wage
workers the opportunity to work with flexitime. High wage earners generally are
involved in jobs that require high levels of human capital investment in firm spe-
cific knowledge or skills. Firms invest heavily in those high-ability workers (who
are also high wage earners) to train them to do complex and multi-tasking jobs. If
those high-ability workers are denied access to flexitime, they are likely quit their
jobs, because they may have good outside opportunities. Consequently, firms
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Table 2.4: Estimation Results of High Wage (top quartile) Workers’ Wage Equa-
tion
Year 2001 Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6)
Flexitime -.03*** -.01 -.04*** -.034** -.07*** -.06** -.03*
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.018) (.01) (.01) (.02)
Male .05*** .06*** .04** .03* .02* .04** .05***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01)
Children .005 .03** .02 .05*** .02 .003 .01
(.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01)
Married .02* .002 .001 .01 .01 .02* -.005
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Union -.04*** -.02 -.04*** -.05*** -.04*** -.03** -.03**
(.01) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age .02** .02*** .03*** .02*** .02*** .02*** .03**
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.006)
Age squared -.0001* -.0002** -.0003*** -.0002*** -.0003*** -.0002*** -.0003***
(.00006) (.00007) (.00006) (.00007) (.00006) (.00007) (.0006)
Education dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 2.50*** 2.65*** 2.37*** 2.69*** 2.25*** 3.14*** 2.72***
(.13) (.21) (.18) (.13) (.15) (.38) (.21)
R squared .20 .18 .21 .18 .19 .21 .21
No. of obs 1713 1527 1510 1438 1409 1359 1335
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of workers’ hourly wage (ln(wage)). The wage equation is estimated by
Ordinary Least Squares.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote
significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
will suffer the loss of their specific human capital investment. In order to protect
the sunk investment and reduce quitting threats, firms are willing to accommod-
ate the requests for flexitime from high wage workers. As for those low-ability
workers (who probably are also low wage earners), they can be easily replaced
and firms do not invest heavily in them. They are less likely to be granted the
chance of working under flexitime compared with high wage earners. Table 1.4
shows that some firms do not allow workers who are on temporary contracts or
workers who are with the firms for short period of time to work with flexitime,
which suggests that firms restrict low human capital workers’ access to flexitime.
To this end, we observe that high wage earners are mo an capital, and high wage
earners are more likely to pay for flexitime because of income effects.
Apart from the income distribution, the other heterogeneity I examine is the
difference between employees with and without children at home. Since flexitime
helps workers rearrange their time so that they can cater to family responsibilities,
workers with children may be more willing to sacrifice their wages in exchange for
flexitime. In order to test this hypothesis, the interaction term of flexitime and
parental status, Flexitime ∗ Children, is included in the wage equation (2.1).
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Table 2.5: Estimation Results of Workers’ Wage Equation with Interaction Term
of Flexitime and Children.
Year 2001 Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Flexitime -.004 .003 .0003 -.006 -.01 -.02 -.004
(.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Male .14*** .14*** .15*** .12*** .11*** .12*** .12***
(.009) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Flexitime*Children -.03* -.06** -.003 -.01 -.03 a -.02 -.05**
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Children .04*** .05*** .03*** .02** .03*** .003 .02**
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Married .03*** .02** .03** .03*** .02*** .06*** .05***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Union .10*** .09*** .09*** .09*** .11*** .08*** .08***
(.009) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age .04*** .04*** .05*** .04*** .04*** .04*** .04***
(.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Age squared -.0004*** -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0004***
(.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003)
Education dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.57*** 1.94*** 1.50*** .97*** 1.33*** 1.29*** 1.15***
(.07) (.10) (.12) (.12) (.12) (.15) (.16)
R squared .48 .50 .50 .50 .50 .53 .52
No. of obs 6839 6095 5921 5716 5599 5406 5286
a In column 6, Flexitime ∗ Chilren and Flexitime are jointly significant at the 10% level.
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of workers’ hourly wage (ln(wage)). The wage equation is estimated by
Ordinary Least Squares.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote
significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
The coefficient of this interaction term tells whether workers with children under
16 would like to pay a higher price for flexitime than workers without children
under 16. The estimation results are reported in table 2.5.
The coefficient estimates of the interaction term Flexitime ∗ Children vary
across years. In some years they are negative, and in some years they are in-
significant. The results could imply that even among the group of workers with
children, the compensating wage differentials effect of flexitime is not very signi-
ficant. One may argue that female and male workers may behave differently when
having children at home. Fathers may be responsible for financially supporting
the family. Mothers may take the main responsibilities of child care. In order to
take this behavioral difference into account, I also estimate female and male work-
ers’ wage equations separately with the interaction term Flexitime ∗ Children
added, and the results are still mixed and inconclusive. For female workers, the
interaction term Flexitime ∗ Children is never significantly negative.
Why might it be the case that female workers with children still do not trade
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their wages for flexitime? First, as I have shown in table 2.4, the main compens-
ating wage differentials associated with flexitime is driven by workers with high
labour income. It could be the case that female workers who desire flexitime are
unable to purchase it because of their low comes. It might also be the case that
many female workers with children choose to stop participating in the labour
market or to shift to part time jobs. On average each year around 14% of the
women who have babies between 0 and 2 years of age shift from full time jobs to
part time jobs. These women are not included in my sample since I only focus on
the full time workers. Among working mothers, more than half of them (56%) are
part time workers and many decide to stay out of the labour market altogether.
Workers who have a strong preference towards flexible working schedules may
prefer part time jobs to flexitime jobs. Given that more than half of the female
workers with young children are part time workers, it would be reasonable to
assume that full time workers in the sample should be those have relatively less
child care responsibilities. Therefore, it may explain the fact that we do not ob-
serve a significant compensating wage differentials effect associated with flexitime
among full time working parents. What is more, flexitime reduces the conflicts
between family and work obligations. Once provided with flexitime, workers (es-
pecially working mothers) may feel less stressed and can be more devoted to their
work by working harder or working longer hours. In this case, flexitime increases
firms’ returns to human capital investments, and firms may be willing to provide
flexitime without reducing wages.
As mentioned above, workers’ flexitime status is demand constrained. Whether
they can work with flexitime also depends on firms’ characteristics. The costs of
providing flexitime may vary across firms due to the nature of their business. For
example, firms with continuous production (such as steel plants) may be unable to
provide flexitime for technical reasons. It is also difficult and expensive for firms
to provide flexitime to workers whose jobs involving many interactive or team-
based activities. Therefore, information about firms’ characteristics should also
be included in workers’ wage equations when estimating the compensating wage
differentials for flexitime. Unfortunately the BHPS is an individual household
panel survey which contains little information about the firm/job characterist-
ics. In the regressions discussed above, I used controls for one digit industrial
classifications and also occupations dummies. In order to check robustness, I
will include in the wage equations (2.1) and (2.2) a dummy variable big firm
which records the size of the firm that the respondent works with. It takes value
1 if the respondent works with a firm with over 50 employees, and 0 if the re-
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Table 2.6: Flexitime Coefficient Estimates in Workers’ Wage Equation (2.1) with
Firm Size
Year 2001 Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007
All Workers:
Flexitime -.02*** .004 -.004 -.002 -.03** -.03*** -.03**
(.009) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
R squared .50 .51 .50 .52 .51 .54 .53
No. of obs 6839 6095 5921 5716 5599 5406 5286
Top Quartile Workers:
Flexitime -.04*** -.02 -.04** -.04** -.07*** -.06*** -.033**
(.01) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.017)
R squared .21 .18 .21 .18 .20 .21 21
No. of obs 1713 1527 1510 1438 1409 1359 1335




No. of obs 38110




No. of obs 9605
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of workers’ hourly wage (ln(wage)). The wage equation is
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares. The last two panels display the panel dimension estimation results, and
the wage equation is estimated with a fixed effects model.
The other control variables include: big firm, male, children, married, union, age, age squared, education
dummies, occupation dummies, industry dummies, year dummies (in the panel dimension estimation only).
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in the parentheses. Asterisks
denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the
1% level.
spondent works with a firm that has 50 or fewer employees. Big firms are more
likely to provide flexitime than small firms (Golden, 2001). The objective is to
see whether the inclusion of firm size in workers’ wage equation may change the
flexitime coefficient estimates. Table 2.6 reports the flexitime coefficient estim-
ates when estimating workers’ wage equations including firm size as an additional
control variable. Table 2.6 suggests that the inclusion of firm size does not qual-
itatively change the estimation results of workers’ wage equation in either cross
sectional or panel dimension estimates.
Given the analysis above, what can we conclude about the role of flexitime in
explaining the existing gender wage gap? Admittedly, female workers on average
do enjoy more flexitime than male workers as shown in the descriptive statist-
ics. However, according to the estimation results in table 2.3, overall flexitime
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Table 2.7: Gender Distribution of Workers with Flexitime and High Wage Work-
ers.
Male workers Female workers










Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The first row reports the total number of observations in each gender. The second row
displays the proportion of workers working with flexitime in each gender respectively. The
third row reports the proportion of flexi-timers who earn wage higher than 14 pounds (top
quartile).
has little effect on workers’ wages. This could suggest that flexitime has little
explanatory power in the gender wage gap.
However, the results displayed in table 2.4 are telling a different story. Workers
with relatively high wages seem to be more likely to pay for flexitime than low
wage workers. By looking at the gender and flexitime distribution of the high
wage workers, we have a rough idea about whether female workers and male
workers would like to pay different prices to work with flexitime.
Table 2.7 reports the gender distribution of flexi-timers (workers who work
with flexitime) and high-wage flexi-timers (worker who earn high wages and work
with flexitime). There are more male workers than female workers in the sample.
Proportionally more female workers have flexitime than male workers, as shown
in the third row. However, we can see that the wage distributions of flexi-timers
are extraordinarily different between genders. As many as 41.4% of male flexi-
timers have hourly wages higher than 14 pounds (top quartile). Only 20.8% of
female flexi-timers earn high wages. If workers with relatively high wages are
willing to pay for flexitime, then it seems that male workers are more likely to
pay for flexitime than female workers.
Table 2.7 gives a basic description of how flexitime might affect the gender
43
Table 2.8: Estimation Results of Workers’ Wage Equation with Interaction Term
of Flexitime and Male.
Year 2001 Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Flexitime -.001 .02 .02 -.001 -.01 -.007 -.02
(.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.02)
Male .14*** .14*** .16*** .12*** .12*** .13*** .12***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Flexitime*Male -.02a -.01 -.05* .003 -.02 b -.04* -.003
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Children .03*** .04*** .03*** .03*** .03*** -.0006 .01
(.009) (.01) (.01) (.009) (.005) (.01) (.01)
Married .03** .02*** .03*** .03*** .03*** .06*** .05***
(.009) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Union .10*** .09*** .09*** .08*** .12*** .08*** .09***
(.009) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age .04*** .04*** .04*** .04*** .05*** .04*** .04***
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.002)
Age squared -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0004*** -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0004***
(.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.0003) (.0003) (.00003)
Education dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.57*** 1.94*** 1.49*** .97*** 1.33*** 1.28*** 1.15***
(.08) (.10) (.12) (.12) (.12) (.15) (.16)
R squared .49 .50 .50 .51 .51 .53 .53
No. of obs 6839 6095 5921 5716 5599 5406 5286
a In column 2, Flexitime ∗Male and Flexitime are jointly significant at the 10% level.
b In column 6, Flexitime ∗Male and Flexitime are jointly significant at the 10% level.
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of workers’ hourly wage (ln(wage)). The wage equation is estimated by
Ordinary Least Squares.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote
significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
wage gap. However, it is not clear if this difference is statistically significant.
A formal way to test the gender difference in their willingness to pay for flexi-
time may be to estimate the wage equation (2.1) with the gender and flexitime
interaction terms included. The coefficient associated with the interaction term
Flexitime∗Male tells whether male workers pay different prices for flexitime than
female workers. The estimation results with the gender and flexitime interaction
terms are reported in table 2.8.
According to table 2.8, it seems that male workers are more willing to sacrifice
part of their wages in exchange for flexitime only in some waves. The coefficient
of the interaction term Flexitime ∗Male has a negative sign in all seven years.
In year 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2006, the coefficient of the interaction term is
statically significant or jointly significant with Flexitime. Though the results
are not very conclusive, they do not suggest that female workers would like to
pay more for flexitime than male workers. This finding is also in line with the
descriptive statistics displayed in table 2.7 and the regression results displayed
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in table 2.4. Since only high wage workers can afford flexitime, and most high
wage workers are male, we expect to find that male workers pay a higher price
for flexitime than female workers in some years.
However, this finding is not very convincing since it only appears in some
years. Nevertheless, it can be seen that there is no evidence suggesting that
female workers would like to pay a higher price for flexitime than male workers.
Though this conclusion is quite the opposite of what is expected, it still makes
sense and coincides with some literature in compensation inequality. For example,
Pierce (2001) argues that the compensation inequality is much larger than pure
wage inequality because high workers workers are also more likely to enjoy fa-
vorable non-wage benefits than low wage workers. Pierce’s (2001) discussion is
mainly from the perspective of total compensation, which includes both wages
and non-wage benefits. The price of those non-wage benefits are calculated as
the cost the employer pays to provide them rather than the compensating wage
differentials. The overall conclusion is still that non-wage benefits increase the
inequality instead of narrowing it.
To conclude, cross sectional evidence shows that when all workers are kept in
the sample, flexitime is only negatively correlated with workers’ wages in some
years. The most important finding is that the compensating wage differentials
associated with flexitime is mainly driven by high wage workers. Simple calcu-
lation suggests that high wage workers pay around 806.4 to 1881.6 pounds per
year in order to have flexitime. Given that most male flexi-timers are also high
wage earners and most female flexi-timers are not high wage earners, a tentative
conclusion is that flexitime does not explain the gender wage gap.
Panel Dimension Estimation
One of the major disadvantages of cross sectional estimation is that it fails to
control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. Estimation using panel data can
overcome this shortcoming by including an individual unobserved heterogeneity
term into workers’ wage equation.
In the panel dimension, the wage equation to be estimated is specified as equa-
tion (2.2). Statistically, whether equation (2.2) should be estimated using fixed
effects or random effects depends on the assumptions we make with regard to the
correlation between individual unobserved heterogeneity (ai) and the explanatory
variables. Random effects models are subject to strong assumptions that indi-
vidual unobserved heterogeneity is not correlated with the explanatory variables.
Fixed effects models treat individual heterogeneity (ai) as a parameter to estim-
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ate, and allow for it to be correlated with the explanatory variables (Wooldridge,
2010, chap. 10).
The Hausman test is conducted to see which estimation method is more ap-
propriate. Though fixed effects estimation is always consistent, random effects
estimation will have efficiency gain if the control variables are not correlated with
individual unobserved heterogeneity. Random effects take both variations within
and across individuals into account. The test statistic is reported in appendix A.3,
table A.7. The Hausman test shows that fixed effects estimation is preferable.
Table 2.9 reports the estimation results of equation (2.2) using fixed effects
models. First, I estimate the wage equation for all workers in my sample. Then
following the approach in the cross sectional estimation section, I focus on high
wage workers (top quartile) only. I found significant negative compensating wage
differentials for flexitime among high wage workers in the cross sectional estima-
tion section. The objective now is to examine whether this still holds in the panel
dimension, where the individual unobserved heterogeneity has been controlled for.
According to table 2.9, when all workers are kept together in the sample,
flexitime has an insignificant effect on workers’ wages. This result is similar to
what was found in the cross sectional section. When only high wage workers
are kept in the sample, the fixed effects model estimation results still suggest
that flexitime is not correlated with wages. This suggest that even among high
wage workers, flexitime has little effect on wages after individual unobserved
heterogeneity has been controlled for.
One advantage of estimating the workers’ wage equation using the fixed effect
model is that all time-invariant factors that may affect workers’ wages have been
controlled for. The omitted variable bias should be reduced as a result. However,
it is worth noticing that when controlling for individual unobserved heterogen-
eity using fixed effects, we eliminate a substantial proportion of variation among
wages. The data set is a seven-year panel with 40862 observations. In other
words, this data set is large in the cross sectional dimension while relatively short
in the time dimension. Since the fixed effects model only picks up the variation
within individuals and most variation in workers’ wage comes from the cross sec-
tional dimension, there is not much wage dispersion left. This may be particularly
true when only high wage workers are kept in the sample, given that the wage
dispersion among high wage workers is low6.
6For the sake of completeness, I also estimate the model using random effects. I find that
flexitime is negatively correlated with workers’ wages if only high wage workers are kept in the
sample. This might be suggestive that the insignificant coefficient estimates in the fixed effects
section may be driven by the fact that there is little wage variation among high wage workers.
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Table 2.9: Estimation Results of Workers’ Wage Equation with Fixed Effects.











Age squared -.0007*** -.0004***
(.0003) (.00007)
Education dummies yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes
Constant 1.62*** 2.44***
(.18) (.26)
R squared .18 .13
No. of obs 38110 9605
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of workers’ hourly wage (ln(wage)). The
wage equation is estimated by a fixed effects model.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
Time dummies are also included in the regression to get rid of the aggregate shock of each
year.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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Some other control variables are also worthy of consideration. For example,
in both cross sectional and panel specifications, union status has a positive effect
on workers’ wages when all workers are kept in the sample. This suggests that
workers with union membership earn higher wages than workers without union
membership. Quantitatively, the effect of union status on workers’ wages seems
to be larger in the cross sectional specification (around 9-12% according to table
2.3), and lower in the panel dimension specification (5% according to table 2.9).
The positive union-wage relationship is also well documented in previous studies
(Blanchflower and Bryson, 2004; Duncan and Stafford, 1980; Swaffield, 2001).
The union coefficient estimates reported in tables 2.3 and 2.9 are very close to
those reported in Swaffield (2001), which compares the cross sectional estimates
with panel dimension estimates of union effects using the BHPS. Intuitively, em-
ployees rely on unions to bargain for higher wages when negotiating contracts.
Meanwhile, union membership also helps protect them from downward adjust-
ment of wages when the economy is in recession (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2004).
As a result, there is a persistent positive relationship between workers’ wages and
union membership. The union wage premium differs across income/skill groups.
Low educated/skilled workers tend to have a high union wage premium, for they
are the group of workers who can benefit most from unionisation (Card, 2001).
Card (2001) reports that the union wage premium is generally large and pos-
itive among low skilled workers, while for high skilled workers, the union wage
premium is usually small or even negative. That is exactly what I find in tables
2.3, 2.4 and 2.9. When workers’ wage equation is estimated using cross sectional
data, the union wage premium is negative among workers with very high wages,
and positive when all workers are kept in the sample. When individual fixed
effects are controlled for, the union effect is positive when all workers are kept in
the sample, and insignificant when only high wage workers are kept in the sample.
Card (2001) argues that this is because union members with high observed skills
tend to have lower unobserved skills than their non-union counterparts, and union
members with low observed skills are likely to have higher unobserved skills than
their non-union counterparts. This also explains why the negative union wage
premium for high wage workers found in cross sectional estimates (table 2.4) be-
comes insignificant in the panel fixed effects specification (table 2.9), because the
unobserved heterogeneity has been controlled for. Apart from union, the coef-
ficient estimates of variables age and age squared are also stable in both cross
sectional specification and panel specification. Both tables 2.3 and 2.9 suggest
that workers’ wages increase with ages, but the speed of increase is decreasing
48
over time. Workers’ age is closely correlated with their labour market experience.
For workers with the same level of education, older workers tend to have greater
labour market experience. The coefficient associated with workers’ age partly
captures the return to labour market experience. As suggested by Dustmann
and Meghir (2005), the return to experience is higher during the first several
years after workers enter into the labour market, and becomes lower afterwards.
Therefore, the coefficient of variable age squared is negative in workers’ wage
equation.
We must also consider the fact that flexitime status is endogenous. Wages and
flexitime status might be jointly determined. First, people with high wages are
more likely to be able to afford flexitime. But at the same time, it is conceivable
that flexitime also affect wages.
Failing to control for the endogeneity of job attributes when estimating com-
pensating wage differentials may bias the coefficient estimates, resulting in the
wrong sign (Hwang et al., 1998). Garen (1988) argues that OLS estimators are
severely downward biased in the case of estimating compensating wage differen-
tials for on the job risk. Garen (1988) adapts an instrumental variables approach
to correct for the endogeneity of job risk in workers’ wage equation. His set of
instruments includes marital status, number of children, house value, and non-
labour income.
Following Garen’s (1988) technique, the instruments chosen for flexitime are:
(1) workers’ fertility information, including number of children aged between 0-2
and 3-4 in the household, and (2) workers’ non-labour income, which includes
various kinds of transfers from other family members or friends, rents, states and
local benefits. People with young kids may particularly demand flexitime for child
care reasons. As shown in figure 1.2, workers with children under 16 are more
likely to work with flexitime than workers without children under 16. Meanwhile,
the number of young children in the household should be independent of the error
term in the wage equation. Non-labour incomes, such as rents, are also important
financial resources. As I have shown in the cross sectional estimation section, high
income people are more likely to “buy” flexitime. It is also reasonable to think
that non-labour income does not have any relationship with the error term in the
wage equations.
Table 2.10 reports the estimation results of the workers’ wage equation (2.2)
using Two Stage Least Squares with the flexitime variable instrumented by the
number of children at different ages and/or workers’ non-labour income. Table
2.11 displays the first stage regression results. I tried two different instrument sets.
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Table 2.10: Correcting for the endogeneity of Flextime. (2SLS Estimates of
Workers’ Wage Equation (2.2))











Age squared -.0007*** -.0007***
(.00003) (.00003)
Education dummies yes yes
Ind & Occ yes yes
No. of obs 38110 38110
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of workers’ hourly wage (ln(wage)).
Workers’ wage equation (2.2) is estimated by Two Stage Least Squares. The dependent
variable is ln(wage).
Instruments Set A: number of children aged between 0-2 (child02), number of children aged
between 3-4 (child34) in the household, non-labour income (nonlabor). Instrument Set B:
Non-labour income (nonlabor)
Ind & Occ is short “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
Instrument set A includes non-labour income, number of children aged between
0-2, and number of children aged between 3-4. Instrument set B contains only
non-labour income.
According to table 2.10, both specifications suggest that flexitime is insig-
nificantly correlated with workers’ wages. Both the coefficient estimates and
the standard errors are unrealistically high. Garen (1988) also finds that the
instrumental variable approach leads to substantially large coefficient estimates
compared to the models that do not correct for the endogeneity. He argues that
this is because OLS severely underestimates the compensating wage differentials
for job attributes. However, the results displayed in table 2.10 raise some con-
cerns about the quality of the instruments. Good instruments need to satisfy
two requirements. First, they should be highly correlated with the endogenous
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explanatory variable. Second, they should not be correlated with the error term.
In order to check the instruments relevance, the first stage estimation results are
reported in table 2.11.
According to the second column of table 2.11, non-labour income is positively
correlated with the workers’ chances of working with flexitime, as expected. It
means that non-labour increases the workers’ chances of working with flexitime.
The number of children aged between 0-2 is uncorrelated with the workers’ flexi-
time status. The number of children aged between 3-4 is negatively correlated
with the chances of working with flexitime. This negative correlation implies that
the more children aged between 3-4 in the household, the less likely that workers
will work with flexitime. A possible reason to explain this counterintuitive finding
is that workers with children within that age range feel high financial pressure
to work hard to support the family. The budget constraint is tight for them to
“buy” flexitime. Monetary payoffs rather than flexitime might be their first con-
cern, and they are not more likely to work with flexitime than other workers7. The
F statistics to test the joint significance of all excluded instruments is 4.60 when
flexitime is instrumented by the instrument set A. This may suggest that the
instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variable. Weak cor-
relation between instruments and the endogenous variable leads to large standard
errors and may bias the coefficient estimates towards the OLS estimation direc-
tion (Wooldridge, 2010, chap. 5). Several formal tests are conducted to test the
quality of these instruments. The test statistics are reported in appendix A.4,
table A.8. The instruments in instrument set A pass the over-identification test.
The test statistics also suggest that these instruments are weak. Similarly, if
flexitime is instrumented with non-labour income only (instrument set B), there
is little correlation between flexitime and non-labour income.
I have also tried to use some other instruments to correct for the endogeneity
of flexitime, including spousal income and spousal working hours. The idea is
that a worker is more likely to work with flexitime if their spouse’s income is
high or their spouse’s working hours are long. However, it turns out that neither
of these variables are correlated with the endogenous variable (Flexitime) and
cannot serve as proper instruments for flexitime.
Strictly speaking, evidence from tables 2.3, 2.9 and 2.10 do not provide enough
evidence for the existence of compensating wage differentials for flexitime. As
7Compared to parents with children in other age groups, parents with children aged between
3-4 are more likely to have a lot of children in the household. Around 70% of parents with
children aged between 3-4 have at least 2 children in the household, compared to only 50% of
parents with children aged between 0-2.
51
Table 2.11: Workers’ Flexitime Equation (First Stage Estimation Results)
Instruments set A Instruments set B
Non-labor income .0000012* .0000012
(.0000007) (.00000076)
No. of children aged between 0-2 .002 -
(.008) -










Age squared .000004 .00003
(.00004) (.00004)
Education dummies yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes
No. of obs 38111 38111
First stage F statistics 4.60 2.57
Pass over-identification test yes -
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is Flexitme. The model is estimated by a fixed effects model.
Instruments Set A: number of children aged between 0-2 (child02), number of children aged
between 3-4 (child34) in the household, non-labour income (nonlabor). Instrument Set B:
Non-labour income (nonlabor)
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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explained in the cross sectional section, flexitime may bring other benefits to
firms (such as increasing the production efficiency so the wage per efficiency
unit of labour is actually lower; increasing the returns of specific human capital
investment; reducing turnover rates; inducing longer net working hours among
workers.) so that the costs of providing flexitime are mitigated or even eliminated.
In this case, firms dot not necessarily need to ask for an actual wage reduction
when providing flexitime.
At this stage, we can see that estimation results using cross sectional data and
panel data are at odds with the compensating differentials estimates. Arguably
estimation results using panel data with fixed effects should produce more con-
sistent results, since all time invariant individual fixed effects have been controlled
for. However, cross sectional estimation also adds value. It has the advantage
of capturing variations across individuals, which might be the main source of
variations in wages and flexitime status. As argued above, estimation using fixed
effects only captures the variations within individuals. But the variation of wages
within each individual might be low, and this may be particularly true if only top
quartile workers are kept in the sample. Also, the variation of flexitime status
within each individual may also be low. The BHPS data set is an unbalanced
panel. During the period I choose (years 2001-2007), on average workers stay in
the panel for 4 years. Among workers who stay in the panel for 4 years, 73.16%
of them never change their flexitime status, and 17.56% of them only change
their flexitime once. This means that over 90% of the respondents in the sample
change their flexitime less than or equal to once during the period they stay in
the panel. Among workers who stay in the panel for 7 years (2001-2007), 64.06%
of them never change their flexitime status, 17.08% of them change their flexi-
time status only once, and another 10.93% of them change their flexitime status
twice. Meanwhile, we can compare the cross section estimation results with the
panel estimation results to show how different estimation strategies may affect
the estimation results of compensating wage differentials. Most (if not all) pre-
vious literature on the compensating wage differentials for flexitime using cross
sectional data. The cross sectional estimates also provide comparisons with pre-
vious literature to show how the results may change when only focusing on high
wage workers.
To conclude, when I estimate the workers’ wage equation in the panel dimen-
sion controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity using the fixed effects
model, I find that flexitime does not have a significant impact on wages. Mean-
while, flexitime also seems to have little effect on high wage workers’ wages.
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However, these insignificant estimation results might be due to the little vari-
ation picked up by the fixed effects estimators, especially when only high wage
workers are kept in the sample. More importantly, firms may also have incentives
to provide flexitime for free if the benefits brought by flexitime outweigh the costs
of flexitime. Attempts are also made to correct for the endogeneity of flexitime
using the instrumental variable approach. However, it is difficult to find proper
instruments for flexitime. The instruments chosen are only weakly correlated
with flexitime, and the conclusion should be treated as provisional.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies the compensating wage differentials associated with flexitime
in the UK labour market using data from the British Household Panel Survey.
Evidence from both cross sectional data and panel data are presented. Cross
sectional estimates reveal that when all workers are kept in the sample, flexitime
has either negative or insignificant effects on workers’ wages. However, workers
with high wages do receive negative wage premiums when they are working with
flexitime.
In the panel dimension, I control for unobserved individual heterogeneity by
using a fixed effects model. The results suggest that flexitime is not correlated
with workers’ wages. I also try to adopt the instrumental variable approach to
explore the relationship between flexitime and wages. Still, there is little evid-
ence suggesting a negative relationship between wages and flexitime. Since the
instruments are only weakly related to workers’ flexitime status, this conclusion
is only provisional.
Previous studies on flexitime report that flexitime is associated with higher
(or insignificant) wages (Gariety and Shaffer, 2001). However, the theory of com-
pensating wage differentials predicts that workers would like to sacrifice part of
their wages in exchange for favourable working conditions (Rosen, 1986). This
chapter tries to reconcile the compensating wage differentials theory with the data
by accounting for income heterogeneity. I find that the compensating wage dif-
ferential effect of flexitime may be present among high wage workers when using
cross sectional data. However, after controlling individual unobserved heterogen-
eity and the endogeneity of flexitime, I find that flexitime does not lead to lower
wages. Factors on the demand side may be helpful in explaining the insignificant
wage-flexitime relationship. Flexitime may successfully increase workers’ produc-
tion efficiency, reduce quit threats, increase workers’ working hours and firms’
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return to specific human capital investment. In this case, firms may have incent-
ives to provide flexitime without asking for actual wage reductions because they
are already “compensated” by benefits brought by flexitime in other respects. As
for the gender wage gap, I find flexitime plays little role. It does not narrow the
existing gender wage gap.
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Appendix A
A.1 Literature on Flexitime
Table A.1 gives a summary of literature on flexitime in sociology and manage-
ment.
Table A.1: Literature on Flexitime
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A.2 Estimation Results of Lower-wage Workers’
Wage Equation (2.1)
Table A.2: Estimation Results of Lower-Wage (lower 75 percentile) Workers’
Wage Equation.
Year 2001 Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6)
Flexitime -.01 .02* .02** .01 .006 -.006 -.009
(.008) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Male .08*** .09*** .09*** .07** .07** .08*** .08***
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.009) (.009)
Children .01 .02** .009 .-.003 .005 -.02* -.01
(.008) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.01) (.009)
Married .01 -.007 .015* .02*** .02*** .04*** .03***
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.008) (.008)
Union .10*** .09*** .09*** .10*** .11** -.03* -.09**
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.01) (.009)
Age .03*** .03*** .03*** .03*** .03*** .03*** .03**
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Age squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0004*** -.0003*** -.0004*** -.0003***
(.00002) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00002) (.0003)
Education dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.47*** 1.64*** 1.61*** 1.12*** 1.40*** 1.43*** 1.27***
(.06) (.10) (.08) (.15) (.05) (.13) (.15)
R squared .35 .36 .36 .39 .37 .40 .39
No. of obs 5126 4568 4428 4278 4190 4047 3951
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-1007.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of workers’ hourly wage (ln(wage)). The wage equation is estimated by
Ordinary Least Squares.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote
significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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A.3 Robustness Check of Income Effects
In this section, workers are divided into either two or three groups according to
their wage levels. I estimate “top third” and“top half” workers’ wage equations
respectively. The results are displayed in tables A.3 and A.4.
Table A.3: Estimation Results of Top 33.3 Percentile Workers’ Wage Equation.
Year 2001 Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6)
Flexitime -.02* .02 -.04*** -.03** -.06*** -06*** -.04**
(.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02)
Male .06*** .06*** .05*** .04*** .04*** .03** .05***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Children .01 .02* .03** .04*** .03** -.01 .02*
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Married .02* .01 .01 .01 .005 .02* .005
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Union -.03*** -.02 .01 -.04*** -.02** -.03** -.02*
(.01) (.015) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age .02*** .02*** .03*** .02*** .02*** .02*** .03***
(.005) (.005) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Age squared -.0002*** -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0002*** -.0002*** -.0002*** -.0003***
(.00006) (.00006) (.00005) (.00006) (.00005) (.00006) (.0006)
Education dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 2.38*** 2.45*** 2.33*** 2.41*** 2.51*** 2.45*** 2.06***
(.13) (.17) (.17) (.16) (.15) (.24) (.13)
R squared .21 .22 .23 .21 .22 .22 .24
No. of obs 2077 2033 1978 1918 1878 1810 1773
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-1007.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of workers’ hourly wage (ln(wage)). The wage equation is estimated by
Ordinary Least Squares.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote
significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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Table A.4: Estimation Results of Top 50 Percentile Workers’ Wage Equation.
Year 2001 Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6)
Flexitime -.02* .01 -.04*** -.02** -.05*** -05*** -.02*
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Male .08*** .08*** .07*** .07*** .05*** .05*** .06***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Children .02** .04*** .02* .02** .03** .02* .02*
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01)
Married .02* .01 .01 .01 .009 .02* .03**
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Union .007 .005 -.001 -.02* .005 -.007 -.003
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age .02*** .03*** .03*** .03*** .03*** .03*** .03***
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Age squared -.0002*** -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0003***
(.00004) (.00005) (.00005) (.00005) (.00005) (.00005) (.0005)
Education dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 2.08*** 2.14*** 2.03*** 1.97*** 2.09*** 1.91*** 1.93***
(.10) (.12) (.12) (.17) (.11) (.11) (.13)
R squared .29 .28 .28 0.28 .26 .28 .30
No. of obs 3516 3065 2984 2878 2817 2720 2658
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-1007.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of workers’ hourly wage (ln(wage)). The wage equation is estimated by
Ordinary Least Squares.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote
significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
A.4 Alternative Measure of Wage
Table A.5 reports the cross sectional estimation results of workers’ wage equation
(2.1) using an alternative measure of ln(wage). Table A.6 reports the estimation
results with panel data using the alternative measure of ln(wage).
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Table A.5: Estimation Results of Workers’ Wage Equation (2.1) Using Alternative
Measure of Wage
Year 2001 Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007
Flexitime -.02* .01 -.0001 .001 -.02** -.03** -.03**
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Male .14*** .15*** .15*** .12*** .11*** .12*** .12***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Children .03*** .05*** .03*** .03*** .03** -.001 .01
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Married .03*** .02** .03*** .03*** .03*** .06*** .05***
(.009) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Union .11*** .10*** .09*** .09*** .12*** .08*** .09***
(.009) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age .04*** .05*** .05*** .05*** .05*** .05*** .04***
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Age squared -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0004***
(.0003) (.0004) (.0003) (.0003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003)
Education dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.60*** 1.96 *** 1.52*** .98*** 1.32*** 1.27*** 1.16***
(.08) (.10) (.12) (.12) (.12) (.15) (.16)
R squared .49 .50 .49 .50 0.48 .54 .52
No. of obs 6839 6095 5921 5716 5599 5406 5286
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of workers’ hourly wage (ln(wage)). It is measured by dividing workers’
weekly gross income by their standard weekly hours. The wage equation is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote
significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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Table A.6: Results of Workers’ Wage Equation (2.2) Using Alternative Measure
of Wage, Fixed Effects











Age squared -.0007*** -.0004***
(.0003) (.00007)
Education dummies yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes
Constant 1.65*** 2.49***
(.18) (.26)
R squared .17 .13
No. of obs 38110 9605
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of workers’ hourly wage (ln(wage)). It is
measured by dividing workers’ weekly gross income by their standard weekly hours. The
wage equation is estimated by a fixed effects model.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
Time dummies are also included in the regression to get rid of the aggregate shock of each
year.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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A.5 Hausman test Statistics (Random effects v.s.
Fixed effects)
Hausman test is conducted to check which specification (random effects or fixed
effects) is more appropriate when estimating equation (2.2). The test statistics
are reported in table A.7.
Table A.7: Hausman Test Statistics of Model Choice (Fixed Effects v.s. Random
Effects)
Null hypothesis: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(42)= 2956.82
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
This table displays the Hausman test statistics of model choices. It tests whether fixed effects
or random effects model should be applied when estimating workers’ wage equation.
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The null hypothesis is that there is not any systematic difference in the coefficient estimates
between fixed effects and random effects. In that case, random effects models are more appro-
priate. Under the null, the Hausman test statistic follows a χ2 distribution. The second row
displays the Hausman test statistic and the third row displays the p-value. The test statistics
reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that fixed effects estimators are more approporiate.
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A.6 Test of Instruments Validity
Table A.8 gives the test statistics for the validity of instruments chosen (Instru-
ments set A).
Table A.8: Instruments Validity Tests (Instruments sets A)
Under identification test a:
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 13.070
Chi-sq(3) P-val = 0.0045
Weak identification test b
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic : 4.603
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:
5% maximal IV relative bias 13.91
10% maximal IV relative bias 9.08
Over identification test of all instruments c
Hansen J statistic 0.237
Chi-sq(3) P-val = 0.888
This table displays the test statistics for the validity of instruments for the fixed effects
models in table 2.10.
Data source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
a The null hypothesis of the under-identification test is that the endogenous variable cannot
be identified by the instruments. Rejecting the null hypothesis suggests that the model is
identified.
b Weak instruments means that the endogenous variable is identified by the instruments but
they are only weakly correlated. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are only
weakly correlated with the endogenous variable. The test statistics in this case falls below
the critical values at the 10% level, suggesting that the set of instruments are only weakly
correlated with the variable flexitime. In this case, other estimators such as LIML (Limited
Information Maximum Likelihood) might be more efficient (Wooldridge, 2010, chap. 5). In
this chapter I also try to estimate the same wage equation using LIML with the same set
of instruments, and the estimation results do not change much.
c The null hypothesis of the over identification test is that all instruments included are not
correlated with the error term of the wage equation. The test statistics and p value suggest




Flexitime and Female Labour Supply
Abstract
This chapter studies the effect of flexitime on workers’ labour market
working hours. A simple model is presented to compare workers’ labour
supply decisions with and without flexitime. In the static case, predic-
tion 1 is that flexitime will increase workers’ labour supply if the benefits
(increased child care production efficiency) brought by flexitime are high
relative to the costs (wage reduction). Prediction 2 is that the increase in
working hours under flexitime regime is more likely to be observed among
high human capital workers than low human capital workers.
I also extend the model to two periods, where workers do not have
flexitime in the first period, but may have flexitime in the second period if
they are in the flexible world. The dynamic model predicts that flexitime
increases the marginal utility of working in the first period if workers can
derive high benefits from flexitime relative to the wage reduction. This sug-
gests a that flexitime may induce workers to increase their working hours in
both periods. The two predictions of the static model are also tested empir-
ically using data from the British Household Panel Survey. When testing
prediction 1, I specify working mothers as the group of workers who can
derive high benefits from flexitime relative to the cost. Estimation results
show that flexitime is positively associated with working mothers’ labour
market hours. In order to test prediction 2, I include an interaction term
of flexitime and high human capital into workers’ labour supply equation.
However, the empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case.
Key words: Working hours, child care, work and home production bal-
ances, human capital accumulation
3.1 Introduction
During the past fifty years, most developed countries have experienced significant
increases in female workers’ labour supply (Attanasio et al., 2008). Many explan-
ations are put forward to explain the reason behind such an increase. This chapter
analyses a potential factor that may induce female workers to supply more mar-
ket hours under certain conditions: the opportunity to work with flexible working
arrangements (from here “flexitime”). By giving workers the authority to vary
the starting and ending time of their work, flexitime eases the tension between
workers’ home production and work responsibilities. With flexitime, workers can
rearrange their working time so that they may produce child care in a more ef-
ficient way. As a result, workers may devote more time to labour market work
when working with flexitime. In this chapter, a simple labour supply model with
flexitime is developed and empirically tested to show the effect of flexitime on
workers’ labour supply choices. The model predicts that working with flexitime
increases workers’ labour supply if the benefit (increased child care production
efficiency) is high relative to the cost (compensating wage differentials for flexi-
time). I also show in the static setting that the increase in working hours under a
flexitime regime is more likely to be observed among high human capital workers
than among low human capital workers.
These two predictions are tested empirically using data from the British
Household Panel Survey. I estimate workers’ labour supply equations with flexi-
time as a control variable to see whether it is associated with high working hours
among workers who can derive high benefits from flexitime. I also test whether
high human capital workers are more likely to increase their working hours when
working with flexitime than low human capital worker by including an interaction
term of workers’ human capital level and flexitime into workers’ labour supply
equation.
In this chapter, the particular type of flexible working arrangement analysed
is flexitime. It is a practice that gives employees’ freedom to decide the when to
start and end their work. The usual practice is that employers choose a certain
period of a day as “core hours” during which workers have to stay at work. For the
rest of the time, workers can decide when to work. Though flexitime was initiated
in Germany in the 1970s, few economics studies have investigated the economic
consequences of flexitime, possibly because it is difficult to get comprehensive
data recording workers’ flexitime status.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First,
a model is developed to explain the conditions under which flexitime may increase
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workers’ labour supply. The model captures two important features of flexitime:
(i) Flexitime is often accompanied by certain costs. In this chapter, the cost is
modeled as a compensating wage differentials effect of flexitime; Workers need
to sacrifice part of their wages in exchange for flexitime. (ii) Combined with a
human capital accumulation process, flexitime may affect workers’ labour supply
decisions dynamically. Workers accumulate human capital by participating in the
labour market. Accumulated human capital in the current period will be trans-
lated into future wages. Anticipating that flexitime will affect their future labour
supply decisions, workers may change current period labour supply accordingly
to accumulate more or less human capital. Second, this chapter is also one of the
first studies that empirically explores the relationship between flexible working
and workers’ labour supply. I divide workers into several groups based on their
possible costs and benefits associated with working with flexitime and estimate
their labour supply equations separately.
The main findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows. The static
model has two predictions. Prediction 1 is that flexitime only increases workers’
labour supply if they can derive high benefits (increased child care production
efficiency) from flexitime relative to costs (compensating wage differentials for
flexitime). Prediction 2 is that, given the same benefit-cost ratio, the increase in
working hours under a flexitime regime is more likely to be observed among high
human capital workers than among low human capital workers. According to the
model, we can think of flexitime as if it expanded workers’ time endowments.
Workers with high human capital levels are more likely to devote the “expanded”
time endowment to market work because they earn higher wages than low hu-
man capital workers. Meanwhile, on the demand side, firms are also likely to ask
high human capital workers to increase their labour supply in order to cover the
costs of providing flexitime. In the two period dynamic setting, flexitime may
increase workers’ labour supply in both periods if it can substantially increase
workers’ child care production efficiency and can be obtained at a low price. This
is similar to prediction 1 in the static setting, except that in the dynamic setting,
flexitime affect workers’ labour supply decisions throughout their life time. Pre-
diction 1 and prediction 2 are also tested empirically using 7 years of data from
the British Household Panel Survey. When testing prediction 1, I specify working
mothers as the group of workers that may derive high benefits from working with
flexitime relative to costs (wage reduction costs). Evidence from the empirical
results reveals that flexitime is particularly effective in inducing working mothers
to increase their labour market working hours. In addition, it is associated with
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higher chances of working full time among female workers and working mothers.
The positive relationship between flexitime and working mothers’ labour supply
is also robust to various specifications. When testing prediction 2, I divide work-
ers into three groups according to their working hours (above 40 hours, less than
30 hours, between 30 and 40 hours). An interaction term of high human cap-
ital and flexitime is included in workers’ labour supply equation to see whether
high human capital workers are more likely to increase their working hours than
low human capital workers when provided with flexitime. I tried two proxies for
workers’ human capital levels: labour market experience and educational quali-
fications. When using the former as proxy for human capital, I do not find any
empirical evidence supporting model prediction 2. When using the latter as proxy
for human capital, I only find this positive relationship among workers working
between 30 and 40 hours a week. However, these results can only treated as
provisional, since both measures for human capital are imperfect.
This rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the
related literature on workers’ labour supply choices and recent studies on flexible
working. Section 3.3 gives a simple model that explains how flexible working will
affect workers’ labour supply decisions. Section 3.4 gives the empirical results.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Previous Literature
How do female workers allocate their time across market work and other activities
has raised interests both theoretically and empirically. Heckman and Killings-
worth (1986) as well as Blundell and Macurdy (1999) give very comprehensive
reviews on the important issues in this area. Fertility and child care respons-
ibilities play very important roles when female workers are making their labour
supply decisions. Montgomery et al. (1986) provide a comprehensive review of
the models on marital status and child bearing.
Early models on female labour supply describe a static setting where female
workers derive utility from leisure, consumption and children (Montgomery et al.,
1986). Child care is produced by a combination of parental time and monetary
expenditure. Female workers maximize utility by allocating time across different
activities at any given desired child care level. Such static models can produce sev-
eral testable implications. In the static settings, female workers’ time allocation
and fertility decisions are considered to be completed, and wages are exogenously
determined and are the only price for women’s time when they decide how to
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allocate time between market work and child care.
However, these static models fail to explain the variations in fertility and
labour supply decisions over time in response to changes in female workers edu-
cation level, human capital accumulation (Hotz and Miller, 1988). Later on, there
are some studies investigating the life-cycle choices of female workers (Heckman
and Macurdy, 1980; Ma Curdy, 1981; Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989; Francesconi,
2002). In a dynamic setting, female workers maximize their expected life time
utility by making a set of plans for each period’s fertility and labour supply
decisions. In such scenario, children and child care now have more profound
influences on female workers’ labour supply choices due to the effect of human
capital accumulation process. In the static settings, children can be considered as
durable goods which are costly to produce but yield utility to the parents. In the
dynamic situation where experience/human capital accumulation plays a central
role in determining wages, the career interruption due to fertility reasons may be
detrimental to female’s future wages and career development (Erosa et al., 2002;
Attanasio et al., 2008; Olivetti, 2006). The human capital loss due to fertility
might be one of the most important reasons to explain women’s disadvantaged
positions in the labour market (Erosa et al., 2002).
Recent increase in female labour supply experienced by most major developed
countries has also attracted attention in labour economics. Attanasio et al. (2008)
design a life-cycle model to explain the increase in female labour participation
rate for three cohorts (1930s, 1940s, 1950s) of women in United States. They
propose that the reduction in child care combined with a narrowed gender wage
gap encourages women to participate in the labour market. Olivetti (2006) uses
a calibrated six period life-cycle model with human capital accumulation and
home production to show that the relative increase in the returns to the exper-
ience are one of the most important factors that account for increases in female
labour supply. High returns to experience increase women’s opportunity cost
of interrupting their career and encourage them to participate more actively in
the labour market. Meanwhile, female workers also accumulate human capital
while participating in the labour market. Accumulated human capital not only
determines workers’ current period wages but also increases their future wages.
With higher wages, women tend to substitute money for time in producing child
care. So long as the wealth effects dominate, children will be better off, and
female workers supply more hours to the labour market. Greenwood et al. (2005)
use a model with home production to address the importance of technological
progress in freeing women from time-consuming housework so that they can have
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enough time to participate in the labour market. Erosa et al. (2002) attribute
female workers’ less advantaged labour market status to the loss of human capital
resulting from fertility related career interruptions. Rocha and Fuster (2006) de-
velop a theory pointing out that labour market frictions can interact with female
labour supply so that there might be positive relations between fertility and the
employment ratio. Conventional fertility-labour supply theory predicts that the
increase in female workers’ earning power will increase the opportunity cost of
time spent with children, resulting working women having fewer kids compared
than unemployed women. Therefore a positive relationship between fertility and
unemployment will be observed. Studying the case of Peru, Field (2007) proposes
that property laws allow people to spend less time on home protection, freeing
up time which can be spent in the labour market.
So far there has been little written within economics about the economic
consequences of flexitime. Early studies in the 1980s were mainly experimental
work in sociology and human resource management (See chapter 2 for a review).
Golden and Altman (2007b) adopt a behavioural approach, arguing that the
cost of firms providing flexitime makes the supply of flexitime perfectly inelastic
regardless of the demand in the market. Technological constraints prevent firms
from providing flexitime that caters to workers’ interests. Flabbi and Moro (2010)
develop a model with job search and bargaining in both wage and job flexibility
dimensions. They find that the wage distribution under a flexible working scheme
and a non-flexible working scheme can overlap, and each distribution supports a
different match-specific productivity. However, they calibrate the model by using
workers’ part time status as proxies for flexitime due to data limitations.
This chapter is different form the existing literature from the following re-
spects. First, it analyzes a job dimension that has been overlooked by previ-
ous literature. Second, human capital accumulation is allowed to interact with
flexitime, so flexitime may have a dynamic influence on workers’ labour supply
decisions. The idea of human capital accumulation throughout workers’ life cycle
comes from recent papers by Erosa et al. (2002) and Olivetti (2006)1, in which
workers’ employment history and past working hours may be translated into cur-
rent human capital levels.
1Erosa et al. (2002) assume that workers’ human capital is accumulated via participation in
the labour market, while Olivetti (2006) assumes that workers human capital level is a function
of past working hours.
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3.3 Model
In this section, a simple model is described which illustrates how flexible working
practices such as flexitime may affect workers’ labour supply decisions. This
model extends standard labour supply models by incorporating flexitime into
workers’ utility maximization process. Here, flexitime is a practice that makes
the child care production process more efficient, but also brings a proportional
reduction in wages.
3.3.1 Model setup
In each period, a worker derives utility from consumption Ct and child quality
Qt, which is produced by time spent with children. For simplicity, the utility









where β is the time discount factor, Ct is the consumption level at each period,
Qt is the child quality level at each period. The specific utility function form
described in equation (3.1) assumes that consumption and child quality are non
separable, and workers attach the same importance to child quality and to con-
sumption. This chapter mainly focuses on female workers’ labour supply de-
cisions, and one of the main responsibilities faced by female workers is child care.
The utility function captures the importance of child care production in female
workers’ time allocation decisions. Besides, it also guarantees an analytical solu-
tion in the dynamic case so that we can have a rough idea about how flexitime
may affect workers’ labour supply decisions over their life time.
Consumption in each period comes from two parts,
Ct = ntht +Rt (3.2)
where Rt is workers’ non-labour income, nt is the number of working hours in each
period and ht is the human capital level at period t. It is assumed that workers are
paid according to their human capital level (ht). Similar to the model developed
by Erosa et al. (2002) and Olivetti (2006), I assume human capital accumulation
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follows a learning by doing process specified by
ht = ht−1(1 + δnt−1) (3.3)
where δ is a parameter that measures the speed at which human capital is ac-
cumulated. Equation (3.3) suggests that current period market work experience
will be translated to future human capital (and, future wages). Therefore, work-
ers’ will have additional incentive to supply more market work hours in the first
period given the human capital accumulation process. Following Becker (1975),
the literature on human capital often distinguishes between “specific human cap-
ital” and “general human capital”. The former refers to the knowledge and skills
that can be only applied in a single firm, while the latter refers to the know-
ledge and skills that can be used with all employers. By supplying more working
hours to the labour market, workers accumulate both general and specific hu-
man capital. Both types may lead to higher future wages. If workers move to
other firms or industries, then specific human capital may be lost. Here in this
chapter, following Olivetti (2006)’s specification, I do not model workers’ job mo-
bility behaviour. The accumulated human capital discussed here can be regarded
as general human capital such as market experience, which depends on workers’
labour supply history. It will not be lost if workers move across firms. Therefore,
so long as workers supply a positive amount of hours to the labour market, they
will accumulate human capital that leads to higher future wages. For the rest of
this chapter, “human capital” refers to “general human capital” if not specified
otherwise.
Workers do not value leisure here. All the time left from the market work
is devoted to the child care production, which can be described as the following
production function:
Qt = T − nt (3.4)
where T is workers’s total time endowment. Qt is the output of child care pro-
duction.
Flexitime changes workers’ utility maximization problem via two channels.
First, workers need to bear certain costs in order to work with flexitime. The
costs can take many forms, such as wage reduction, or reduced future promotion
probability. Here the costs are modelled as a compensating wage differential
effect. Flexitime proportionally reduces workers’ wages and in turn workers’
consumption changes under the flexitime regime. Specifically,
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Cft = nthtb+Rt (3.5)
where Cft is workers’ consumption level when working with flexitime at period
t, b is a parameter that measures the degree of wage reduction, and b ∈ [0, 1].
It follows that high values of b implies a lower wage reduction associated with
flexitime and small values of b suggest that workers need give up higher amounts
their wages in exchange for flexitime. b = 1 means that workers’ do not need to
sacrifice any wages in order to work with flexitime. b = 0.5 means that workers
need to give up half of their wages in order to work with flexitime. b = 0 suggests
that workers need to give up all their wages in exchange for flexitime.
Flexitime also changes workers’ child care production according to the follow-
ing process:
Qft = T − nt + a (3.6)
where Qft is the child quality under the flexitime regime, a is a parameter that
measures how working with flexitime can help with child care production, and
a ∈ (0,∞). High values of a mean that flexitime is very helpful with workers’
child care production. a = 0 means that flexitime does not help with child care
production at all. When it comes to the ability to fulfil family responsibilities
such as child care, it is not only the total amount of time available that matters,
but also when the parents are available to take care of the children. Flexitime
enables parents to spend time with children when the children need them most.
Consequently, even though parents spend the same amount of time taking care
of their children under the flexitime scheme, the quality of child care production
may increase. To some extent, we can think as if flexitime could extend workers’
time endowment.
Workers choose the number of working hours (nt) in each period to maximize
life time utility. Given the above set up, workers’ utility maximization problem





s.t. Ct = ntht +Rt
Qt = T − nt
ht = ht−1(1 + δnt−1)
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s.t. Cft = nthtb+Rt
Qft = T − nt + a
ht = ht−1(1 + δnt−1)
3.3.2 Static Case
Here, I analyze the case assuming that workers only live for one period. In this
case, we can suppress all the time subscripts and the problem reduces to a static
case. Solving (3.7) and (3.8) in the static setting by choosing the number of













where n∗ and nf∗ represent the optimal market work hours under the rigid working
scheme and flexitime scheme respectively. From (3.9) and (3.10), it can be seen
that high human capital workers will always supply more market hours than low
human capital workers, and non labour income acts as a disincentive to work.
Heckman and Killingsworth (1986) illustrate a simple version of model on family
time allocation assuming a conventional Cobb-Douglas utility function, and end
up with similar solutions as described in (3.10)2.
And equation (3.10) shows that workers will supply more market hours if (i)
flexitime can help a lot in child care production (i.e. high values of a), or (ii)
flexitime can be obtained with less wage reduction (i.e. high values of b). Note
here the time endowment constraint needs to be binding, i.e. nf∗ ≤ T .





, T ) (3.11)
Expression (3.11) simply states that no matter how helpful flexitime is, workers
2In their model, workers’ utility depends on consumption and leisure. They find that for
each family member, non labour income is in a negative relationship with working hours, and
wage is in a positive relationship with working hours.
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cannot supply working hours that are higher than their time endowment.
Given the analytical solutions (3.9) and (3.10), it can be verified that whether
workers will work more hours when provided flexitime depend on how much they
can benefit from flexitime (in terms of increased child care production efficiency),
how much they need to pay for working with flexitime (wage reduction cost), and
their human capital levels.
Proposition 1 When the benefit to cost ratio associated with flexitime is above
a certain range ( ab
1−b ≥ T ), flexitime induces more workers to participate in the
labour market, and conditional on participation, workers supply more working
hours if they work with flexitime than they do without flexitime. In addition, the
increase in working hours under a flexitime regime is greater among high human
capital workers.
Proof. See appendix B.1.
Proposition 2 When the benefit to cost ratio associated with flexitime is below
a certain range ( ab
1−b < T ), workers are more likely to participate in the labour
market when they do not work with flexitime. Conditional on participation, flexi-
time only increases the labour supply of workers with human capital higher than
a certain level (h ≥ Rab
1−b
).
Proof. See appendix B.2.
In order to see the two propositions of this model in a more intuitive way, I plot
workers’ labour supply decisions under two different schemes against their human
capital levels. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the optimal working hours under different
working hours arrangements when the relative size of the benefit-cost brought
by flexitime are different. In these two figures, the horizontal axis represents
workers’ human capital levels, and the vertical axis represents workers’ optimal
market working hours.
Figure 3.1 shows the situation where flexible working is helpful and cheap. In
this case, the benefit to cost ratio associated with flexitime is high ( ab
1−b ≥ T ).
In this situation, flexitime increases workers’ child care production efficiency by
a large amount, and workers do not need to pay a high price for flexitime. In
figure 3.1, the points where the working hours curves cross the horizontal axis
represents the critical human capital level for participation (ĥf ). The point where
the optimal working hours curve under flexitime scheme crosses the horizontal
axis lies to the left of the point where the optimal working hours curve under the
non-flexible working scheme. Intuitively, flexitime reduces the cost of working,
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Figure 3.1: Optimal Working Hours When Flexitime is Cheap and Helpful
This graph shows optimal working workers under different working hours arrangements when
the benefit-cost ratio of flexitime is high ( ab1−b ≥ T ). The horizontal axis denotes workers’
human capital levels, and the vertical axis denotes workers’ optimal working hours. nf∗
curve denotes workers optimal working hours under flexitime regime, and n∗ curve denotes
workers’ optimal working hours without flexitime. The points where curves intersect with
horizontal axis determines the critical human capital level of participating. In the special








Figure 3.2: Optimal Working Hours When Flexitime is Expensive and Not Helpful
This graph shows optimal working workers under different working hours arrangements when
the benefit-cost ratio of flexitime is low ( ab1−b < T ). The horizontal axis denotes workers’
human capital levels, and the vertical axis denotes workers’ optimal working hours. nf∗
curve denotes workers optimal working hours under flexitime regime, and n∗ curve denotes
workers’ optimal working hours without flexitime. The points where curves intersect with
horizontal axis determines the critical human capital level of participating.
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and the critical human capital level of participation becomes lower with the help
of flexitime. More importantly, under such circumstances, regardless of workers’
human capital levels, they all choose to work more hours when they are provided
with flexitime. Being able to work with flexitime makes child care production
more efficient. The same amount of time now can produce more child care and
therefore workers can use the saved time to do more market work. This is also
reflected in figure 3.1, as the optimal working hours with flexitime curve (nf∗
curve) always sits above the optimal working hours without flexitime curve (n∗
curve). Figure 3.1 also suggests that the higher the human capital level, the bigger
the difference between optimal working hours under two schemes. Flexitime saves
workers time from child care production. For each one hour devoted to the market
work, high human capital workers earn higher wages than low human capital
workers. Consequently, it is observed that when working with flexitime, high
human capital workers increase their labour supply more than low human capital
workers.
Figure 3.2 describes workers’ labour market decisions when condition (B.3) is
not satisfied (i.e. ab
1−b < T ). In this case, flexitime is not helpful and expensive.
In figure 3.2 the two curves intersect at the point where h = Rab
1−b
, and after
that the optimal market hours with flexitime (nf∗) curve lies above the optimal
market hours without flexitime (n∗) curve. This suggests that only workers with
high human capital levels are going to increase their labour supply when they are
working with flexitime. Flexitime increases workers’ child care production by a
fixed amount a, as if it increased workers’ time endowment. This extra time can be
used for either market work or child care production. Workers’ wages, meanwhile,
are determined by their human capital, and high human capital workers are more
likely to devote their extra time to market work than low human capital workers
are. Thus, even though flexitime is associated with a significant compensating
wage differential, workers with high levels of human capital are still likely to
increase their working hours once they are provided with flexitime.
Propositions 1 and 2 (discussed above) focus on the labour supply side to
explain the possible effects of flexitime on workers’ labour supply decisions. We
must also consider the fact that the provision of flexitime is subject to other
constraints. Flexitime has always been an under supplied family friendly practice
(Golden and Altman, 2007a), in the sense that more workers have wanted it than
have had access to it. Some technology constraints and other constraints (such as
administrative costs and/or coordination costs) may prevent firms from granting
flexitime working requests from all workers (Golden, 2001; Golden and Altman,
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2007a). Table 1.4 in chapter 1 shows that at least some firms do not allow certain
types of employees to work flexitime.
Firms will only provide flexitime for workers if the costs of providing it are
less than or equal to the benefits they can derive from it. On one hand, flexi-
time may reduce the absenteeism and promote on the job attachment so that
the productivity of workers may increase (Dalton and Mesch, 1990; Golden and
Altman, 2007a). On the other hand, firms may need to adopt new equipment
and additional supporting staff to be able to provide flexible working opportun-
ities at the workplace. In order to cover the non-trivial costs associated with
flexitime, firms would like to be compensated by asking workers to work longer
hours. Therefore, we may observe a positive relationship between working hours
and workers’ flexitime status. This may be particularly true for high human cap-
ital workers. Workers with high human capital are more frequently observed to
work with flexitime than workers with low human capital. Possibly it is because
their requests for flexitime are more likely to be agreed by firms due to their high
bargaining power when negotiating the contract. In addition, the replacement
costs of those high human capital workers may also be higher than those low
human capital workers, so the quit threats of high human capital workers may
give firms additional incentives to provide them with flexitime. For each unit
of labour devoted to the production process, workers with high human capital
produce more output than low human capital workers. Firms benefit more by
inducing or asking high human capital workers to increase their working hours
under the flexitime regime than increasing low human capital workers’ labour
supply. What is more, if firms invest heavily in workers (in this case, workers
with high specific human capital), they may also wish to accommodate workers’
request for flexitime working and amortize rents by asking them to work longer
hours. To this extent, longer working hours may act as a pre-condition for work-
ers to work with flexitime. Once provided with flexitime, it is possible that high
human capital workers are required by firms to raise their labour supply more
than low human capital workers.
In summary, the static model has two predictions. Prediction 1 is that workers
will increase their labour supply when working with flexitime if it can effectively
increase the child care production, and can be obtained at a low price. Prediction
2 is that the increase in working hours is more likely to be observed among workers
with high human capital.
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3.3.3 Two Periods, Two worlds
In this section, the simple static model discussed above is extended to a two period
model. There are two distinct worlds: flexible world and non-flexible world. In
the non flexible world, workers do not have access to flexitime, and are restricted
to the rigid working schedules throughout their life time. In the flexible world
each worker has access to flexitime in the second period but not in the first period.
By comparing workers’ labour supply decisions in these two different worlds we
may have a better understanding of the effect of flexitime on workers’ market
hours. Compared to the static case, human capital accumulation now plays a
very important role in workers’ labour market decisions . Anticipating that they
are going to work with flexitime in the future, workers’ incentives to work in the
previous period also change. Therefore, the introduction of flexitime has a more
profound effect on workers’ labour market decisions in the dynamic case than it
does in the static case.
In the two-period model, workers’ utility maximization problem in the two
distinct worlds are given by (3.7) and (3.8) with t = 2. Workers choose the
optimal working hours in each period to maximize their utility. In the non flexible






















Equations (3.13) and (3.15) are very similar to the optimal working hours
chosen by workers in the static case. In the second period, each worker knows
that this is the last period. Therefore, workers maximize their utility as if they
were in the static case. The introduction of the human capital accumulation
process makes workers supply more market work hours in the first period given
certain initial human capital levels, for their current experience will increase their
future wages.


























where n∗1 and n
∗
2 are workers’ first period and second period optimal working
workers in the non-flexible world, and,
P = −16h31δ + 4h31Tδ2 + h21T 2βδ3
− 4h21δ2R1 − (h41δ2(T 2βδ24h1(2 + Tδ)− 4δR1)2)
O = −h61δ3((T + a)βδ2 + 4h1(2 + Tδ))3
+ 4h61δ
4(3(T 2βδ2 + 4h1(2 + Tδ))
2R1
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where nf∗1 and n
f∗
2 are workers’ first period and second period optimal working
hours in the flexible world, and,
A = −16bh31δ + 4bh31Tδ2 + a2b2h21 + 2ab2h21Tβδ3 + b2h21T 2βδ3
− 4bh21δ2R1 − (b2h41δ2(b(a+ T )2βδ2 + 4h1(2 + Tδ)− 4δR1)2)
B = −bh61δ3(b(a+ T )2βδ2 + 4h1(2 + Tδ))3
+ 4b2h61δ
4(3b(b(a+ T )2βδ2 + 4h1(2 + Tδ))
2R1





−b4h121 βδ8R22(b(b(a+ T )2βδ2 + 4h1(2 + Tδ)− 4δR1)3 − 432βδ2R22
Though the analytical solutions to the maximization problem appear to be
complicated, still some inferences can be made.
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Proposition 3 When the benefits of flexitime (increased child care production
efficiency) are high relative to the wage reduction cost associated with flexitime
(i.e. when ab
1−b ≥ T ), the marginal utility of one hour of market work in the first
period is higher in the flexible world than that of the non-flexible world. This
suggests that workers will supply more hours in both the first and second period
when working with flexitime, regardless of their initial human capital levels.
Proof. See appendix B.3.
Intuitively, when flexitime greatly improves workers’ child care production
efficiency and can be obtained at a low price (wage reduction), workers with
flexitime will supply more hours of market work in the second period than they
do without flexitime. Nevertheless, anticipating that they are going to supply
more hours in the second period than they are in the non-flexible world, workers
with flexitime have additional incentive to work more hours in the first period
than they do without flexitime so that they will accumulate enough human capital
to earn high wages in the second period. Therefore, in the dynamic situation,
flexitime will increase workers’ labour supply decisions in both periods if the
benefit to cost ratio associated with flexitime is very high ( ab
1−b ≥ T ).
On the other hand, if ab
1−b ≥ T (which means flexitime is not very helpful
with child care production or workers need to sacrifice a large amount of wages in
exchange for it), whether the introduction of flexitime will increase labour supply
depends on workers’ human capital levels.
Proposition 4 If the benefits of flexitime (increased child care production effi-
ciency) are low relative to the cost (wage reduction cost) of working with flexitime
(i.e. when ab
1−b < T ), the overall effect of flexitime on workers’ labour supply is
ambiguous. The marginal utility of first period work could be lower for some
parameter specifications (nf∗1 ≤ ( R2h1( ab1−b )−1)
)1
δ
), which suggests that workers may
supply less hours of market work in both periods in the flexible world. However,
this is less likely to be the case for high human capital workers than for low human
capital workers.
Proof. See appendix B.4.
Intuitively, when flexitime is not helpful with workers’ child care production,
workers cannot save much time from their child care production to be devoted to
market work. In addition, the compensating wage differentials effect associated
with flexitime may also discourage them from supplying more hours into the
labour market. Therefore, workers may choose to work less under the flexitime
scheme in the second period. Anticipating that they are going to work less in the
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second period with flexitime, workers in the flexible world have less incentive to
accumulate human capital in the first period as well because the marginal utility
of the first period working is lower with flexitime than without flexitime. This
may be particularly true for workers with low human capital levels since they
earn lower wages than workers with high human capital, and have less incentive
to work long hours in the labour market. As a result, we may observe that workers
with low human capital levels supply fewer hours in the flexible world for both
periods than they do in the non-flexible world.
We can also look at this problem from the demand side. Given the costs as-
sociated with flexitime provision, firms may wish to be “compensated” by asking
workers to work more hours. Meanwhile, firms are more likely to grant high hu-
man capital workers’ requests for working flexitime as they may want to maximize
the return to human capital investment. As a result, we are likely to observe that
the labour supply of high human capital workers increases more than that of low
human capital workers. If firms only agree to workers’ flexitime requests if their
human capital levels exceed a certain level (h), then such flexitime constraints
imposed by firms may give workers additional incentives to work more hours in
the first period. They need to accumulate up to the threshold level human capital
(h) in order to enjoy flexitime working in the second period.
In summary, in the dynamic setting, human capital accumulation is crucial
in workers’ labour supply decisions. Not only does it affect workers’ current
period labour supply under different time arrangement regimes, but also it alters
workers’ optimal time allocation strategies over time. If flextime is very helpful
with workers’ child care production and can be obtained with little cost, then
all workers will increase their working hours in both periods regardless of their
human capital levels. If the cost of working with flexitime is very high compared
to the benefit, then for some parameter specifications (as suggested by inequality
(B.18)), workers may decrease their working hours in both periods when working
with flexitime. The negative effect of flexitime on workers’ labour supply is more
likely to be found among workers with low human capital levels.
The introduction of flexitime has two effects on workers labour supply de-
cisions. By increasing child care production efficiency, it saves workers’ time in
child care production so that they can spend more hours at market work. On the
other hand, flexitime reduces workers’ hourly wages so that it becomes less at-
tractive for them to work long hours. As a result, whether flexitime can increase
workers’ labour supply depends on the overall effect of these two forces.
The main insight of the two period model is that flexitime now has dynamic
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effects on workers’ labour supply decisions via a human capital accumulation
process. In the static case, flexitime only affects workers’ labour supply decisions
in the current period. It did not affect workers’ incentives to accumulate human
capital. Now, the human capital accumulation process links workers’ labour
supply decisions in the two periods together, so flexitime not only affects current
period working hours, but also working hours in the previous period. Anticipating
that they will later work with flexitime, workers may alter their optimal first
period working hours because their incentives to accumulate human capital are
different under the flexitime and non-flexitime regimes. Particularly, if flexitime
is associated with high benefits and can be obtained at a low price, then it gives
people additional incentives to work in the labour market. When workers choose
to increase their working hours in the first period, knowing that they are going
to work in the flexible world in the next period, they accumulate more human
capital than they would in the non-flexitime world. In turn, the accumulated
human capital from the first period induces workers to increase their second period
working hours. Thus, the interaction between flexitime and workers’ human
capital accumulation process enables flexitime to have more nuanced effects on
workers’ labour supply decisions in the two period model.
3.4 Empirical Implications
This section tests the model predictions empirically. Admittedly, in the dynamic
model, flexitime has more nuanced effects on workers’ labour supply decisions
than it does in the static model. It would be interesting to know whether flexi-
time does affect workers’ life cycle labour supply decisions via its interaction with
the human capital accumulation process. However, it is difficult to empirically
test the predictions of the dynamic model. Particularly, it would be difficult
to test how flexitime affect workers’ labour supply in the previous period. I
can observe workers’ flexitime status in each period, but I cannot observe how
workers perceive their future flexible working opportunities. According to the dy-
namic model described in previous section, workers’ incentives to work is affected
by their future flexitime status because they know that they are going to work
with flexitime in the next period. However, in the data set, such information is
unavailable and we cannot distinguish workers who know their next period flexi-
time status and those who do not. In addition, according to the dynamic model,
both wage and past labour market experience are endogenous in workers’ hours
equation. It is difficult to find instruments for both of them to correct for the
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endogeneity issue in the system. Given the limitations discussed above, in this
section I focus on testing for the predictions of the static model only.
The model predicts (i) the effect of flexitime depends on the benefit to cost
ratio associated with flexitime. If flexitime is helpful with workers’ child care
production and can be obtained at a low price, then it can effectively increase
workers’ labour supply (prediction 1). If flexitime is not very helpful and ex-
pensive, then it might be the case that workers decrease their market work hours
when they work with flexitime. (ii)The increase in working hours under flexitime
regime is more likely to be observed among high human capital workers.
3.4.1 Data, Variable Definitions and Sample Statistics
The data used are from the British Household Panel Survey (Hereafter BHPS),
years 2001-2007. The BHPS is a national wide survey that includes comprehensive
information on workers’ labour market activities, demographic characteristics and
flexitime status. The survey started in 1991 and was conducted on a yearly basis.
I chose wave 11 (year 2001) to wave 17 (year 2007) for the sake of consistency
in the coding system.3 Because BHPS only asks respondents questions regarding
their flexitime status if the respondent are employed, only employed people are
kept in the sample.
In this chapter, a labour supply equation is estimated:
Hoursit = c+ ai + βF lexitimeit + Σ
M
m=1φmXimt + uit (3.20)
where Hoursit is the normal weekly working hours of individual i at time t, c
is constant, ai captures the individual unobserved heterogeneity, t is the time
index, Flexitimeit denotes workers’ flexitime status at time t, Ximt is a vector
including factors that may affect workers’ labour supply decisions, and uit is the
error term. Flexitimeit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent
works with flexitime at time t and 0 otherwise. Variables included in vector X
include ln(wage), age, agesq, Male, Children, Married, Non− labour income,
Education. The variable ln(wage) is the natural logarithm of workers’ real hourly
wage. Age records workers’ age at the interview. Agesq is the square of each
worker’s age. Male is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the respondent is
a male and 0 otherwise. Children is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the
worker has children under 16 and 0 if the worker does not have children under 16.
3Starting fro wave 11 (year 2001), samples from Scotland and Northern Ireland are included,
and a new industry and occupation coding system was introduced.
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Married denotes workers’ marital status. It takes value 1 if the worker is married
and 0 otherwise. Education is defined as the highest academic degrees held by
the respondent. Education is measured by the highest qualification obtained by
the respondent. BHPS divides workers’ educational degrees into 7 levels; higher
degree (postgraduate degrees), first degree, hnd, hnc, teaching degree, A level
qualification, O level qualification, Cse qualification, and No qualification.
Sample Statistics
Table 3.1 reports the sample statistics of those key variables in workers labour
supply equation (3.20). Most of the sample statistics are stable throughout the
sample period. The first row in table one displays the average real hourly wages
of all workers across seven years. Average real hourly wage has increased from
10.00 pounds in 2001 to 11.56 pounds in 2007. The percentage of workers that
work with flexitime fluctuates across years. It is relatively high in year 20014.
Average normal weekly working hours are around 37 hours. 47% of respondents
are male. On average, workers in my sample are 37 years old. 54% of them are
married, and 37% of respondents have children under age 16.
3.4.2 Testing For Prediction 1
In this section, I will focus on testing prediction 1. Prediction 1 suggests that
the effect of flexitime on workers’ labour supply decisions depends on the benefits
they can derive from working with flexitime (increased child care production
efficiency) relative to the cost (reduced wages). It is reasonable to assume that
female household members take the main responsibilities for child care production
in most households. Therefore, working mothers should be the group of workers
that can derive high benefits from working with flexitime. In addition, in my
second chapter, I find that flexitime decreases high wage workers’ wages, and
most high wage workers are male. This may be suggestive that female workers and
working mothers receive less wage penalty for working with flexitime than male
workers. Therefore, I estimate workers’ labour supply equation (3.20) keeping
all workers in my sample first, then I restrict my sample to female workers, and
finally I estimate equation (3.20) for working mothers only.
4Some of the respondents in wave 11 (year 2001) are interviewed in year 2002. If we cal-
culate the percentage of workers working with flexitime on calendar year basis rather than on
wave basis, then this spike is washed out. Manning and Petrongolo (2005) also find that the
percentage of workers with flexitime is slightly higher than other years in 2001 using Labour
Force Survey data, but the difference is not so big as suggested here.
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Table 3.1: Sample Statistics of Variables in Labour Supply Equation (3.20)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Wage 10.00 10.52 10.67 11.00 11.09 11.42 11.56
(6.25) (6.98) (7.55) (9.28) (7.22) (7.04) (7.40)
Flexitime .22 .14 .18 .15 .15 .15 .16
(.42) (.34) (.37) (.35) (.35) (.35) (.35)
Age 37.28 37.56 37.84 38.09 38.12 38.92 38.87
(12.11) (12.16) (12.29) (12.45) (12.52) (12.36) (12.51)
Married .54 .54 .54 .53 .52 .53 .53
(.49) (.49) (.49) (.49) (.50) (.50) (.50)
Children .37 .36 .36 .36 .36 .36 .36
(.48) (.48) (.48) (.48) (.48) (.48) (.48)
Male .47 .47 .47 .47 .47 .47 .47
(.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50)
Hours 37.31 37.10 36.91 36.74 36.62 36.75 36.86
(13.57) (13.09) (13.21) (13.17) (12.97) (12.58) 12.79
No.of obs 9148 8127 7953 7750 7567 7195 7049
Source: BHPS, years 2001-2007.
For each variable, both mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) are reported.
The Effect of Flexitime on Workers’ Weekly Working Hours
Table 3.2 reports the estimation results of equation (3.20) for different sets of
samples (all workers together, female workers, working mothers). According to
model prediction 1, flexitime should be effective in inducing working mothers
supply more market hours. In table 3.2, from left to right, the benefit to cost
ratio associated with flexitime should be in ascending order. Workers’ labour
supply equation (3.20) is estimated using a random effects model, because within
each person, the variation of hours is small over years.
According to table 3.2, the presence of children in the household decreases
the workweek by 3.42 hours. Education level increases workers’ hours choice.
Workers with no academic degrees work around 5.30 hours less per week than
workers holding higher education degrees (postgraduate degrees). If we can treat
workers’ education degree as a proxy for their human capital levels, then it is
clear from table 3.2 that human capital is associated with an increased incentive
to work, which confirms the model’s prediction.
In all three regressions, a negative relationship between wages and working
hours is reported, which suggests that an increase in workers’ wages induces them
to reduce their weekly working hours. This seems to be at odds with conventional
literature on labour supply. According to standard labour supply models, work-
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Table 3.2: Estimation Results of Workers’ Labour Supply Equation (3.20), Ran-
dom Effects




Flexitime -.287∗∗∗ .095 .713∗∗∗
(.107) (.155) (.231)
ln(wage) -1.765∗∗∗ -1.795∗∗∗ -1.596∗∗∗
(.115) (.286) (.415)
Age .874∗∗∗ .815∗∗∗ .184
(.040) (.068) (.193)
Age squared -.012∗∗∗ -.011∗∗∗ -.0001
(.0005) (.0009) (.003)




Non-labour -.0002∗∗∗ -.0002∗∗∗ -.0001∗∗
income (1.00e-05) (.00005) (.00004)
Education First degree -.494 -1.508∗∗ -2.772∗
(.434) (.750) (1.437)
Hnd teaching -2.330∗∗∗ -3.842∗∗∗ -4.293∗∗∗
(.487) (.860) (1.492)
A level -3.062∗∗∗ -4.862∗∗∗ -5.657∗∗∗
(.437) (.778) (1.460)
O level -3.607∗∗∗ -6.434∗∗∗ -6.911∗∗∗
(.433) (.792) (1.503)
Cse qualification -4.696∗∗∗ -9.015∗∗∗ -9.440∗∗∗
(.533) (.914) (1.588)
No qualification -5.306∗∗∗ -9.890∗∗∗ -8.747∗∗∗
(.468) (.851) (1.570)
Constant 26.69∗∗∗ 32.58∗∗∗ 31.336∗∗∗
(.83) (1.44) (3.76)
R squared .24 .18 .04
No. of obs 50669 26430 10189
Source: BHPS, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is normal weekly working hours. Equation (3.20) is estimated by
a random effects model.
Time dummies are also included in the regression to control for the aggregate shock of each
year.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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ers’ labour supply can respond to wages either positively or negatively, depending
on whether the substitution effect or income effect dominates. Usually the negat-
ive relations between wages and labour supply are only found among workers with
very high wages. In most empirical studies, wage elasticity of labour supply is
positive (Heckman and Killingsworth, 1986). However, there is also literature re-
porting a negative wage elasticity to labour supply in the panel dimension. When
estimating workers labour supply equation using panel data, Smith Conway and
Kniesner (1994) also find persistent negative relationship between labour supply
and wages, and that relationship is robust through many specifications.
A possible reason for this could be that within the individual, the real hourly
wage is increasing over time, while the working hours may remain relatively stable
due to labour market restrictions or even slightly decrease over time. Therefore,
the negative relationship between wages and real hourly wage is not entirely
surprising in the panel dimension. Heckman (1993) points out that the measure-
ment error in workers’ self reported data may also lead to this problem. Heckman
(1993) suggests that measurement errors in hourly wages are positively correlated
with workers’ characteristics such as education, and measurement errors in hours
are negatively correlated with its true values. As a result, a negative relationship
between hourly wage and workers’ hours is observed. In addition, workers face
hours constraints imposed by firms, which means that they cannot choose their
working hours freely (Altonji and Paxson, 1992). Models of implicit lifetime
contracts suggest that workers’ wages and the value of their marginal product
may diverge at a given point of time. When wage exceeds the value of marginal
product, firms may restrict workers from working longer hours. When the value
of marginal product surpasses the wage, then firms may restrict workers form
working fewer hours (Kahn and Lang, 1992). In other words, firms prevent work-
ers from working long hours if they are overpaid. Therefore, we may observe a
negative relationship between workers’ wages and their working hours over years,
as suggested by table 3.2.
The key variable of interest is the dummy variable denoting workers’ flexitime
status. When all workers are put together, the flexitime coefficient is negative
and significant. This suggests that workers who work with flexitime supply fewer
weekly working hours than workers who do not work with flexitime. As per the
model prediction, this could be the result of a low benefit to cost ratio associated
with working flexibly. For example, flexitime gives workers the ability to decide
when they start and end work. If the worker is engaged in a job requiring long
working hours each day, she may not be able to derive much utility from working
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with flexitime since there is not much room for her to vary her working time.
As a result, we find a negative relationship between flexitime and working hours.
This may be particularly true for male workers since they may not enjoy many
benefits from flexitime, or because they need to pay high costs when working with
flexitime.
After restricting the sample to female workers only, we can find that the
flexitime coefficient becomes positive, though insignificant. When the sample is
further restrained to contain only working mothers, the positive effect of flexible
working on labour supply decisions is significant at the 1% level . The fourth
column shows that on average workers with flexitime work 0.71 hours more than
those who do not have flexitime. It can be seen that the effect of flexitime
is more prominent among working mothers than other workers. This finding
confirms model prediction 1. Workers will be induced to increase their working
hours if the benefit to cost ratio brought by flexitime is high enough (Flexitime
can increase child care production efficiency a lot and can be obtained at low
price). Compared to male workers and childless female workers, working mothers
may enjoy highest benefits from flexitime. It is also reasonable to assume that
it is easier for working mothers to obtain flexitime at a lower costs with many
legislations aiming at helping female workers with their family responsibilities.
As a result, working mothers respond to flexitime by increasing their working
hours.
Estimations using fixed effects are also conducted and tell the same story.
Table 3.3 displays the coefficient estimates of Flexitime using a fixed effects
model. According to estimation results using a fixed effect model, flexitime is
still most effective in increasing working mothers’ weekly working hours. Though
statistically the fixed effects model produces consistent estimates, it only picks up
variations within individuals. This is also reflected by the low R squared reported
in table.
I also tried adding workers’ union membership into the labour supply equation
to see whether that alters the estimation results significantly. Workers who are
union members may have high bargaining power when negotiating contracts with
their employers. Possibly they are more likely to have flexitime than workers
without union membership. Table B.1 in appendix B displays the estimation
results with union membership as an additional control variable. Across all three
specifications, the variable “union” is positively associated with workers’ working
hours, suggesting that union members work more than non-union members. More
importantly, adding union status as an additional control into workers’ wage
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Table 3.3: Estimation Results of Labour Supply Equation (3.20): Fixed Effects
All workers Female workers Working mothers
Flexitime -.07 .18 .70***
(.13) (.17) (.24)
R squared .04 .06 .05
Source: BHPS, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is normal weekly working hours. Equation
(3.20) is estimated by a fixed effects model. Other control variables
included are the same as in table 3.2.
Time dummies are also included in the regression to control for the
aggregate shock of each year.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard
error is reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels.
*: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***:
significant at the 1% level.
equation does not qualitatively alter the coefficient estimates of flexitime. Table
B.1 shows that flexitime can effectively increase working mothers’ labour supply.
When all workers are pooled together, flexitime is associated with fewer weekly
working hours. When the sample is restricted to contain female workers only,
flexitime has insignificant effect on workers’ weekly working hours.
We also must consider the fact that workers’ wages are endogenous in the
labour supply equation. As discussed above, firms may choose to set wages and
hours simultaneously according to the efficiency contract models (Kahn and Lang,
1992). Moffitt (1984) argues that workers’ wage rates depend on their hours,
and extends the conventional labour supply model by making wages endogenous.
Failing to correct for the endogneity of wages in the labour supply equation may
lead to biased estimation results. This simultaneity problem may be solved by
the instrumental variable approach. The existing literature often use two types of
information as the instruments for wages. The first type of information is workers’
own characteristics. Mroz (1987) summarizes that workers’ characteristics, such
as high order terms of age, years of education, and the interaction term of age
and education could be used as instruments for their wages. In addition, factors
on the demand side may also be useful in specifying workers’ wage equation.
Moffitt (1984) uses three area variables (size of labour force in the respondent’s
region, the employment fractions in manufacturing and in government in the
census region of residence) to specify the workers’ wage equation. The rationale
is that such information reflects the aggregate wage level and the general labour
market characteristics which may affect workers’ wage levels.
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Following Moffitt (1984)’s style, in this chapter, I use area variables as in-
struments for workers’ wages5. Since BHPS only contains information about the
workers’ side, I use the regional dummies as the instruments for workers’ wages.
I created a dummy variable London which takes value 1 if the respondent lives
in London and 0 otherwise. I also created another variable Scotland that takes
value 1 if the respondent lives in Scotland. These regional dummies contain in-
formation on the characteristics of local labour market, which may also affect
the wage levels of workers in that area. In addition, I also include an ethnicity
dummy white as instrument for wage. It takes value 1 if the respondent is white
and 0 otherwise. It is well documented that workers’ ethnicity group affects their
wages (Blau and Beller 1992). Table 3.4 reports the estimation results of work-
ers’ labour supply equation (3.20) using 2SLS, and table 3.5 gives the first stage
estimation results.
According to table 3.4, after correcting for the endogeneity of the variable
ln(wage), the negative relationship between wage and workers’ weekly working
hours disappears in all three specifications. When all workers are pooled to-
gether, wage has a positive effect on workers’ labour supply, suggesting that a
high wage induces more weekly working hours. This is similar to what has been
reported in most of the previous literature (Heckman and Killingsworth, 1986).
When the sample is restricted to contain only female workers, the positive rela-
tionship between wage and working hours persists. When only working mothers
are kept in the sample, wages seem to have little effect on workers’ labour supply
decisions. The changes in the signs of the wage coefficient from table 3.2 to table
3.4 suggest that treating the wage as endogenous does matter when specifying
workers’ labour supply equation. Besides, the instrumental variable approach is
also helpful for correcting the potential measurement error that may arise dur-
ing the construction of the hourly wage variable. Particularly, the hourly wage is
calculated by dividing workers’ labour income by their working hours. Any meas-
urement error in workers’ weekly working hours may lead to a spurious negative
correlation between wage and weekly working hours (Mroz, 1987). The changed
signs of the wage coefficient may also be the outcome of reduced measurement
error.
5I also tried using workers’ characteristics suggested by Mroz (1987) as instruments, such
as age, age squared, experience, experience squared, cubic and quartic terms in ages and ex-
perience, interaction terms of education dummies and experience. However, they all failed the
over-identification test, which means that they cannot serve as proper instruments for wages.
Mroz (1987) also suggests spousal income and spousal experience as possible instruments. How-
ever, the spousal information does not fit in this chapter for around 44% of workers in my sample
are not married.
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Table 3.4: 2SLS Estimation Results of Workers’ Labour Supply Equation




Flexitime -.578∗∗∗ -.329∗ .719∗
(.132) (.196) (.400)
ln(wage) 4.089∗∗ 4.625∗∗∗ .295
(2.040) (1.587) (4.026)
Age .462∗∗∗ .566∗∗∗ .288
(.145) (.101) (.180)
Age squared -.007∗∗∗ -.009∗∗∗ -.002
(.002) (.001) (.002)
Union .595∗ 1.904∗∗∗ 3.064∗∗∗
(.326) (.382) (.860)




Non-labour -.0002∗∗∗ -.0003∗∗∗ -.0002∗∗∗
income (1.00e-05) (.00002) (.00002)
Education First degree .146 -.988∗∗ -1.932∗
(.464) (.486) (1.069)
Hnd teaching -.715 -2.295∗∗∗ -3.357∗
(.736) (.722) (1.919)
A level -.540 -2.192∗∗∗ -4.060∗
(.938) (.830) (2.241)
O level -.317 -2.533∗∗∗ -4.766∗
(1.127) (.982) (2.568)
Cse qualification -.819 -4.005∗∗∗ -6.789∗∗
(1.367) (1.173) (2.926)
No qualification -.938 -4.646∗∗∗ -6.141∗
(1.528) (1.286) (3.364)
Constant 20.657∗∗∗ 22.640∗∗∗ 24.763∗∗∗
(2.221) (2.313) (8.062)
No. of obs 50606 26354 10169
Over-identification test fail (p=0.03) pass (p=0.90) pass (p=0.46)
Source: BHPS, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is normal weekly working hours. Equation (3.20) is estimated by
2SLS with random effects. The endogenous variable is ln(wage). The instruments used are
London, Scotland, white.
Time dummies are also included in the regression to control for the aggregate shock of each
year.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.5: First Stage Estimation Results
All workers Female workers Working mothers
London .145*** .217*** .182***
(.016) (.018) (.040)
Scotland -.019** -.007 .005
(.010) (.010) (.019)
White .052** .046* .016
(.027) (.028) (.054)
Source: BHPS, years 2001-2007.
This table reports the first stage regression of the 2SLS estimation
of workers’ labour supply equation (3.20). The dependent variable is
ln(wage).
Other control variables include: Age, Age squared, Union,
Flexitime, Married, Children, Male, Non labour income, Edu-
cation dummies, year dummies.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard
error is reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance
levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level.
***: significant at the 1% level.
As shown in table 3.4, people react to flexitime differently. The pattern is the
same as that displayed in table 3.2. Generally flexitime is associated with fewer
working hours among workers. But when I focus on working mothers only, I find
that flexitime is positively correlated with working hours. In other words, after
correcting for the endogeneity of wages, I still find that flexitime can effectively
increase working mothers’ labour supply.
Table 3.5 gives the coefficient estimates of those instruments in the first stage
estimation, where ln(wage) is regressed on the instruments and all the other
exogenous control variables in workers’ labour supply equation. It shows that
workers who live in London earn more than workers living in other areas of the
United Kingdom. Meanwhile, workers in Scotland seem to earn slightly lower
wages, but this area effect is insignificant among female workers and working
mothers. Furthermore, as shown by the second and third column of table 3.5,
white workers receive higher wages than workers with other ethnicities. However,
the variable white is not significant in working mothers wage equation, suggesting
that ethnicity may have little effect on working mothers’ wages. The first stage
estimation results show that at least some of the instruments are correlated with
the endogenous variable ln(wage).
In addition, over-identification tests are also conducted to test whether all
instruments included are not correlated with the error term of the labour supply
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equation. As shown in the last row of table 3.4, the instruments pass the over-
identification test in female workers’ labour supply equation and working mothers’
labour supply equation. However, they do not pass the over-identification tests
when all workers are kept in the sample. The suggests that at least one of the
three instruments are correlated with the error term in workers’ labour supply
equation when all workers are kept in the sample. Given this, the instruments
chosen here are not entirely satisfactory. I have also tried other possible area
dummies such as Wales, North Ireland, but they fail the over-identification test
in all three specifications. Despite the imperfections of the instruments, I adopt
the 2SLS approach to see whether correcting for the endogeneity of ln(wage)
helps to get more accurate estimates of workers’ labour supply equation.
In conclusion, in this section, I find that flexitime can effectively increase
working mothers’ labour supply. This empirical finding is in line with model
prediction 1, since working mothers may be the group of workers that can de-
rive much benefit from working with flexitime, and possibly they can work with
flexitime at a low price.
Robustness Check 1: Correcting for Sample Selection Biases
Regressions using random effects imply positive relations between working moth-
ers’ labour supply and the flexitime working arrangements. However, this es-
timation strategy is subject to some shortcomings. We only observe workers’
labour market characteristics such as wages and flexitime status when they are
employed. Obviously those people who stay in the employment pool are not a
random sample of the whole population. Failing to correct for the self-selection
process may lead to biased estimation.
In this chapter, panel techniques rather than cross sectional techniques are
used to explore the relationship between flexitime and workers’ labour supply
decisions. I follow the method discussed in (Wooldridge, 2010, chap. 19) to correct
the sample selection problem in the panel dimension. The structural equation of
interest is given by (3.20). Let sit denote the selection status of respondents.
sit = 1 means the person is selected into the sample (i.e. the person is employed
in that period) while sit = 0 indicates that the person supplies zero market hours
in that period. The selection process is assumed to be
sit = 1[b+ Σ
M
m=1ϕmXim +$House statusi + θhealthi + vit > 0] (3.21)
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Equation (3.21) underlines the sample selection process. The vector Xi in-
cludes all the variables in the structural model (3.20) that can be observed among
all workers. Note here Xi not only includes the explanatory variables in the cur-
rent period but also contains all their lags, because the selection process is not
only determined by current period situations, but also past information. In order
to preserve more degrees of freedom, when estimating the sample selection equa-
tion I follow Mundlak‘s (1978) procedure. Instead of having all the explanatory
variables of each period, I use the variables in the current period as well as their
time averages.
Two additional variables are added to identify the selection process. The first
is theHouse statusi, which records the housing status of the respondent: whether
she owns the house she lives in, or has a mortgage, or rents it. Housing status is
a good signal of people’s financial status, which may significantly affect workers’
participation decisions. Another variable is the health indicator–healthi, which
records whether the respondents think their own health status prevents them
from participating in the labour market.
Following Wooldridge (2010), I first estimate a probit regression of (3.21) for
each time period and then collect all the inverse mill ratios, λit. Then I run a
pooled regression of equation (3.20), including all the inverse mill ratios from
the probit regression and the time averages of all explanatory variables in the
structural equation. Table 3.6 reports the estimation results after correcting the
sample selection bias. Now there are two coefficients reported for each explan-
atory variable (except for Flexitime and Male). One is for the control variable
in the current period, and the other is the coefficient associated with the time
average of that particular explanatory variable. The time average of Flexitime
is not included because it is highly correlated with Flexitime itself. Including
both would lead to multicollinearity which makes both coefficients insignificant.
Since I am interested in both quantitative and qualitative effects of flexitime on
workers’ labour supply, only workers’ flexitime status in the current period is kept
the equation.
Most estimation results do not differ very much from table 3.2. Children and
non-labour income act as disincentives to market work. One significant change is
that the coefficients associated with wages are positive after correcting for sample
selection bias; suggesting it is important to correct for the fact that workers are
non-randomly selected in to employment.
The qualitative relationship between workers’ working hours and flexitime
remains unchanged in table 3.6. Working mothers are most likely to respond
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Table 3.6: Correcting for Sample Selection
All workers Female workers Working mothers
(1) (2) (3)
Flexitime -1.446∗∗∗ -.386∗∗ .550∗∗
(.120) (.155) (.264)
Male 9.491∗∗∗ n/a n/a
(.103)
ln(wage) 1.032∗∗∗ 3.133*** .754*** 4.182*** 1.752*** 3.354***
(.258) (.235) (.343) (.372) (.530) (.592)
Age .495** -.125 .593*** -.058 -.945** 1.498***
(.119) (.121) (.160) (.165) (.392) (.396)
Age squared -.006*** .0001 -.005*** -.002 .018*** -.025***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.004) (.004)
Married -.440*** -.662*** -1.121*** -2.305*** -.517 -3.822***
(.281) (.309) (.369) (.406) (.612) (.675)
Children -2.826*** -1.353** -4.995*** -2.880*** n/a
(.249) ( .281) (.363) (.415)
Non-labour -.0001*** .-0002*** -.0002*** -.0002*** -.00006 -.0004***
income (.00003) (.00004) (.00005) (.00006) (.00004) (.00007)
Education First Degree .057 -.507 .261 -1.440 -4.025 3.442
(1.41) (1.465) (1.629) (1.716) (4.096) (4.185)
Hnd,teaching 1.006 -2.463 1.020 -3.600* -1.481 .234
( 1.791) (1.832) (2.068) ( 2.140) (3.878) (3.968)
A level -1.412 .478 -.368 -2.215 -7.575* 6.032
(1.578) (1.619) (1.827) (1.901) (4.461) (4.533)
O level -1.598 .875 -2.825 .015 -7.372 5.534
(1.701) (1.741) (2.057) (2.125) (4.779) (4.845)
Cse -3.101 2.117 -5.724* 1.434 -8.578 4.741
(2.348) (2.377) (3.176) (3.223) (5.720) (5.779)
No qualification -.359 -1.029 -1.313 -3.460 -7.202 5.002
(2.039) (2.066) (2.848) (2.898) (6.099) (6.152)
Poor health -.819*** -.332 -.750** -.603 -1.168* 2.024
(.277) (.418) (.355) (.547) (.648) (.974)
House in .194 1.570*** .239 2.085*** -.328 1.440
Mortgage (.267) (.320) (.363) (.437) (.820) (.975)
Renting House -.127 2.372*** .124 2.345*** -2.054** 2.802**
(.357) (.412) (.492) (.566) (1.026) (1.188)
Constant 22.347*** 23.211*** 17.292***
(1.035) (1.408) (3.263)
R squared 0.27 0.24 0.11
No.of obs 50602 26400 10184
Source: BHPS, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is normal weekly working hours.
Time dummies are also included in the regression to control for the aggregate shock of each year.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote
significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
Column 3, 5 and 7 report the coefficients estimates of the control variable specified in column 1 at current period while
column 4, 6 and 8 report the coefficient estimates of the time averages of those control variables. The mean of ’male’ is
not included in the regression because workers’ genders do not change over time.
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to flexitime by increasing their working hours. Working mothers with flexitime
work 0.550 more hours each week than those who do not have flexitime. Still,
when all workers are pooled together, flexitime is associated fewer hours, and this
relationship also persists when only female workers are kept in the regression.
Due to the nature of the regression, no causal relationship can be inferred from
the estimation, but at least this provides some information about how flexitime
affects different types of workers’ labour supply decisions.
Robustness Check 2: Distinguishing Full time and Part time workers
As has been mentioned above, the variation of weekly working hours may be quite
small. It is not easy for workers to choose their optimal working hours due to cer-
tain labour market frictions. Given such considerations, I focus on workers’ labour
supply by looking at their full time work status. Instead of exploring the effect of
flexitime on weekly working hours, I investigated whether flexitime increases the
chances of full time work. BHPS uses objective measurements to record whether
the respondent is working full time or part time. Workers whose weekly working
hours are below 30 hours are considered part time workers. Compared to full time
workers, part time workers may have greater freedom in adjusting their working
hours.
In this section, I conduct two types of analysis. First, I investigate whether
flexitime increases workers’ chances of working fulltime. Second, I estimate the
labour supply equation (3.20) for full time workers and part time workers separ-
ately to see whether flexitime has different effects on them.
The model describing workers’ full time status can be written as
Fulltimeit = d+ a2i + π lnwageit + µF lexitimeit + Σ
M
m=1φmXimt + ξit (3.22)
where Fulltimeit is the dependent variable, which denotes whether the worker is
a full time worker or not at time t. It takes value 1 if the worker works full time
and 0 otherwise. a2i is the individual unobserved effect (not to be confused with
the unobserved effect in equation (3.20)), Xit includes all workers’ characteristics
that may affect their labour supply choices at time t. ξit is the error term.
Equation (3.22) is estimated by a probit model with random effects. Table
3.7 reports the estimation results of equation (3.22).
According to table 3.7, flexitime is associated with higher chances of working
full time. Overall, workers with flexitime are 9% more likely to work full time
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Table 3.7: Estimation Results of Workers’ Full Time Status Equation (3.22)




Flexitime .091∗∗ .141∗∗∗ .196∗∗∗
(.042) (.047) (.069)
ln(wage) .096∗∗ .060 .006
(.040) (.048) (.076)
Age .293∗∗∗ .205∗∗∗ .057
(.015) (.017) (.049)
Age squared -.004∗∗∗ -.003∗∗∗ -.00008
(.0002) (.0002) (.0007)




Non-labour -.00006∗∗∗ -.00005∗∗∗ -.00003∗∗∗
income (4.13e-06) (5.40e-06) (6.85e-06)
Education First degree -.044 -.147 -.361
(.162) (.192) (.357)
Hnd teaching -.452∗∗ -.626∗∗∗ -.723∗
(.177) (.210) (.376)
A level -.577∗∗∗ -.757∗∗∗ -.969∗∗∗
(.160) (.191) (.354)
O level -.749∗∗∗ -1.011∗∗∗ -1.115∗∗∗
(.159) (.189) (.347)
Cse -1.277∗∗∗ -1.744∗∗∗ -1.751∗∗∗
(.188) (.227) (.392)
No qualification -1.345∗∗∗ -1.744∗∗∗ -1.421∗∗∗
(.169) (.203) (.377)
Constant -2.381∗∗∗ -.122 -.914
(.305) (.363) (.966)
Log Likelihood -12855 -9880 -4646
No. of obs 50669 26430 10189
Source: BHPS, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is Fulltime. Equation (3.22) is estimated by a probit model with
random effects.
Time dummies are also included in the regression to control for the aggregate shock of each
year.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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than workers without flexitime. This effect is even bigger among female workers
and working mothers than that of all workers pooled together. This shows that
flexitime might affect workers’ labour supply decisions on the extensive margin.
Given that 90% of part time workers are female, and only 4% of the male workers
work part time, a tentative conclusion is that the positive effect of flexitime on
workers’ full time working status is mainly driven by female workers.
Labour market frictions may prevent workers from choosing the exact amount
of hours they prefer, but workers can still choose to work full time or part time.
Compared to other European labour markets, British labour market features high
female participation rates. Most female workers, especially those with children,
work part time. In the BHPS data, more than half (56%) of the female workers
work part time. If the introduction of flexitime can encourage more workers to
work full time, then it could result in a substantial increase in the total labour
supply of all workers. Part time work opportunities can be thought as flexible
working schedules too. However, female workers who choose part time work
usually end up with jobs that are below their education level and accumulated
labour market experiences (Connolly and Gregory, 2008). Based on the results
discussed above, flexitime helps workers stay in or move to a full time job, which
reduces the inefficiencies involved in balancing work and home production.
In order to investigate the possible different effects of flexitime on full time
workers’ and part time workers’ labour supply decisions, I estimate the full time
and part time workers’ labour supply equations separately. Table 3.8 reports the
estimation results of equation (3.20) for part time workers only. Compared to full
time workers, the variation in part time workers’ hours should be bigger. More
importantly, part time workers work far less than their time endowment. This
means that there is room for them to increase their labour supply. Therefore, I
expect that the positive effect of flexitime on workers’ market hours will be bigger
among part time workers than among full time workers. Table 3.8 reveals a similar
pattern as shown in table 3.2. When all workers are pooled together, flexitime
has little effect on part time workers’ weekly working hours. However, when only
working mothers are kept in the sample, the estimated coefficient is positive,
which suggests that flexitime may increase part time working mothers’ labour
supply. However, we may see that though the flexitime coefficient in working
mothers’ equation is positive and significant, the size is small: flexitime increases
working mothers weekly hours by 0.356. This might be because part time workers
supply relative low number of working hours into the market; they have plenty of
time devoted to child care. Working with flexitime may not increase their child
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care production by enough to induce them increase their market hours by a large
amount.
Table 3.9 reports the regression results for full time workers only. Unlike part
time workers, full time workers’ working hours exhibit a negative relationship
with flexitime. Such negative relationship is not significant in working mothers’
hours equation, which suggests that flexitime has little effect in increasing full
time working mothers’ labour supply.
A possible explanation for this negative relationship may be that some full
time jobs require workers to stay at work for extraordinarily long hours. In this
case, it might involve an enormous cost for the firm to provide flexitime to work-
ers. Meanwhile, workers can not benefit much from flexitime since long working
hours imply that there is not much room for them to vary their working hours.
Therefore, these workaholic workers do not work with flexitime, and this could
render the signs of the flexitime coefficients for full time workers to negative.
Besides, no matter how helpful flexitime is in helping workers with their child
care production, workers cannot supply more market hours than their time en-
dowments. Full time workers already supply substantial working hours into the
labour market, and there is little room for them to further increase their labour
supply.
From tables 3.7 to 3.9, it can be seen that among full time workers, people
who work with flexitime work less than those without flexitime. Flexitime can
effectively increase part time working mothers’ working hours. More importantly,
flexitime increases the possibility of working full time. Possibly flexitime induces
part time workers to increase their working hours, until they become full time
workers. At this stage, with the help of flexitime, they already supply more mar-
ket hours compared to other part time workers without flexitime, but compared
to other full time workers, they still belong to the “low market hour” category.
Consequently, we may observe flexitime is associated with lower working hours
among full time workers.
In summary, this section shows how workers’ labour supply responds differ-
ently to flexitime when they have different benefit to cost ratio associated with
flexitime. Working mothers benefit from flexitime most, therefore they respond to
flexitime by increase their working hours. Meanwhile, flexitime is also associated
with higher chances of working full time for female workers.
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Table 3.8: Part Time Workers’ Weekly Hours Equation (3.20), Random Effects




Flexitime .227 .183 .356∗
(.148) (.155) (.187)
ln(wage) -1.420∗∗∗ -1.322∗∗∗ -.840∗∗∗
(.192) (.211) (.282)
Age .470∗∗∗ .499∗∗∗ -.043
(.052) (.059) (.141)
Age squared -.006∗∗∗ -.006∗∗∗ .001
(.0007) (.0007) (.002)




Non-labour -.00004 -.00004 -.00003
income (.00003) (.00003) (.00003)
Education First degree .260 -.285 -.004
(.665) (.718) (.944)
Hnd, teaching .017 -.671 -.661
(.717) (.779) (1.053)
A level .126 -.364 -.444
(.649) (.704) (.948)
O level -.521 -1.235∗ -1.236
(.641) (.696) (.945)
Cse -1.265∗ -2.134∗∗∗ -2.264∗∗
(.713) (.771) (1.019)
No qualification -1.752∗∗∗ -2.520∗∗∗ -2.481∗∗
(.661) (.721) (1.010)
Cosntant 13.941∗∗∗ 14.250∗∗∗ 21.237∗∗∗
(1.174) (1.302) (2.642)
R squared .02 .04 .005
Number of obs 9826 8922 5236
Source: BHPS, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is workers normal weekly working hours. Only part time workers
are kept in the sample. Equation (3.20) is estimated by a Random effects model.
Time dummies are also included in the regression to control for the aggregate shock of each
year.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.9: Full Time Workers Weekly Working Hours Equation (3.20), Random
Effects




Flexitime -.658∗∗∗ -.522∗∗∗ -.102
(.104) (.124) (.213)
ln(wage) -1.436∗∗∗ -1.203∗∗∗ -.892∗∗
(.224) (.255) (.447)
Age .378∗∗∗ .274∗∗∗ -.036
(.040) (.050) (.156)
Age squared -.005∗∗∗ -.004∗∗∗ .0007
(.0005) (.0006) (.002)




Non-labour -.00002 -.00004∗∗ -.00006∗∗∗
-income (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
First degree -.630 -1.330∗∗ -1.917∗
(.411) (.551) (1.019)
Hnd, teaching -1.856∗∗∗ -3.024∗∗∗ -3.389∗∗∗
(.455) (.624) (1.117)
A level -2.219∗∗∗ -3.877∗∗∗ -4.057∗∗∗
(.416) (.565) (1.057)
O level -2.137∗∗∗ -4.488∗∗∗ -4.645∗∗∗
(.423) (.568) (1.044)
Cse -1.795∗∗∗ -4.708∗∗∗ -5.085∗∗∗
(.493) (.646) (1.172)
No qualification -2.300∗∗∗ -5.752∗∗∗ -5.003∗∗∗
(.474) (.629) (1.166)
Constant 38.563*** 42.341*** 44.757***
(.785) (1.032) (2.979)
R squared .07 .06 .03
No.of obs 40732 17414 4903
Source: BHPS, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is workers normal weekly working hours. Only full time workers
are kept in the sample. Equation (3.20) is estimated by a Random effects model.
Time dummies are also included in the regression to control for the aggregate shock of each
year.
For each variable, coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in the
parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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3.4.3 Testing For Prediction 2
The model in described in section 3.3 predicts that if flexitime is very helpful in
increasing child care production, then workers will increase their working hours,
and workers with high human capital level will increase their hours more. If
flexitime is not very helpful or involves large cost, only workers with high levels
of human capital may increase their working hours, or high human capital workers
are less likely to decrease their working hours with the help of flexitime. On the
firms’ side, they also have incentives to ask high human capital workers to work
more hours in exchange for working flexitime. In summary, the working hours
responses to flexitime are more likely to be positive (or less negative) for high
human capital workers. In this section, this prediction 2 will be tested empirically.
In order to test prediction 2, two types information are used as proxies for
workers’ human capital level. The first one is workers’ labour market experi-
ence6, which reflects how long workers have participated in the labour market.
The second is workers’ education. Since the BHPS does not record exactly how
many years the respondent has been working in the labour market, I follow the
standard approach in labour economics to calculate the labour market experience,
i.e. subtracting school leaving age from their age. Next I add an interaction term
of workers’ experience and flexitime Exp∗ flexitime into workers’ working hours
equation (3.20) to see whether flexitime increases the labour supply of more ex-
perienced workers more than workers with little market experience. In this case,
the labour supply equation to be estimated is:
Hit = e+ a3i + β2Flexitimeit
+ υ1Experienceit + υ2Exp ∗ flexitimeit + ΣMm=1ϑmXimt + εit (3.23)
where Experienceit is workers’ labour market experience, Exp∗flexitimeit is the
interaction term, e is the constant, and εit is the error term. Since the effect of
flexitime varies according to the length of working hours, workers are divided into
three degree based on their weekly working hours: higher than 40 hours per week,
less than 30 hours per week, and those between 30 to 40 hours per week. The idea
is that the effect of flexitime on workers’ labour supply could be hump shaped.
For workers who already supply long hours, flexitime is of little use since they do
not have much freedom to vary their working hours. For workers who supply few
hours into the labour market, flexitime is not helpful either since they already
6The BHPS does not contain a proper measure of tenure. It only records how many days
workers are working with current position rather than with current firm.
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have enough time to take care of children. Flexitime should be most effective in
increasing middle-level-market-hour workers’ labour supply. For one thing they
still have some space to increase their market hours, for another flexitime also
gives them greater freedom than conventional 9-5 working schedules so that they
can take better care of their children. Firms, on the other hand side, may also
be interested in increasing middle-working-hours workers’ labour supply since
workers who work over 40 hours per week already supply labour close to their
time endowment.
Table 3.10 reports the estimation results of equation (3.23). The first panel of
table 3.10 displays the estimation results of equation (3.23) when I keep workers
with all kinds of working hours together. Similar to what was reported in table
3.2, flexitime is associated with greater working hours among working mothers.
In general, the interaction term of experience and flexitime is not statistically sig-
nificant in workers’ labour supply equation (3.23), suggesting that workers with
long labour market experience do not increase their working hours more under
a flexitime regime than workers with relatively short labour market experience.
The second panel reports the estimation results for workers with very long hours
(higher than 40 hours per week). Among those workers, flexitime is negatively
correlated with working hours (or flexitime is jointly significant with the interac-
tion term Exp∗flexitime). The results show that flexitime decreases the working
hours of those who already supply long hours into the labour market, and workers
with longer labour market experience are observed to have their working hours
decreased more than those with short labour market experience. This contradicts
the model’s prediction. However, workers in this category already supply many
hours into the labour market, flexitime may be off little use to them since they do
not have much room to vary their work schedule. In addition, firms may also be
reluctant to provide flexitime to employees in very senior positions. As sugges-
ted by the descriptive evidence in table 1.4, some firms do not allow employees
with managerial positions to work flexitime. Meanwhile, those workers with very
senior positions in the company also tend to have greater labour market exper-
ience. Therefore, when we focus on the group of workers whose weekly working
hours are long, flexitime is negatively correlated with workers’ working hours, and
some times long market experience reinforces such negative effects. As for workers
who supply a middle level of working hours (between 30 and 40 hours per week),
I find that working with flexitime increases female workers’ and working mothers’
labour supply, but the interaction term has little effect on workers’ labour supply.
As discussed above, this group of workers is expected to react to flexitime more
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Table 3.10: Estimation Results of Weekly Working Hours Equation (3.23)
All Workers Female Workers Working Mothers
All workers together:
Flexitime -.075 .072 1.443***
(.226) (.303) (.536)
Experience .401*** .338*** -.001
(.023) (.031) (.07)
Exp*flexitime -.009 .005 -.050
(.011) (.015) (.033)
R squared .23 .13 .02
No. of obs 48008 25228 10461
Workers with weekly hours higher than 40
Flexitime -.335a -1.082*** -.683b
(.260) (.31) (.601)
Experience .156*** .159*** .253***
(.021) (.03) (.079)
Exp*flexitime -.011 .001 -.011
(.013) (.02) (.048)
R squared .02 .03 .04
No. of obs 21781 6534 1793
Workers with weekly hours between 30 and 40
Flexitime .082 .155* .523**
(.060) (.08) (.250)
Experience .008 .003 .005
(.005) (.007) (.027)
Exp*flexitime -.004 -.003 -.024
(.003) (.004) (.015)
R squared .05 .02 .01
No. of obs 14362 8115 3256
Workers with weekly hours lower than 30
Flexitime .390 .221 .263
(.282) (.309) (.487)
Experience .300*** .304*** .103**
(.022) (.024) (.052)
Exp*flexitime -.013 -.010 .002
(.012) (.010) (.030)
R squared .02 .02 .007
No. of obs 10453 9378 5412
a Flexitime and Exp ∗ Flexitime are joint significant at 1% level.
b Flexitime and Exp ∗ Flexitime are joint significant at 10% level.
Source: BHPS, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is workers normal weekly working hours. Equation (3.23) is
estimated by a random effects model. Other controls included are: ln(wage), Male,
Married, Children, Experience squared, Non labour income, Education dummies.
Time dummies are also included in the regression to control for the aggregate shock
of each year.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported
in the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10%
level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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sensitively (and positively) than the other two groups of workers because they can
benefit more from working flexitime and there is room for them to increase their
labour supply. However, as shown by the empirical results in table 3.10, in this
category, workers with long labour market experience (which can be thought of
as a proxy for high human capital) do not increase their labour supply more when
working with flexitime than workers with shorter labour market experience. The
last panel of table 3.10 gives the estimation results for workers who work under
30 hours per week. This group of workers already has plenty of time to spend on
child care production, and flexitime might be of little help to them. As a result,
they are not likely to respond to flexitime by increasing their working hours, even
for those with high human capital (long labour market experience). As shown in
the last panel of table 3.10, through all three specifications, flexitime, as well as
the interaction term of flexitime and labour market experience, has insignificant
effect on workers weekly working hours.
To summarize, the estimation results displayed in table 3.10 do not support
model prediction 2–I find no evidence suggesting that workers with high human
capital increase their working hours more with the help of flexitime than workers
with low human capital. One possible explanation might be that workers with
long market experience already work long hours in the labour market compared
with their counterparts in each working group. Therefore, the effect of flexitime
on working hours may not be very large.
The way I construct the experience variable is to subtract workers’ final school
leaving age from their age. One shortcoming of this approach is that workers’
labour market experience may not be accurately measured. For example, people
may leave school and go to work for some years and come back to university
again. In that case, the calculated experience variable may underestimate the
true experience. More importantly, the experience variable calculated using the
conventional approach is likely to overestimate the actual experience of female
workers and working mothers. Many female workers and working mothers are
likely to suffer years of career interruptions due to fertility-related reasons, and
that is not considered when constructing the experience variable. Given the above
concerns, the constructed labour market experience variable may not be the ideal
measure of workers’ human capital.
I also tried using workers’ education as a proxy for workers’ human capital.
BHPS records the highest academic qualification held by the respondent, which
is a relatively accurate measure of respondents’ education level. Education level
could be regarded as a measure of workers’ general knowledge and ability. Human
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capital theory developed by Becker (1975) points out that the knowledge and skills
that workers learned at school are closely related to workers’ productivity later on
when they work in the labour market. Therefore, education can also be treated
as a measure of workers’ human capital level. It reflects workers’ ability to deal
with work related issues. In the following, education level is used as a proxy for
workers’ human capital. The empirical model is similar to equation (3.23), except
that an interaction term of flexitime and educational information is included.
Hit = f + a4i + β3Flexitimeit
+ φhigh degreeit + ηhigh flexit + Σ
M
m=1γmXimt + uit (3.24)
where high degreeit is a dummy variable that takes value one if the worker has
a higher than high-school degree at time t and zero otherwise. high flexit is
the interaction term of flexitime and high degree. a4i is individual unobserved
heterogeneity, f is the constant, and uit is the error term.
The null hypothesis is that high human capital (high degree) workers are more
likely to respond to flexitime by increasing their working hours. It is expected
that the coefficient of the interaction term η will be positive. Table 3.11 displays
the estimation results of equation (3.24) for workers with weekly working hours
higher than 40 hours.
According to table 3.11, throughout all three specifications, workers with high
human capital level (high academic degrees) work more hours in the labour mar-
ket than workers with low human capital. Flexitime decreases the number of
weekly working hours. When all workers are pooled together, the presence of
flexitime even significantly decreases the working hours of high human capital
workers. This clearly contradicts the model prediction. However, for workers
who are working more than 40 hours per week, their labour supply is already
high and there is little room for them to increase their working hours. Particu-
larly, substantial proportion of workers in this group supply more than 60 hours
market work a week. Therefore, it makes little sense for them to use flexitime for
they do not have much space to vary their working time. The higher the human
capital level, the more likely that they will be workaholic and use flexitime less.
If workers who work extraordinary long hours do not use flexitime, then it is not
surprising that the coefficient on flexitime and the interaction terms on flexitime
and human capital are negative when only workers with long working hours are
kept in the sample.
107
Table 3.11: Estimation Results of Workers Weekly Working Hours’ Equation
(3.20), High Than 40 Hours
All Workers Female Workers Working Mothers
Flexitime -.287 -.861*** -.852
(.194) ( .257) (.535)
High flex -.700*** -.594 -.374
(.333) (.461) (.725)
High degree 1.078*** .796 .796
(.217) (.589) (.589)
R squared .02 .03 .03
No.of obs 23367 7079 1640
Source: BHPS, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is workers normal weekly working hours. Only
workers with weekly working hours higher than are kept 40 in the sample.
Equation (3.20) is estimated by a random effects model. Other controls
included are: ln(wage), Male, Married, Children, Age, Age squared,
Non− labourincome.
Time dummies are also included in the regression to control for the aggregate
shock of each year.
For each variable,a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is
reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: signi-
ficant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at
the 1% level.
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Table 3.12: Estimation Results of Workers Weekly Working Hours’ Equation
(3.20), Less Than 30 hours
All Workers Female Workers Working Mothers
Flexitime 289 .183 .237
(.164) (.180) (.254)
High flex .059 .050 .045
(.384) (.415) (.476)
High degree .749*** .978*** .883***
(.258) (.282) (.376)
R squared .11 .03 .007
No.of obs 11451 9706 4959
Source: BHPS, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is workers normal weekly working hours. Only
workers with weekly working hours less than 30 are kept in the sample.
Equation (3.20) is estimated by a random effects model. Other controls
included are: ln(wage), Male, Married, Children, Age, Agesquared,
Non− labourincome.
Time dummies are also included in the regression to control for the aggreg-
ate shock of each year.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error
is reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *:
significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant
at the 1% level.
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Things are different if we look at workers with very little labour supply. Table
3.12 displays the estimation results for workers with less than 30 working hours.
It follows the same layout as table 3.11. There are very few observations in this
group, and around 90% of workers in this group are female workers. This time,
all three interaction terms (high flex) are insignificant, showing that the effect
of flexitime does not vary across different human capital levels. Particularly, it
can be seen that within this group, most workers do not respond to flexitime
significantly either. When workers only supply very few hours into the labour
market, the relative benefits they can drive from flexitime are correspondingly
small (i.e. a is very small) for they have plenty time devoted to child care.
Therefore, it is also difficult for flexitime to induce workers to supply more market
hours even though their market hours are far less than their time endowment.
Table 3.13 reports the results of workers whose weekly working hours are
between 30 and 40 hours. For this group of workers, unlike those over-40 hours
workers, labour supply is not high so there still plenty room to increase their
market hours. Also, when compared with the below-30 hours workers, this group
benefits more from flexitime. Therefore, when provided with flexitime, this group
of workers is more likely to increase their working hours. Particularly, from table
3.13 it can be seen that the coefficients of variable high flex are always positive
and statistically significant, suggesting that flexitime is mainly acting on workers
with high human capital levels to induce them supply more hours into market
work. For this group of workers, it is observed that high human capital workers
do respond more than low human capital workers.
The shortcoming of using education level as a proxy for human capital might
be that it contains less information on the accumulated human capital from actual
work. It does not properly discriminate between employees with different skills
since most of these will have been accumulated during their work in the labour
market. Therefore, the results shown above are only suggestive.
In the model, I only focus on the supply side decisions. However, in the labour
market, firms may set the number of working hours and workers are unable to
work the exact amount of hours they desire (Altonji and Paxson, 1988). In other
words, firms, instead of workers, may choose to set a different amount of working
hours according to workers’ flexitime status. Particularly, flexitime may reduce
workers’ utilization7. By asking those flexitimers to work more hours firms can
mitigate some of the costs of flexitime. This would apply more forcibly to high
7For instance, under a flexitime regime, workers’ may devote their most productive time
period to family duties rather than jobs, or firms may need to hire additional staff to cover the
absence of flexitimers when they are not available because of family duties.
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Table 3.13: Estimation Results of Workers Weekly Working Hours’ Equation (3.20),
Between 30 and 40 Hours




Flexitime -.032 .059 .061
(.043) (.059) (.085)
High flex .166∗∗ .183∗ .327∗
(.072) (.110) (.196)
Highdegree -.113∗∗ .019 .030
(.050) (.073) (.143)
ln(wage) -.002 .056 -.111
(.049) (.068) (.116)
Age .073∗∗∗ .064∗∗∗ -.045
(.013) (.018) (.062)
Age squared -.001∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗ .0006
(.0002) (.0002) (.0008)




Non-labour -.00003∗∗∗ -.00003∗∗∗ -.00003∗∗
income (5.76e-06) (9.12e-06) (1.00e-05)
Constant 35.293∗∗∗ 35.483∗∗∗ 37.013∗∗∗
(.217) (.310) (1.129)
R squared .07 .04 .02
No.of obs 15122 8366 2433
Source: BHPS, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is workers normal weekly working hours. Only workers with weekly
working hours between 30 hours and 40 hours are kept in the sample. Equation (3.20) is
estimated with by a random effect model.
Time dummies are also included in the regression to control for the aggregate shock of each
year.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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human capital workers, whose request for flexitime are more likely to be granted
by firms. Due to the data limitations, I have little information on firms’ choices of
flexitime. Therefore the positive relationship between flexitime and working hours
among workers who work between 30 and 40 hours per week when using education
information as proxy for human capital may be because firms insist on a higher
number of working hours rather than workers deciding to increase their working
hours. In other words, we need to take account of firms’ flexitime provision choices
and working hours offers when interpreting the estimation results.
To conclude, when using workers’ labour market experience as a proxy for their
human capital level, I do not find evidence supporting model prediction 2. The
estimation results suggest that workers with high human capital do not increase
their labour supply more when working with flexitime than low human capital
workers. When using workers’ educational information as a proxy for their human
capital levels, I find that among workers whose weekly working hours are between
30-40 hours, the main positive effect of flexitime on workers’ labour supply is
driven by the high human capital workers (those with high academic degrees).
Since both measures of the human capital (experience and education) may have
some potential shortcomings, the empirical evidence on model prediction 2 is only
suggestive and needs to be interpreted with caution.
3.4.4 Market Work v.s. Child Care
The above analyses show that when provided with flexitime practice, working
mothers tend to reallocate their time endowments and spend more time in the
labour market work than before. This may lead to concerns about what will
happen to workers’ child care and to children’s well-beings. Intuitively, spending
less time on child care does not necessarily decrease children’s welfare in the
flexitime scenario.
Flexitime improves the child care production efficiency. This mitigates the
effects of less time devoted to child care. For example, without flexitime, workers
go to work according to the rigid schedules (e.g.9 to 5). This time window is
also the period during which children need parents’ attention. There is little
time the parents can spend with the children after they get off work. However,
when workers are working with flexitime, workers can choose to take care of the
children in the daytime and work in the evening or the early morning. They
can also reschedule their working time so that they work during the time when
children are at school.
To some extent, flexitime acts as if it expanded workers’ time endowment span
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and more time were available to workers now (as shown in the model). Recent
papers on women’s time allocation find that during recent decades, female work-
ers, especially highly educated female workers spend more time in both work and
child care. Ramey and Ramey (2009) find that mothers in the United States in-
creased their child care time along with labour market work time during past two
decades. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) report similar findings. Since the probability
of working with flexitime is positively related with workers’ human capital levels
(which can be signalled by their educational achievements), this finding can be
explained by the fact that flexible working practices became more popular in the
developed world during recent years. With the help of flexitime, high-educated
workers can expand both working time and child care time more easily than their
counterparts who do not have flexitime.
Moreover, the model developed in this chapter abstracted form the fact that
time and monetary expenditure could be close substitutes in the child care pro-
duction process. If flexitime encourages more labour supply, it also increases
workers’ labour income for both current period and future periods because of the
human capital accumulation process. The income effects suggest that workers are
able to spend more money on their children, perhaps by providing them better
education. Olivetti (2006) argues that with higher wages, women tend to substi-
tute monetary expenditure for time in producing child care, and so long as the
wealth effects dominate, children will be better off.
3.4.5 Other Issues
So far the empirical results shown above only provide a descriptive analysis of the
relationship between flexitime and workers’ labour supply. It is difficult to use
instrumental variables in the estimation because it is difficult to find exogenous
variables which are not correlated with the error term. I try to use firm size and
occupation as instruments, but the results hardly changed. Another issue is that
in this chapter, only employees’ working hours are considered. In fact, flexitime
not only affect workers’ working hours choices but also workers’ participation
choices. Therefore, the effect of flexitime on workers’ labour supply decisions
discussed in this chapter can be regarded as a lower bound of the true effect.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter explores the relationship between flexitime and workers’ labour sup-
ply decisions. A basic model is developed to show that flexitime can only induce
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high levels of market work if the benefit-cost ratio (increased child care produc-
tion efficiency relative to the compensating wage differentials effect) brought by
flexitime falls into a certain range. In other words, flexitime needs to generate
sufficient gains in child care production compared to the wage reduction to induce
higher levels of labour supply. Meanwhile, workers with high human capital levels
are more likely to respond to flexitime by increasing their market hours than low
human capital workers. The model also suggests that flexitime provides workers
with additional incentives to engage in market work. Anticipating high future
labour supply under the flexitime regime, workers may increase current period
labour supply.
Empirical evidence confirms some predictions of the model. When working
with flexitime, working mothers are more likely to supply more hours than those
who do not have flexitime. Working mothers can benefit more from flexitime
(they have a higher a). Meanwhile, they are also likely to be engaged in jobs
that have low cost in providing flexitime (they have a lower b). Therefore, female
workers with children should frequently fall into the area where ab
1−b ≥ T , and
then they may increase their working hours when provided with flexitime. There
is also evidence suggesting that flexitime is associated with higher chances of full-
time work. It could be that flexitime frees more time for workers so that they are
able to shift from part time work to full time work.
Flexitime can be used as an effective tool to reduce working mothers’ costs of
participating in the labour market and boost labour supply. The findings of this
chapter suggest that it is not only the availability of family friendly policies that
matters, but also the costs of working with such practices. Though the United
Kingdom, government has put forward many policies encouraging workers with
children to request flexible working opportunities from their employers, there
are still many firms do not provide flexible working to their employees. The
British Equal Opportunities Commission Study reports that the proportion of
firms that provide flexible working schedules to workers is much less in Britain
than that of mainland Europe (British Equal Opprtunities Commision, 2007).
Golden and Altman (2007b) point out that the supply of flexitime is always
behind the demand due to technological constraints. It is possible that currently
in the United Kingdom the cost of employees requesting flexitime is still too high
to induce workers to supply more hours. Sometimes the cost involved may be so
high that workers may not even ask for it. The same case also applies to other
types of flexible working patterns, like part time work. Connolly and Gregory
(2008) find that many people need to experience downward occupation mobility
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in order to get part time opportunities. Based on the findings of this chapter, in
order to have flexitime really help female workers balance their home production
and work responsibilities, measures should be taken to encourage firms to provide
flexible working at low prices. Current legislation gives employees the right to
request flexitime from the employers, but more effort should be made to make sure
that those requests are granted without bringing too much cost to the employees.
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Appendix B
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Setting (3.9) and (3.10) equal to zero, the critical human capital levels
that enable workers to participate in the labour market (supply positive numbers









where ĥf is the critical human capital level that enables workers to participate
in the labour market when workers work with flexitime, and ĥ is the critical
human capital level that enables workers to participate in the labour market
when workers do not have flexitime.
If the critical human capital level that enables workers to participate in the
labour market is lower under the flexitime scheme ((B.2) ≤ (B.1)), it means that
flexitime encourages more workers to participate in the labour market. In this









When inequality (B.3) is satisfied, there are three cases.
Case 1: when workers’ human capital are below certain level (h ≤ R
b(T+a)
), they
will not participate in the labour market, regardless of their flexitime status. In
this case, under both flexitime and non-flexitime schemes, the number of working
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hours will be zero (nf∗ = n∗ = 0).
Case 2: when workers’ human capital are between between certain levels
( R
b(T+a)
< h ≤ R
T
), they will participate if they have flexitime but not if they do
not have flexitime (nf∗ > n∗ = 0). In this case, workers work strictly more with
flexitime than they do without flexitime.
Case 3: when workers’ human capital are above a certain levels (h > R
T
), they
will participate in the labour market in both flexitime scheme and non-flexitime
scheme. They will work more market hours under the flexitime scheme than they
do under the non-flexitime scheme. The difference in workers’ working hours
under two schemes can be written as:




















nf∗ − n∗ > 0 (B.5)
From the analysis discussed in case 1 and case 2, it can be seen that flexitime
encourages more workers to participate in the labour market. Conditional on
participation, according to expression (B.4), the higher the human capital levels,
the larger the difference between the optimal working hours under flextime and
non flexitime schemes. In other words, high human capital workers increase more
market work hours than low human capital workers when provided with flexitime.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. First, given the participation constraints specified in equation (B.1) and
(B.2), it can be seen that when the benefit to cost ratio associated with flexitime
is low ( ab
1−b < T ), the entry level human capital is higher under flexitime scheme
(ĥ < ĥf ). This suggests that fewer workers are participating in the labour market
under flexitime scheme than under the non-flexitime scheme. Flexitime will not
always increase workers’ labour supply.
If ab
1−b < T , there are in total three cases.
Case 1: when workers’ human capital is below a certain level (h ≤ R
T
), they
will not participate in the labour market under both schemes. In this case, under
both flexitime and non-flexitime schemes, number of working hours will be zero
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(nf∗ = n∗ = 0).





), they will supply positive number of working hours if they do not work
with flexitime, and choose to not to participate in the labour market in the
flexitime scheme. In this case, n∗ > nf∗ = 0.
Case 3: conditional on participation, only workers with human capital higher
than a certain level will work more hours under flexitime scheme than they do
under non-flexitime scheme. In order for workers to work more under the flexitime
scheme, it must be the case that:













Combined with the results discussed in all three cases, we can conclude that
when flexitime is not very helpful with workers’ child care production and is
expensive, only high human capital workers will increase their working hours
under the flexitime scheme.
One thing worths noticing is that when flexitime leads to substantial wage
reduction, workers are not always better off under the flexitime scheme. In order
for workers to take up flexitime, the benefits and costs associated with flexitime
must satisfy condition (B.7).
V f ≥ V nf
(bnf∗h+R)(T − nf∗ + a) ≥ (n∗h+R)(T − n∗) (B.7)
where V f and V nf are the maximum utility that can be obtained when workers
work with and without flexitime respectively. Plugging (3.9) and (3.10) into













Inequality (B.8) gives the condition under which workers will take up flexible
working. Inequality (B.3) is a sufficient condition for condition (B.8) to hold. In
other words, when the benefit-cost ratio associated with flexitime is high ( ab
1−b ≥
T , which means flexitime is very helpful with child care production and workers
do not need to sacrifice substantial wages in order to work with it), workers are
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always better off when they are working with flexitime.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. When ab













for all positive values of hf2 , where h
f
2 is second period human capital with flexi-
time. Inequality (B.9) guarantees that workers will be able to achieve higher
utility in the flexible world than in the non-flexible world. The marginal utility
of one hour of first period market work in the flexible world is given by:
∂U f
∂n1













where U f represents the utility of working in the flexible world. The marginal
utility of one hour of market work in the non-flexible world is:
∂Unf
∂n1













where Unf represents the utility in the non-flexible world. The second line of














































Inequality (B.13) suggests that when flexitime is helpful and cheap ( ab
1−b ≥ T ),
the marginal utility of first period market work is higher in the flexible world than
that in the non-flexible world. This inequality suggests that workers will supply
more first period market work in the flexible world than in the non-flexible world:
nf∗1 ≥ n∗1 (B.14)
As a result, the labour supply of workers with flexitime in the first period will be
higher than that of the workers without flexitime. As they move to the second
period, given the initial human capital level h1 and the human capital accumu-
lation process, workers in the flexible world now have accumulated more human
capital than workers in the non-flexible world (hf2 ≥ h2). In the second period,
workers are facing a static maximization problem. It has been shown in the static
case that when ab
1−b ≥ T , workers will supply more hours of market work with
flexitime than without flexitime regardless of their initial human capital levels,




nf∗2 ≥ n∗2 (B.15)
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. First, workers can only enjoy the benefit of flexitime if and only if they
participate in the labour market. The second period labour supply must be
positive. The second period maximization problem is the same as that in the











where nf∗1 is given by (3.18). The right hand side of inequality (B.16) gives
the minimum level of first period working hours that guarantees second period
participation. If workers do not work up to the level specified in (B.16), then
cannot enjoy the benefit of flexitime for they do not participate in the second
period.
Condition (B.9) may not hold in this case. Now flexitime is associated with
low benefits and high costs. It may not be optimal for workers to take up flexitime
at the costs of substantial wage reductions. From (B.9) it can be seen that the
lower the ratio of ab
1−b , the more likely that the inequality does not hold and
workers’ do not choose to work with flexitime.
Combining (B.9) and (B.16), we can conclude that when flexitime is not very











< b(T + a) (B.17)
The left part of inequality (B.17) ensures that workers are better off when
they are working with flexitime, and the right part of (B.17) is the participation
constraint. hf2 is the implied by (3.18) and (3.3). If inequality (B.17) does not
hold, workers will work more (or equal) hours in the non-flexible world than in
the flexible world1.
From now on, I will discuss the situation when inequality (B.17) holds. Start-
ing from second period, where workers are facing a static maximization problem,














where nf∗1 is given by (3.18). Inequality (B.18) suggests that workers who do not
accumulate enough human capital in the first period work less in second period
with flexitime than without flexitime. Combined with (B.10) and (B.11), it can
be verified that the marginal utility of market work in the first period is also
smaller when workers work with flexitime in this case. Workers’ marginal utility
1If inequality (B.17) does not hold, there might be two situations. First, workers may
participate in the non-flexible world but not in the flexible world. In this case, workers’ labour
supply is higher intensively in the non-flexible world. Second, workers participate in both
worlds, but they do not choose to work with flexitime in the flexible world. In this case,
workers’ utility maximization problems in both worlds are the same, and workers supply the
same amount of hours in flexible and non-flexible world.
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of market work in the first period in both flexible world and non flexible world
are given by (B.10) and (B.11). Comparing (B.10) and (B.11), the first three
items are the same. Given ab































Inequality (B.21) suggests that if the relative benefit to cost ratio associated with
flexitime is not high enough (i.e. if ab
1−b < T ) and workers do not work long
hours in the first period (B.18), working with flexitime decreases the marginal
utility of working in the first period, which in turn leads to fewer working hours
in both periods for workers in the flexible world. Besides, the right hand side of
inequality (B.18) is an decreasing function of workers’ initial human capital level
h1. Therefore, the higher the human capital level, the less likely that inequality
(B.18) will hold, and the less likely that workers’ working hours will respond
negatively in both periods to flexitime. However, if inequality (B.18) does not
hold, then it is not clear in what direction flexitime will change the marginal
utility of market work in the first period and the overall effect of flexitime on
labour supply is ambiguous.
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B.5 Adding Union Membership
Table B.1: Workers’ Labour Supply Equation (3.20) with Union Membership




Flexitime -.303∗∗ .064 .694∗∗∗
(.119) (.155) (.231)
ln(wage) -1.878∗∗∗ -1.993∗∗∗ -1.728∗∗∗
(.228) (.286) (.415)
Age .852∗∗∗ .775∗∗∗ .163
(.050) (.068) (.193)
Age squared -.011∗∗∗ -.011∗∗∗ .00003
(.0006) (.0009) (.003)
Union 1.183∗∗∗ 1.936∗∗∗ 1.750∗∗∗
(.154) (.212) (.327)




Non-labour -.0001∗∗∗ -.0002∗∗∗ -.0001∗∗
income (.00003) (.00005) (.00004)
Education First degree -.531 -1.557∗∗ -2.838∗∗
(.520) (.735) (1.400)
Hnd teaching -2.326∗∗∗ -3.838∗∗∗ -4.230∗∗∗
(.580) (.841) (1.444)
A level -3.022∗∗∗ -4.682∗∗∗ -5.479∗∗∗
(.529) (.761) (1.417)
O level -3.564∗∗∗ -6.240∗∗∗ -6.686∗∗∗
(.535) (.773) (1.456)
Cse qualification -4.622∗∗∗ -8.704∗∗∗ -9.044∗∗∗
(.619) (.897) (1.542)
No qualification -5.207∗∗∗ -9.569∗∗∗ -8.466∗∗∗
(.580) (.833) (1.524)
Constant 27.048∗∗∗ 33.203∗∗∗ 31.498∗∗∗
(1.013) (1.434) (3.749)
R squared .22 .18 .04
No. of obs 50669 26430 10189
Source: BHPS, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is normal weekly working hours. Equation (3.20) is estimated by
a random effects model. In this specification, union membership is added as an additional
control variable.
Time dummies are also included in the regression to control for the aggregate shock of each
year.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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Chapter 4
Flexitime, Job Satisfaction and Job
Mobility
Abstract
This chapter investigates how the provision of flexitime affects work-
ers’ job satisfaction levels and job mobility decisions. When provided with
flexitime, both male and female workers report higher overall job satisfac-
tion, but female workers’ positive response to flexitime is only observed
when they have young children at home. Flexitime also decreases female
workers’ chances of quitting their jobs if they have young children. This
suggests that female workers value flexitime as a family-friendly practice
that helps them balance work and home production responsibilities. On
the other hand, male workers’ labour mobility decisions are not affected by
flexitime, and the way they respond to flexitime has little to do with child
care responsibilities. Most male workers who enjoy flexitime are high-rank
employees that take senior positions in the company, while female workers
with flexitime usually take up jobs that can provide flexitime at low costs
like secretaries and administrative positions. There is also some suggestive
evidence showing that job mobility is an important mechanism that work-
ers adjust their flexitime status to desired levels.
Keywords: Quit, gender differences, work and home production bal-
ances
4.1 Introduction
As per the prediction of the compensating wage differential theory, all dimensions
of a job affect workers’ wages (Rosen, 1986). However, how workers value the non-
pecuniary side of a job is not only reflected by the wage differentials that they
would like to pay, but also how they may change their job mobility decisions given
wage and non-wage job dimension combinations. Workers may attach different
importance to different job dimensions: Clark (1997) finds that male workers
tend to rank monetary payoffs as the most crucial factor that determines their
job satisfaction while female workers may put the number of working hours as
their first priority. With the increase of female participation rates across all
major developing countries, it has become increasingly important to know which
what factors female workers take into account when they make labour market
decisions. The previous literature has emphasized the importance of working
hours in workers’ labour market decisions (Clark, 1997; Blundell et al., 2005),
but few studies have explored the importance of working hours flexibility. This
chapter investigates how workers’ preferences towards non-monetary dimensions
of the job (flexible working arrangements) can be reflected in their self reported
job satisfaction levels and their job mobility decisions. The particular type of
flexible working arrangement analysed in this chapter is called “flexitime”. It is
a practice that enables workers to choose when to start and end their work given
fixed contract hours.
Job mobility is one of the most important mechanisms through which workers
adjust their jobs features and labour supply decisions to desired levels (Farber
et al., 1999; Altonji and Paxson, 1992). In a world with labour market frictions
(such as asymmetric information), workers are not always allocated to the jobs
that suit their preferences best. The conventional literature on job mobility pre-
dicts that a worker will quit her job if the lifetime income stream generated by
an alternative job offer surpasses the current one (Farber et al., 1999). However,
monetary incentives alone are not enough to explain workers’ job mobility, or
at least not enough to explain female workers’ job mobility decisions, since they
attach greater importance to the compatibility between work and child care du-
ties. Blundell and Macurdy (1999) find that as much as 40% of full time female
workers prefer to work fewer hours than their current contract hours. Altonji and
Paxson (1992) find that workers realize their preferred working hours by changing
their jobs. By giving workers the freedom to vary the starting and ending time of
their work, flexitime may help workers feel less stressed given the same number
of working hours so that they are more likely to be satisfied with their jobs, and
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therefore less likely to quit.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in the following respects.
First, it analyzes the effect of a non-monetary job dimension–flexitime–on work-
ers’ job satisfaction levels and job mobility decisions using data from a nationwide
survey. Second, it links workers’ job satisfaction and job mobility behaviour to-
gether and shows to what extent factors that affect workers’ job satisfaction levels
may also affect their quit probabilities. Third, it analyses the gender differences
in their responses to flexitime and conclude that flexitime means different things
to male and female workers.
The main findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows. First, workers
who work with flexitime report higher job satisfaction than those who do not
have flexitime, controlling for relevant job and worker characteristics. Among
female workers, the positive relationship between flexitime and job satisfaction
is only present when they have young children to take care of. Male workers
are in general happier with their jobs when working with flexitime, regardless of
whether they have young children at home. Second, flexitime is also associated
with a lower quitting probability among female workers when they have young
children. For male workers, working with flexitime does not significantly affect
their quitting probability. The gender differences in their reactions to flexitime
could imply that workers may work with flexitime for different reasons. To male
workers, flexitime is a non-monetary incentive and perhaps a signal of a good
job. Flexitime is perhaps appreciated by male workers, but it is not crucial when
they are making job mobility decisions. Third, workers who quit their jobs have
a greater chance of experiencing a change in their flexitime status. This might
imply that “flexitime constraints” existed in the labour market. It might suggest
that it is difficult for workers to adjust their flexitime status within jobs. They
need to change their jobs if they want to change their flexitime status.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews previ-
ous literature on job mobility. Section 4.3 discusses the conceptual framework
and empirical specifications. Section 4.4 gives the empirical results. Section 4.5
concludes.
4.2 Previous Literature
There has been a large literature addressing the reasons that workers quit their
jobs. Most studies in this area focus on the role of monetary payoffs. The central
idea is straightforward: workers compare the expected income stream generated
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by their current job and the best alternative job, and they will opt for the job that
offers a higher payoffs, taking into account the potential risk of uncertainty and
search costs (Farber et al. 1999). Farber et al. (1999) give a comprehensive review
of the features of job mobility in the United States and the United Kingdom.
They summarize that the probability of job mobility is decreasing with workers’
tenure. Based on data from US and UK, they find most employment relationships
are long lasting; jobs ending in relatively short periods are usually newly created
ones.
Many theories have been put forward the explain the driving forces behind
workers’ job mobility behaviour. The first strand of theories on job mobility em-
phasizes the role of firm-specific human capital in workers’ job mobility decisions
(Topel, 1991). Workers accumulate specific human capital (possibly in the form
of some firm-specific skills) which increases workers’ productivity and may lead
to further wage growth associated with tenure. After quitting, the worker loses
all firm specific human capital and cannot enjoy the benefits brought by tenure.
Therefore it is often observed that the quitting probability is positively related
to workers’ tenure. Topel (1991) develops a two-step estimator to obtain a lower
bound estimation of the return to tenure using a longitudinal data set. He finds
tenure significantly increases workers wages, which explains why senior workers
are less likely to quit. Because it is costly to hire new employees who do not have
any firm-specific human capital, firms design payment schemes so that workers’
payments increase with seniority. Anticipating wage growth in the future, workers
are less likely to quit their jobs when they have already spent a long time in the
firm. Another group of theories attribute motivation of voluntary job turnover
to the firm-worker match quality (Mortensen, 1978). Workers who learn of low
quality matches quit early. Consequently, all the remaining matches are good
quality ones and will last long. Farber et al. (1999) note that the firm-worker
match quality can also be regarded a type of specific human capital.
Search also plays an important role in workers job mobility behaviour. On-
the-job search enables workers to find possible outside opportunities, but also
involves substantial costs. Burdett (1978) develops a model that incorporates
dynamics on the job search, arguing that the probability of workers quitting
their jobs depends on the quality of their outside opportunities, which in turn
depends on the intensity of workers’ efforts in job search. In this case, age and
wage rates are the main determinants of workers’ job mobility behaviour, while
tenure does not matter much. Workers with high wages are less likely to quit
than low-wage workers. Older workers are less willing to engage in the on-the-job
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search behaviour than young workers, for they have less time left to repay the
search costs.
Some studies find that unobserved heterogeneity among workers determines
the probability of quitting (Farber et al., 1999; Topel and Ward, 1992). There are
simply two different types of workers: “high mobility” types and “low mobility”
types. Low mobility workers may have some features that make them more willing
to stay with firms than high mobility workers. There is an overlap between the
type theory and the specific human capital accumulation theory. For example, the
existing heterogeneity may be driven by the fact that some workers are good at
accumulating firm specific human capital, or less likely to exert effort on searching
for new jobs, which leads to a lower probability of voluntary turnover. In this
case, workers’ “types” determine job mobility, and the effect of tenure is small
(Topel and Ward, 1992).
Most empirical studies on the determinants of workers’ job mobility focus
on monetary payoffs and tenure. Abraham and Farber (1987) use instrumental
variables approach to estimate a workers’ earnings equation and a job duration
function. They find a positive correlation between workers’ job duration and
their wages. Topel and Ward (1992) attempt to explain the frequent job mobility
and rapid wage growth among American young men in their early careers. After
controlling for individual heterogeneity, they conclude that wage is the driving
factor of job mobility behavior. Galizzi and Lang (1998) confirm the hypothesis
that future wage growth is the major determinant of workers’ mobility decisions.
They use information on the payment of workers with similar characteristics as
an approximation of their outside wage offers. They find that workers are more
likely to quit their jobs if they are paid less than other workers with similar char-
acteristics. Gielen and van Ours (2010) find that the effect of wage on workers’
job mobility is U-shaped. Lower-end workers are underpaid and are likely to
receive job offers with higher wages than their current jobs. This may lead to
high quitting rates among low wage workers. Workers on the higher end are also
likely to quit because they can attract favorable job offers outside. They also
find that workers with a high predicted probability of quitting are more likely to
experience wage growth when they stay within the firm, which suggests that firms
would like to offer higher wages to skilled workers to prevent turnover. Similarly,
after controlling the selection into voluntary and involuntary quits, Perez and
Rebollo Sanz (2005) find that voluntary quits are usually accompanied by large
wage growth.
Compared to the substantial literature that documents the effect of wages and
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tenure on job mobility, research on how non-monetary incentives affect workers’
job mobility decisions is relatively sparse. But Clark (2001) and Rosen (1986) note
that jobs contain far more elements than have been addressed by the conventional
labour economics literature. Clark (2001) points out that worker-firm match
quality can be reflected in job satisfaction levels. He argues that workers’ self
reported job satisfaction levels are good predictors of their future quits. Clark’s
(2001) research represents a novel strand of the literature on the determinants of
quitting, which uses workers’ job satisfaction as a “measure” of their job quality.
Similar studies include Lincoln and Kalleberg (1996) as well as Akerlof et al.
(1988).
Job satisfaction can only serve as an approximation of job quality and it is
difficult to compare across workers. Some studies use objective measures of job
attributes to analyze workers’ quitting behaviour. Bartel (2002) investigates how
unfavorable working conditions and repetitiveness affect workers’ job mobility
decisions. Young workers are more likely to quit if they are engaged in repet-
itive jobs, but they do not seem to mind bad working conditions so much as
middle-aged workers do. On the contrary, middle-aged workers do not tolerate
bad working conditions. Groot and Verberne (1997) consider the effect of less
attractive working conditions on workers’ job-to-job mobility patterns along with
the age effect. They find that workers’ job mobility rates decrease with ages be-
cause older workers have less time to make up for the costs of moving. Ophem
(1991) develops a on the job search model that incorporates searching for non-
wage elements to explain the relative importance of current wages, future wages
and job characteristics in workers on the job search decision making process.
They find that non-wage characteristics like promotion expectations, overtime,
and commuting time significantly influence chances of mobility.
Other non-wage aspects of a job like fringe benefits (health insurance, life in-
surance, pensions) are also important factors that will influence workers’ mobility
decisions. These benefits usually cannot be carried to a new job when workers
leave the firm. The potential loss of those benefits adds to the cost of mobility,
which may decrease workers’ chances of quitting. The phenomenon that workers
are reluctant to quit their jobs for the sake of certain employer-specific bene-
fits is termed “job lock”. Madrian (1994) looks into the relationship between
employer-provided health insurance, expected medical expenses and job mobility
using a novel difference-in-difference approach. He compares the mobility dif-
ferences between workers with and without employer-provided health insurance
taking into account the differences in their expected medical expenses. Workers
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with high expected future medical expenses are less likely to quit their jobs than
workers with low expected future medical expenses (when provided with health
insurance). He find that the provision of health insurance reduces the turnover
probability by as much as 25%. Mitchell (1982) considers a broad range of fringe
benefits including pensions and various kinds of insurance, and finds a signific-
ant negative relationship between mobility and fringe benefits, especially when
the fringe benefits package includes a pension. Andrietti (2001) concludes that
pension-covered workers are less likely to change their jobs than workers without
pensions because they do not want to lose the pension benefits when they move
jobs.
There are few economics studies discussing how flexible working arrangements
may affect workers’ job mobility, despite their importance in shaping workers’ la-
bour market behaviour. One exception is Connolly and Gregory (2008). They
examine the relationship between occupational mobility and working part time.
They find that part time work is often accompanied with a downward occupa-
tional mobility. Though this is not a direct estimation of the relationship between
flexible working arrangements and job mobility, it to some extent shows the dif-
ficulties workers face when they want to work flexibly.
The current study extends the previous literature on job mobility by consid-
ering a job dimension-flexitime-that may affect workers’ job mobility decisions.
I also investigate whether flexitime is correlated with workers’ overall job sat-
isfaction level, for workers’ job satisfaction is closely related to their job mo-
bility decisions. There are few economics studies investigating the relationship
between job flexibility and job satisfaction; two exceptions are Bender et al. (2005)
and Asadullah and Fernandez (2008). Both studies try to explain the gender
gap in workers’ job satisfaction reported in previous job satisfaction literature.
Clark (1997) shows that despite their disadvantaged labour market positions, fe-
male workers persistently report higher job satisfaction levels than male workers.
Bender et al. (2005) point out that this gender difference might be because female
workers are more likely to be self-selected into more flexible1 jobs so that they
can take better care of their family responsibilities. Using U.S data, they find
that female workers who work in male-dominated firms do not report higher job
satisfaction levels than their male counterparts. Asadullah and Fernandez (2008)
find that even after including various measures of family-friendly policies, there
is still a significant gender gap in job satisfaction levels. There also a couple of
studies in sociology which documents the positive effect of flexitime on workers’
1They define “flexible” job as jobs that help workers with family responsibilities.
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attitudes towards their work and organizational commitments (see Golden and
Altman, 2007b for a review).
4.3 Conceptual Framework and Empirical Spe-
cifications
In this section, I describe a simplified version of Groot and Verberne’s (1997)
one period model with compensating wage differentials associated with non-wage
elements of a job to explain how flexitime status may affect workers’ job mobility
decisions.
Assume that workers’ utility obtained from a job consists of two elements,
wage (W ) and whether the job provides flexitime (F )
U = U(W,F ) (4.1)
where F is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the job provides flexitime and
0 otherwise. Given the same wage, workers weakly prefer to work with flexitime:
U(W, 1) ≥ U(W, 0) (4.2)
For each worker, there is certain wage differentials (D ≥ 0) that will induce the
worker to value a job without flexitime same as she values a job with flexitime:
U(W −D, 1) = U(W, 0) (4.3)
The amount of additional compensation needed to make workers indifferent between
jobs with and without flexitime depends on worker’s characteristics, i.e. how
much does she value flexitime. Assuming it is costly for firms to provide flexi-
time2, firms may charge a market price ∆W for workers who want to work with
flexitime. Simple utility maximization tells that workers compare the wage dif-
ferential charged by the firm (∆W )to their own valuation and will choose to work
with flexitime if
∆W ≤ D (4.4)
Inequality (4.4) simply means that workers will choose to work with flexitime if
they value flexitime more than its market price.
2For example, new technology may be needed to record the actual working hours of the
worker who takes flexitime, or the firm may need to hire additional staff that could cover the
duty of the flexi-timers in case of emergency, or some administrative costs.
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When workers are thinking about leaving the firm, they need to consider the
whole compensation package including both wages and flexitime. Assuming that
there are certain mobility costs (C) involved when workers decide to move to
another job, and (Wa, Fa) represents the best alternative job offer, the net return
of moving to another job is
U(Wa, Fa)− U(W,F )− C (4.5)
where Wa is the alternative wage offer, and Fa is the alternative flexitime offer.
Workers will choose to move if (4.5) is greater than 0,
U(Wa, Fa)− U(W,F )− C ≥ 0 (4.6)
Inequality (4.6) means that the utility gain from moving to another job must
exceed the costs of quitting in order to induce workers to change jobs.
Thus, firms compete for workers in both monetary and non-monetary dimen-
sions. Since flexitime enters positively into workers utility function, outside firms
need to offer more favorable compensation packages (either provide flexitime or
offer high wages) in order to induce workers who currently have flexitime to quit.
In other words, flexitime acts as a disincentive to quit. Similarly, flexitime also
makes it easier for firms which can provide flexitime to attract workers from
competitors that do not provide flexitime.
We can also look at the problem dynamically. Suppose workers can accumu-
late specific human capital (e.g. firm specific skills) by staying with the same
firms. Flexitime reduces workers’ quitting probability in the current period, thus
workers with flexitime are more likely to accumulate higher levels of specific hu-
man capital, which makes them even less likely to quit their jobs in the future.
In this case, flexitime is not only a non-wage job dimension that discourages
quitting, but also a mechanism that reinforces the role of specific human capital
accumulation in workers’ job mobility decisions.
According to this basic model, factors that affect workers’ mobility decisions
are: current and best alternative wage offer (W and Wa), current and alternative
flexitime status (F and Fa), how much workers value flexitime (D), and their
mobility cost (C).
Prob(quit = 1) = f(W,Wa, F, Fa, D,C) (4.7)
Among those factors described in equation (4.7), current wage (W ) and current
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flexitime status (F ) can be observed, but we cannot observe the best alternative
offer and mobility cost. We only observe workers’ alternative offer when they move
to another job. For those who stay with their original employers, their alternative
offers are never revealed. Therefore, we can only use workers’ characteristics and
their job history information to approximate those unobservable factors. We can
assume that workers’ best alternative wages (Wa) are largely determined by their
productivity, which in turn is influenced by their educational achievements and
labour market experiences. The possible flexitime offer (Fa) also depends on
workers educational achievements3. In addition, how much flexitime is valued by
each worker (D) depends on their parental status (i.e. whether they have children
at home) and whether they take the main responsibility for child care. Factors
affecting workers’ mobility costs include workers’ age and the industries they are
working in. Groot and Verberne (1997) suggests that worker’ ages decrease the
probability of quitting because older workers have less time left to generate income
to overcome the mobility costs than younger workers. Similar findings are also
reported by Topel and Ward (1992); Gielen and van Ours (2010). Industries affect
workers’ mobility costs in the sense that they may contain information about how
much effort the workers need exert to find new jobs. Workers in industries that
feature higher unemployment rates may be more reluctant to quit their jobs. The
wage compensation structure in each industry may also affect workers’ chances
of getting outside offers that trump the current one. Tenure is also included in
workers’ job mobility equation. It may affect wages via the specific human capital
accumulation process. What is more, tenure is also associated with workers’
chances of getting flexitime within the firm in the future. Unfortunately in the
BHPS data set tenure is defined as how long the workers have been doing the
job rather than how long the worker has been working with the employer, so
the coefficient of “tenure” in the regression table needs to be interpreted with
caution.
In summary, the job mobility equation estimated in this chapter is:
Prob(Quitit = 1|Xit, ci)




γmPimt + uit) (4.8)
3In my second chapter, I find that flexitime is more frequently observed in professional and
skilled jobs; there is a positive relationship between workers’ educational level and the chances
of working with flexitime.
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where t is the time index, Quit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the worker
reports that she quits the job, and 0 otherwise. X is the vector of regressors
including both workers’ and jobs’ characteristics that may affect workers’ mobility
choice and full sets of time dummies. ci is individual unobserved heterogeneity.
The second line of equation (4.8) further specifies the control variables. Flexitime
denotes worker’s flexitime status, Flexitime∗Children is the interaction term of
flexitime and children. Adding this interaction term enables me to know whether
working parents respond to flexitime differently than workers without young chil-
dren at home. P is the vector of all other measured factors that may affect
workers’ job mobility decisions. To be more specific, the vector P includes the
following variables: Children, Married, Age, Age squared, Female, ln(wage),
Hours, Tenure, Education, Industries and Occupations. Children is a dummy
variable that takes value 1 if the respondent has children under the age of 16 and
0 otherwise. Married is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the respondent
is married and 0 otherwise. Age is the age of the respondent, Age squared is the
square of age, Female is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent is
female and 0 if the respondent is male, ln(wage) is the natural logarithm of work-
ers’ real hourly wage, Hours is the respondent’s normal weekly working hours.
Tenure is the number of years that the respondent has been working with current
job. Education is measured by the highest qualification obtained by the respond-
ent. The BHPS divides workers’ educational degrees into 7 levels: higher degree
(postgraduate degrees), first degree, hnd, hnc, teaching degree, A level qualifica-
tion, O level qualification, Cse qualification, No qualification. Industries records
the industries of the respondent’s employer, and Occupations denotes the occu-
pation of the respondent. Both industries and occupations are controlled at one
digit level. Φ(.) is the standard normal cdf, and uit is the error term.
In this chapter, equation (4.8) is estimated by a probit model with random
effects using panel data. Farber et al. (1999) and Topel and Ward (1992) point
out that some unobserved individual heterogeneity may determine that there are
“high mobility” type workers and “low mobility” type workers. The advantage
of using panel data when studying the determinants of workers’ job mobility
decisions is that it takes into account unobserved individual heterogeneity that
may systematically affect the probabilities of voluntary job mobility (Madrian
1994).
However, treating the individual unobserved heterogeneity term ci as an para-
meter to estimate using fixed effects in the probit models leads to biased estim-
ates (Wooldridge, 2010, pg. 612). Wooldridge (2010) points out that consistent
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estimation of equation (4.8) using a random effects model requires very strong
assumptions about the distribution of individual unobserved heterogeneity (ci).
Particularly, traditional probit models with random effects assume that ci is in-
dependent of all the control variables Xit and follows a normal distribution with
mean 0 and variance σc.
ci|Xi ∼ Normal(0, σc) (4.9)
Assumption (4.9) is very restrictive. It not only does not allow any correlation
between the individual heterogeneity and control variables, but also specifies the
distribution of ci. One possible way to relax the assumption is to assume a normal
distribution of ci conditional on the time averages of all the other explanatory
variables (Wooldridge, 2010, chap. 15). Instead of assuming (4.9), we assume
that:
ci|Xi ∼ Normal(ψ +Xiξ, σa) (4.10)
where
ci = ψ +Xiξ + ai (4.11)
where σa is the variance of ci conditional on the average of all explanatory vari-
ables. Intuitively, this means that we estimate the effect of the explanatory vari-
able on dependent variable (in our case, the effect of flexitime on workers’ quit
probability) holding the time averages of all the control variables (Wooldridge,
2010, chap. 15). Wooldridge (2010) refers this estimation strategy as “Cham-
berlain random effects model”. When using this model, we still need to assume
a conditional normal distribution of unobserved factors (ci), but we can at least
allow certain types of correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity term and
the explanatory variables implied by equation (4.11). Still, it is assumed that the
error term (ai) in equation (4.11) is not correlated with the explanatory vari-
ables. Compared to the conventional random effects probit models, the chamber-
lain random effects model has the advantage of allowing the correlation between
unobserved factors and the explanatory variables and therefore may reduce the
bias in the estimated coefficients. In practice, the Chamberlain approach is im-
plemented by adding the time average of the explanatory variables (Xi) (except
the full set time dummies) into estimation equation (4.8) as additional regressors.
Here in this chapter, I mainly report the regression results using the conventional
random effects model. I also estimate equation (4.8) using Chamberlains’ random
effects model as a robustness check, and the results do not change.
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4.4 Data and Empirical Results
4.4.1 Data and Sample Statistics
The data used in this chapter are from the British Household Panel Survey (here-
after BHPS) wave 11 to wave 17 (years 2001-2007). It is a comprehensive survey
which interviews 10,000 respondents in Britain annually and follow the same in-
dividuals over the years. It contains rich information on respondents’ labour force
status, income, job characteristics and their labour market decisions over years.
The primary variable of interest is the job mobility variable Quit. The BHPS
has an indicator recording whether an individual is holding a different job than at
the previous interview. If the respondent reports she has a different job she left
the old job intentionally, I code this as a quit. The BHPS records respondents’ job
mobility status based on their self-reported statistics, which is subjected to the
criticism that respondents tend to claim they initiate the separation even when
they are dismissed. McLaughlin (1991) points out that quits are usually followed
by a more rapid wage growth and lower chances of experiencing involuntary un-
employment immediately after the separation than layoffs. In this chapter, the
main interest lies in how workers respond to working with flexitime when making
job mobility decisions, so I only focus on workers’ voluntary job turnover events
(i.e. quits). One possible way to check the validity of these self-reported stat-
istics in the BHPS may be to look at the subsequent job status of those who
claim they quit their jobs. Workers who move to another job immediately after
the separation are likely to be the true quits while those who are unemployed
after the separations may be separations for other reasons. Clark (2001) uses the
early waves of BHPS data, showing that most of the self-report quits are reliable
according to their subsequent job status4.
Table 4.1 displays the job status of workers who report separation for volun-
tary and involuntary reasons. The first block of table 4.1 displays the job status
for workers that: (i) quit (ii) were dismissed sacked or made redundant (iii) left
their jobs for other reasons5. The second block gives the average real hourly
wages of all employed workers in their new jobs for each job mobility category.
In the current data set, only 2% of workers who say they quit their jobs are
4Clark (2001) shows that as much as 95% of the respondent who report they quit their
previous job end up with going to another job in one year time.
5Other reasons include: promoted, temporary job ended, took retirement, stop for health
reasons, left to have baby, children and home care, care of other persons in the household,
move area, started college or university, other reasons (reasons that are not specified by the
respondent).
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unemployed by the time of the next BHPS interview; 96% have found new jobs
and 2% have dropped out of the labor force because of other reasons. These
numbers are very close to what have been found by Clark (2001) using earlier
waves of the same data set. Among workers who are dismissed, sacked or made
redundant, only 65% have another job by the time of the next interview, and
26% end up in the unemployment pool. Within the group of job separations for
reasons other than quits and layoffs, 72% of the respondents are in employment
after the ending of previous job spell, and only 8% of them are unemployed.
Based on the statistics of respondents’ after-job-separation job status, most self-
reported quits were followed by another job, which to some extent validates the
self-reported quitting events. What is more, the statistics also show that people
who quit their jobs are different from those who are fired or made redundant.
The latter group is much more likely to be unemployed than the former group.
The average real hourly wages of the new jobs for workers who reports quits is
£9.95, which is £3.75 higher than for workers who are dismissed. This suggests
that workers who quit their jobs are more productive than those who are laid off.
The average real hourly wage of workers who quit their jobs is £0.44 less than
that of workers who left for other reasons. However, this result is not surprising
considering that job separation for other reasons in the BHPS data also includes
the “promotion” category. In summary, the statistics reported in table 4.1 show
that respondents who quit their jobs are more likely to find another job and get
high wages than those who leave their jobs involuntarily.
In order to reduce the self report bias on job mobility status, in this chapter,
only those who have another job after they report quitting their previous job are
treated as actual quits.
Family friendly practice like flexitime adds up to the costs of job mobility
and therefore may reduce quitting probability, encouraging long term attachment
between firms and employees. Figure 4.1 displays the relationship between quits
and flexitime for all workers together and for full time workers, respectively. In
both graphs, the vertical axis represents the fraction of workers that quit their
jobs, and the horizontal axis lists different workers’ types. Here I divide all
workers into four groups: male workers with and without children under 16 years
old, female workers with and without children under 16 years old. Within each
group, I tabulated the incidence of quitting by their flexitime status.
As shown by figure 4.1, in most cases workers with flexitime have a lower
probability of quitting than workers without flexitime. An exception is the fe-
male employees without young children group, where those with flexitime have
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Job status after quits
Employed 90.50% 59.35% 66.46%
Self-employed 5.42% 5.57% 5.67%
Unemployed 2.08 % 26.09% 7.07%
Other job status 2.00 % 9.09% 20.80%
No.of obs 3,507 1,257 7,439
Mean of hourly wage 9.95 6.20 10.39
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
“Other job status” includes: retired, maternity leave, family care, full time student, sick and
disabled, start government training programme.
“Other reasons” includes: promoted, temporary job ended, took retirement, stopped health
reasons, left to have babies, children or home care, care of other person, move area, start college
or university.
slightly higher chances of quitting than those who do not have flexitime (though
the difference is very small). When only full time workers are kept in the sample,
the differences in quitting rates between workers with different flexitime status
are even more prominent. Among male workers, flexitime is consistently asso-
ciated with a lower probability of quitting, but the difference has little to do
with whether there are children in the household. Unlike male workers, the quit-
flexitime relationship among full time female workers is closely related to their
parental status. Full time female workers with young children are less likely to
quit their jobs when working with flexitime than working without flexitime.
Table 4.2 gives the sample statistics of variables used in the chapter. Each
year, around 6% to 7% of all employees report that they quit their jobs. The
proportion of workers that worked with flexitime is around 15% to 22%. Average
age of all workers in the sample is about 37. Female respondents account for 53%
of the sample. 54% of the respondents in the sample are married. Around 36% of
the respondents have children in the household. On average workers work around
33 hours each week. Average job tenure is around 4 to 5 years.
4.4.2 Flexitime and Job Satisfaction
Flexitime provides employees a way to balance work and home production re-
sponsibilities. However, little is known about how flexitime is appreciated by
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Figure 4.1: Flexitime and Quits: Descriptive Statistics
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
Around 93% male workers are full time workers, and 62% female workers are full time
workers.
Table 4.2: Sample Statistics of Variables in Job Mobility Equation
wave 11 wave 12 wave 13 wave 14 wave 15 wave 16 wave 17
year 2001 year 2002 year 2003 year 2004 year 2005 year 2006 year 2007
Quit .07 .07 .07 .07 .06 .06 .06
(.26) (.26) (.26) (.26) (.25) (.25) (.25)
Wage 10.00 10.52 10.67 11.00 11.09 11.42 11.56
(6.25) (6.98) (7.55) (9.28) (7.22) (7.04) (7.40)
Flexitime .22 .14 .18 .15 .15 .15 .16
(.42) (.34) (.37) (.35) (.35) (.35) (.35)
Age 37.28 37.56 37.84 38.09 38.12 38.92 38.87
(12.11) (12.16) (12.29) (12.45) (12.52) (12.36) (12.51)
Married .54 .54 .54 .53 .52 .53 .53
(.49) (.49) (.49) (.49) (.50) (.50) (.50)
Children .37 .36 .36 .36 .36 .36 .36
(.48) (.48) (.48) (.48) (.48) (.48) (.48)
Male .47 .47 .47 .47 .47 .47 .47
(.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50)
Hours 37.31 37.10 36.91 36.74 36.62 36.75 36.86
(13.57) (13.09) (13.21) (13.17) (12.97) (12.58) 12.79
Tenure 4.77 4.63 4.85 4.88 5.10 5.14 5.32
(6.03) (5.86) (6.17) (6.17) (6.13) (6.10) (6.22)
No.of obs 9148 8127 7953 7750 7567 7195 7049
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
For each variable, both mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) are reported.
different types of workers. The relationship between flexitime and job satisfac-
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tion is helpful in understanding what the most important job dimensions are for
workers. More importantly, as argued by Freeman (1978) and Clark (2001), job
satisfaction is also a good predictor of job mobility. Unsatisfied employees are
more likely to leave their jobs than employees who are happy with their jobs.
This section gives some descriptive evidence showing the effect of flexitime on
workers’ job satisfaction levels.
The job satisfaction model can be described as:





JSit = j if µj−1 < JS
∗
it < µj, j = 0, 1....6
and µ−1 = −∞, µ0 = 0, µj =∞ (4.12)
where JS∗it is the latent job satisfaction variable, and JSit is workers’ actual re-
ported overall job satisfaction level. e is a constant, αi is workers’ individual
unobserved heterogeneity, ςit is the error term in the latent job satisfaction equa-
tion. µ is the cutoff point. The rest of the notation in the latent job satisfaction
equation are the same as defined in equation (4.8). Each job satisfaction variable
is coded in 7 levels, 1 to 7, with the smallest number meaning not satisfied at all
and biggest number meaning very satisfied with the jobs.
Table 4.3 reports the estimation results of equation (4.12) using an ordered
probit model with random effects. Positive coefficient estimates unambiguously
suggest higher chances of reporting the highest job satisfaction level and lower
chances of reporting not satisfied with their jobs at all. It is not clear how will
the probability of reporting a middle category satisfaction level changes (Greene,
2003, pg. 833).
According to table 4.3, the provision of flexitime is associated with higher
levels of reported job satisfaction when all workers are kept in the sample. This
suggests that workers working with flexitime tend to report higher levels of job
satisfaction than workers without flexitime. This finding is not surprising given
that flexitime may help workers with balancing work and home responsibilities,
or provide a better way for them to enjoy leisure time. However, there are gender
difference in their job satisfaction responses to flexitime. Male workers are hap-
pier with their jobs when working with flexitime than they are without flexitime,
regardless of whether they have children at home. Whether female workers are
happier with their jobs when they work with flexitime depends on whether they
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Table 4.3: Flexitime and Overall Job Satisfaction
Dependent variable: overall job satisfaction
All workers Female workers Male workers
Flexitime .071*** .031 a .126***
(.021) (.028) (.031)




Age -.055*** -.041*** -.082***
(.004) (.006) (.007)
Age squared .0007*** .0005*** .001***
.00006 (.00008) (.0009)
Children .049** .032*** .054**
(.019) (.026) (.028)
Married .110*** .143*** .050**
(.018) (.024) (.029)
Hours -.006*** -.008*** -.001
(.0007) (.0009) (.001)
ln(wage) .144*** .075*** .255***
(.016) (.022) (.024)
Tenure -.00004*** -.00005*** -.000049***
(3.53e-06) (5.19e-06) (4.85e-06)
Education dummies yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Log likelihood -71920.943 -37294.064 -34436.733
No.of obs 53430 28243 25187
a Flexitime and Flexitime ∗ Children are jointly significant at the 5% level.
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is workers’ overall job satisfaction level. Equation
(4.12) is estimated by an ordered probit model with random effects.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is
reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant
at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5%. ***: significant at 1% level.
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have children in the household. This could be reflected by the joint significance
of Flexitime and Flexitime ∗Children in female workers’ job satisfaction equa-
tion. To this extent, it might be suggestive that the flexitime increases female
workers’ job satisfaction via the channel of helping them take better care of their
children so that they can balance work and home responsibilities. These results
seem counterintuitive in the sense that female workers benefit more from flexi-
time than male workers, given that they take the main responsibility for child
care. There are at least two possibilities for the gender differences suggested in
table 4.3. One might be that flexitime affects female and male workers in differ-
ent ways. To male workers flexitime could act like a non-monetary incentive. It
might be a signal of a good job, or a senior position in the company. To female
workers, flexitime might act like a family-friendly policy, which helps them with
child care. As a result, female workers will appreciate flexitime more if they have
children in the household. Another tentative explanation might be that whether
workers are happier when provided with flexitime depends on their relative ex-
pectations. Clark (1997) argues that women’s low expectations can explain part
of the existing gender gap in the job satisfaction levels. It might be the case that
compared with male workers, female workers are more likely to take flexitime for
granted. A substantial proportion of female workers work in industries or occu-
pations where it is relative easy to obtain flexitime6. Observing that many other
female workers are working with flexitime, female workers themselves may have
a high expectation about flexible working conditions being provided at the work
place. Therefore, we may not observe them report higher levels of job satisfaction
when provided with flexitime.
Other coefficients estimates shown in table 4.3 seem to be in line with the pre-
vious literature. Female workers are more likely to report higher job satisfaction
than male workers, though they are often observed to be in a more disadvantage
situation. Real hourly wage has in a positive relationship with job satisfaction for
all workers. Long working hours decrease workers’ overall job satisfaction. This
negative relationship is particularly significant in female workers’ job satisfaction
equation, suggesting that female workers particularly dislike working long hours.
Compared with Bender et al. (2005) and Asadullah and Fernandez (2008) on
the relationship between job satisfaction and job flexibility, this chapter has the
advantage of using panel techniques to control for individual unobserved hetero-
geneity. Besides, I also focus on the importance of children in affecting female
6According to BHPS data set, 17.87% of all employed female workers are working with
flexitime.
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workers’ job satisfaction levels when they work with flexitime. To conclude, the
estimation results in this section suggest that flexitime is associated with high
levels of job satisfaction for both genders. In addition, there is some evidence
suggesting that whether female workers appreciate flexitime is closely related to
whether they have children to take care of.
4.4.3 Flexitime and Job Mobility
The previous section discussed how flexitime affects workers’ overall job satisfac-
tion levels controlling for various job and workers’ characteristics. This section
investigates whether the effect of flexitime on workers’ job satisfaction levels is
translated into workers’ job mobility behaviour. If flexitime makes people hap-
pier with their jobs, it may also decrease their probability of quitting. Job-to-job
mobility is one of the major mechanisms for workers to move to jobs that involve
preferred amount of working hours (Blundell and Macurdy, 1999). Because the
cost of providing flexitime may vary across firms, it might be difficult for em-
ployees to obtain flexitime within the firm even in the presence of government
legislation that encourages employees to request flexitime from their employers.
Therefore, it is expected that workers who do not have flexitime but have a
strong preference for flexitime will leave their jobs for jobs that do provide flexi-
time. Meanwhile, since flexitime is not a portable job dimension, workers who
already work with flexitime may be reluctant to leave current firms.
The job mobility equation is specified by equation (4.8), in which the de-
pendent variable is a dummy variable coding workers’ quitting behaviour. It
takes value 1 if the respondent quits her job, and 0 otherwise. Equation (4.8) is
estimated by probit with random effects.
Table 4.4 reports the estimation results of workers’ job mobility equation (4.8).
Again the workers are divided into two groups by gender. Most estimates are in
line with the previous job mobility literature as well as the findings in the job
satisfaction section. Factors which lead to higher job satisfaction also decrease
the probability of quitting. For instance, high hourly wages reduce individuals’
chances of quitting, and long working hours are associated with higher probability
of quitting. Corroborating the findings of Farber et al. (1999), the probability of
quitting declines with tenure. In the BHPS, the tenure variable is defined as the
number of years the employee has been holding a job rather than the length of
time the respondent stays in the firm. For instance, if the individual is promoted
internally, then the tenure variable will reset to zero. Therefore the coefficient
of the tenure variable should be interpreted as the effect of job tenure on the
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Table 4.4: Estimation Results of Workers’ Job Mobility Equation (4.8): All Work-
ers
All workers Female workers Male workers
(1) (2) (3)
Flexitime .001 .061 -.076
(.038) (.051) (.058)
Flexitime*Children -.088 -.152∗ .006
(.061) (.081) (.093)
Children .044 .035 .026
(.030) (.043) (.043)
Married -.091∗∗∗ -.148∗∗∗ -.026
(.028) (.037) (.043)
Age .007 .006 .013
(.008) (.011) (.011)




ln(wage) -.154∗∗∗ -.159∗∗∗ -.171∗∗∗
(.027) (.040) (.039)
Hours .009∗∗∗ .008∗∗∗ .010∗∗∗
(.001) (.002) (.002)
Tenure -.056∗∗∗ -.063∗∗∗ -.051∗∗∗
(.003) (.005) (.004)
Education dummies Yes Yes Yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Constant -1.267∗∗∗ -1.102∗∗∗ -1.423∗∗∗
(.211) (.312) (.291)
No. of obs 40152 21196 18956
Log likelihood -9224.353 -4678.899 -4516.836
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is Quit. Equation (4.8) is estimated by a probit model with random
effects.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5%. ***: significant at 1% level.
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quitting probability. Being married decreases the probability of quitting, and the
effect is mainly driven by female workers.
When all workers are pooled together, flexitime is not significantly associated
with the probability of quitting. This may suggest that overall, workers who
work with flexitime are neither less or more likely to quit their jobs than workers
without flexitime. The interaction term of flexitime and children clarifies the
effect of flexitime on parents’ labour mobility choices. It tells whether flexitime
can reduce (or increase) working parents’ probability of quitting. As mentioned
above, people may work with flexitime for different reasons. Here in this chapter,
I mainly explore how flexitime may affect workers’ job mobility decisions as a
family-friendly practice7. As suggested by the estimation results in column 2,
table 4.4, flexitime has little effect on working parents’ job mobility choices either.
Things are different when we estimate female workers’ and male workers’ job
mobility equations separately. Comparing the results in column 3 and column
4 of table 4.4, it can be seen that flexitime is more likely to affect female work-
ers’ labour mobility choices. In female workers’ job mobility equation, though the
variable Flexitime is not statistically significant, the interaction term Flexitime∗
Children is significantly negative. This suggests that flexitime decreases fe-
male workers’ chances of quitting if they have young children at home. In
male workers’ job mobility equation, neither Flexitime nor the interaction term
Flexitime ∗ Children is significantly correlated with their quitting probability.
This implies that flexitime does not affect male workers’ job mobility choices,
even when they have children in the household. Based on the findings reported
in table 4.4, a tentative conclusion may be drawn at this stage that flexitime is
helpful and valued by working mothers as a tool to balance their work and child
care obligations. Meanwhile, male employees also appreciate this practice (they
report higher levels of job satisfaction when working with flexitime than they do
without flexitime), but their responses to flexitime are not affected by whether
they have children. It seems that the absence of flexitime is not a strong enough
incentive for them to quit their jobs.
Estimation results reported in table 4.4 provide some evidence showing that
flexitime can effectively reduce female workers’ quitting probability if they have
young children at home. This might suggest to female workers with children,
flexitime is a helpful family-friendly practice. To this end, we may expect that
female workers who work full time particularly need the help of flexitime if they
7This is also the stated objective of the UK government’s encouragement of workers’ flexitime
requests (Hayward et al., 2007).
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have children in the household. Therefore, in this section, I also estimate full
time workers’ job mobility equation (4.8) to see whether flexitime can effectively
reduce the quitting probability of full time workers, and the results are reported
in table (4.5).
Table 4.5: Estimation Results of Workers’ Job Mobility Equation (4.8): Full time
workers only
All Workers Female workers Male workers
(1) (2) (3)
Flexitime -.0004 .056 -.074
(.041) (.056) (.061)
Flexitime*Children -.122∗ -.222∗∗ .006
(.069) (.100) (.097)
Children .081∗∗ .094∗ .034
(.033) (.051) (.044)
Married -.064∗∗ -.122∗∗∗ -.024
(.031) (.044) (.044)
Age -.011 -.023∗ .003
(.009) (.014) (.012)




ln(wage) -.193∗∗∗ -.212∗∗∗ -.192∗∗∗
(.031) (.049) (.041)
Hours -.0009 -.008∗∗∗ .005∗∗
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Tenure -.052∗∗∗ -.057∗∗∗ -.050∗∗∗
(.004) (.006) (.005)
Education dummies yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Constant -.331 .542 -.978∗∗∗
(.232) (.367) (.307)
No. of obs 31452 13588 17864
Log likelihood -7829.775 -3464.89 -4326.648
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is Quit. Equation (4.8) is estimated by a probit model with random
effects. Only full time workers are kept in the sample.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5%. ***: significant at 1% level.
Qualitatively, most results are similar in tables 4.4 and 4.5. Flexitime has
different effects on female and male workers’ job mobility decisions. In female
workers’ job mobility equation, the coefficient of interaction term Flexitime ∗
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Children is significantly negative at the 5% level. This suggests that flexitime
reduces the quitting probability when they have children. Again, for male full
time workers, flexitime has little to do with their job mobility decisions. In table
(4.5), when all workers are kept together, the coefficient of the interaction term
Flexitime ∗Children is significantly negative. This suggests that controlling for
gender and other personal and job characteristics, flexitime reduces the workers’
voluntary job mobility if they have children. Given the gender differences in their
response to flexitime, it is suggestive that this negative relationship is mainly
driven by female workers.
4.4.4 Robustness Checks
Several other methods to estimate the relationship between flexitime and work-
ers voluntary job mobility are also conducted to check the robustness of results
reported in section 3.4.3. First, I adopt Chamberlains’ random effects model
by adding the time averages of explanatory variables8 into the probit regression
specified by equation (4.8). Intuitively, the objective is to estimate the effect of
flexitime on workers’ quit probability holding the time averages of all the other
factors constant. In addition, I also estimate workers’ job mobility equation using
logit and linear probability models to see whether the estimation results depend
on the econometric specifications. Table 4.6 displays the coefficient estimates of
Flexitime and Flexitime ∗ Children using different econometric specifications.
According to table 4.6, most alternative econometric specifications do not
lead to significant changes in the estimation results of flexitime variables. The
second panel in table (4.6) displays the coefficient estimates of flexitime and the
interaction term of flexitime and children for female workers. Estimation results
using both logit Chamberlain’s probit models suggest that flexitime decreases
female workers’ probability of quitting their jobs if they have children in the
household. The coefficient of the interaction term Flexitime ∗Children has a p-
value of 0.11. following what has been found in the previous section, flexitime has
little to do with male workers quitting decisions, even when they have children
in the household.
Some other variables may also affect workers’ access to flexitime and, in turn,
their job satisfaction levels and job mobility decisions. For instance, union mem-
bership may help workers bargain for favourable working conditions, such as
8Because Flexitime ∗ Children and Flexitime do not vary over years very much within
individuals, putting the time average of Flexitime∗Children and Flexitime into the regression
may lead to multicollinearity, so I do not include the time averages of Flexitime and Flexitime∗
Children in the regression when adopting Chamberlains’ approach.
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Table 4.6: Estimating the Job Mobility Equation Using Other Econometric Meth-
ods
Chamberlain Probit Logit Model LPM
All workers
Flexitime .018 .013 .0004
(.039) (.08) (.004)
Flexitime*Children -.102* -.165 -.007
(.061) (.122) (.007)
No.of obs 41052 40152 40152
Loglikelihood/R squared -8749.6575 9222.5369 .06
Female workers
Flexitime .076 .118 .001
(.052) (.100) (.009)
Flexitime*Children -.145* -.290* -.015
(.082) (.162) (.012)
No. of obs 21196 21196 13405
Loglikelihood/R squared -4438.8247 -4674.982 .06
Male workers
Flexitime -.052 -.127 -.007
(.059) (.114) (.006)
Flexitime*Children -.034 .018 .001
(.95) (.185) (.01)
No. of obs 18956 18956 18956
Loglikelihood/R squared -4259.0781 -4518.064 .06
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is Quit, the first row of this table specifies the model
choice when estimating workers’ job mobility equation.
Other control variables included are the same as specified in table (4.5)
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is re-
ported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at
the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at 1% level.
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flexitime, from their employers. Consequently, union members and non union
members may respond differently to flexitime, and have different expectations
from their jobs. Ignoring the effect of union membership may bias the estimation
results. The BHPS records information about each respondent’s union mem-
bership, and I include workers’ union status as an additional control variable in
workers’ job satisfaction equation (4.12) and job mobility equation (4.8) respect-
ively. The estimation results are reported in table C.1 and table C.2 in appendix
C.
Comparing table 4.3 with table C.1, we can see that adding information on
workers’ union membership into the job satisfaction equation does not change the
estimation results significantly. Flexitime is associated with higher levels of job
satisfaction among male workers. As for female workers, the variable flexitime
is jointly significant with the interaction term of flexitime and children. The
variable union is negatively associated with workers’ job satisfaction levels for
both male and female workers. This suggests that union members tend to report
lower job satisfaction than workers without union membership. This result is
similar to what has been found in previous literature on job satisfaction (Clark,
1997; Asadullah and Fernandez, 2008; Freeman, 1978). Compared with non-union
members, workers who have union membership may have higher bargaining power
when negotiating contracts with their employers. They are also more likely to
voice their discontent with their jobs. Freeman (1978) suggests that the negative
relationship between union membership and job satisfaction is because union
encourages workers to express their discontent and unhappiness with their jobs.
Table C.2 displays the estimation results of workers’ job mobility equation
(4.8). Workers’ union status has been included as an additional regressor in the
job mobility equation. The inclusion of variable union does not alter the coeffi-
cient estimates of Flexitime and Flexitime ∗Children significantly. We can see
from table C.2 that working with flexitime significantly reduces female workers’
chances of quitting when they have children at home. To reiterate: whether work-
ing with flexitime does not affect male workers’ job mobility decisions, even when
they have children. This is similar to what has been found in table 4.4, where
flexitime only affects female workers’ job mobility. Among all three specifications
in table C.2, union is negatively associated with workers’ chances of quitting their
jobs. This suggests that workers with union membership are less likely to quit
than workers without union membership. Combined with the results displayed in
table C.1, we can see that compared with workers who do not have union mem-
bership, union members tend to report lower job satisfaction levels, but they are
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less likely to quit their jobs. Freeman (1978) also report this seemingly counterin-
tuitive finding, and he argues that union members are encouraged to report their
unhappiness, make formal complaints about their jobs and get problems sorted
out rather than simply quitting their jobs. In this case, as suggested by Freeman
(1978), union acts as a “voice institution”.
As suggested by tables C.1 and C.2, workers’ union status does play an im-
portant role in workers’ job satisfaction and job mobility decisions. Nevertheless,
after the inclusion of union as additional regressor, the qualitative results do not
change.
4.4.5 Discussion on Gender Differences
Estimation results in the previous section suggest that flexitime is one of the
most influential factors that keep female workers in their jobs when they have
young children. Among male workers, those who have flexitime report higher
job satisfaction levels than those who do not have flexitime, but flexitime has
little effect on their job mobility decisions. Results from tables 4.3 to 4.5 tell
a consistent story. The major gender differences in the response to flexitime
relate to child care responsibilities. According to the BHPS, in most British
households, female members take the main responsibility for child care (see figure
1.3). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that flexitime would be a helpful family
friendly policy to female workers.
Another way to look at the gender differences in the response to flexitime is
through the occupational distribution of people with and without flexitime. Table
4.7 displays the occupation distribution of flexi-timers of different gender. The
BHPS divides all employees’ occupation in to 9 major categories, from managerial
positions to elementary jobs. The first row of table 4.7 lists four different worker
types, and each column reports the percentage of given type of workers that work
with the corresponding occupation. Workers with flexitime mostly concentrate in
the top four occupations, suggesting a strong correlation of flexitime and human
capital. However, we can see that most male flexi-timers fall into the top 3 oc-
cupations. Female flexi-timers mostly work in the secretarial and administrative
occupations.
From the estimation results and the occupational distribution of male flexi-
timers, it seems that male workers work with flexitime because they are good
employees, or because they have senior positions in the company. Flexitime
might be part of their compensation package and is a signal of good jobs. Female
workers get flexitime mostly because of family reasons. In order to taking better
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Table 4.7: Occupational Distribution of Flexi-timers by Gender
Flexitimers Non-flexitimers
Female Male Female Male
Managers and senior officials 11.15 18.03 9.51 15.65
Professionals 10.15 16.95 11.71 10.90
Associate professionals 17.43 17.22 14.25 12.21
Secretary and administrative 36.19 14.66 17.48 4.43
Skilled trade 0.94 10.82 2.85 23.61
Personal service 6.40 1.87 16.01 2.28
Sales and customer service 9.41 3.92 12.84 4.46
Process, plant and machine operatives 1.43 8.20 2.61 13.96
Elementary occupations 6.90 8.33 12.74 12.49
No.of obs 5,231 4,059 26,326 27,806
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
Numbers in the table are percentages.
care of their children while keep participating in the labour market, female work-
ers are self-selected to occupations that have higher chances of offering flexible
working chances, i.e. the secretary and administrative occupations, which are
not necessarily well paid jobs. Therefore, male workers with flexitime are more
satisfied with their jobs when working with flexitime because they have good
jobs, while female workers are more satisfied with their jobs when working with
flexitime because flexitime helps them with their domestic responsibilities.
4.4.6 Flexitime Status After Quits
The analyses discussed above only show that there is a correlation between female
workers’ job mobility decisions and their flexitime status when they have children.
As suggested above, the absence of flexitime may be one of the reasons that
make female employees with children quit their jobs. This leads to an important
question: what happens to those workers after they quit their jobs? If flexitime
is an important factor that drives the female workers’ job mobility, will female
workers with children move to jobs that provide flexitime after they quit the
previous job?
Because of the longitudinal features of the BHPS data, I am able to observe
workers’ job changes along with their flexitime status changes over time. First, I
estimate an equation in which the dependent variable is the “upward” change of
flexitime status, i.e. whether workers move from a no-flexitime status to flexitime
151
status. The independent variables are individual and job characteristics plus a
dummy variable Quitit, which denotes whether the respondent quits her job. The
flexitime status equation estimated in this chapter is:
Mt flexitimeit = c+α2i+ϕ2Quitit+ρQuit∗Childrenit+ΣNn=1λnZint+ε2it (4.13)
where c is the constant, t is the time index, α2i is individual unobserved hetero-
geneity. Mt flexitime is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the respondent
moves from a non-flexitime to flexitime status. The variable takes value 0 if the
respondent’s flexitime status is unchanged, or she moves from a flexitime status
to a non-flexitime status. Quit ∗Children is the interaction term of job mobility
and children. It indicates whether working parents are more or less likely to move
to jobs with flexitime when they quit their jobs. Z is the vector that consists
of all the other factors that may have effects on the changes of workers’ moving
towards a more flexible job, and ε is the error term. Coefficient ϕ2 gives the
relationship between workers’ job mobility choices and the chances of moving to
a job with flexitime.
Table 4.8 tells whether quitting the current job is associated with higher
chances of moving from a job without flexitime to a job with flexitime in the
next period. For both genders, the coefficient estimates for quit are significantly
positive. This suggests that workers who quit their jobs are more likely to move
from a non-flexitime job to a job with flexitime than workers who do not quit.
In other words, quitting acts as an important mechanism for workers to adjust
their flexitime status to desired levels. According to table 4.8, children are one
of the most important factors that drive female workers to move towards jobs
with flexitime. The effect of children on male workers’ flexitime status change is
not statistically significant. This confirms the idea that male workers’ flexitime-
related decisions are not related to whether they have children in households.
All these results show that the presence of children plays a crucial role in female
workers’ flexitime-related decisions. Female workers seem to attach more import-
ance to family and child care obligations and seek for means that enable them to
balance work and home production conflicts. That might be why they are more
satisfied with their jobs when working with flexitime; if firms do not provide them
with flexitime, they would like to quit and move to firms that do.
Another way to look at the results displayed in table 4.8 is that they reveal the
constraints faced by workers when they want to work with flexitime. Though the
British government started to give employees the right to request flexible working
if they have young children at home in 2003, over the years there is not much
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Table 4.8: The Effect of Quitting on Moving from Non-flexitime to Flexitime
All workers Female workers Male workers
(1) (2) (3)
Quit .262∗∗∗ .290∗∗∗ .226∗∗∗
(.045) (.061) (.068)
Quit*Children -.016 .022 -.053
(.075) (.099) (.115)




Children .072∗∗∗ .105∗∗∗ .046
(.027) (.037) (.043)
Married -.046∗ -.021 -.064
(.026) (.033) (.042)
Age -.016∗∗ -.017∗ -.010
(.007) (.010) (.011)
Age squared .0002∗∗ .0002 .0002
(.00009) (.0001) (.0001)
ln(wage) -.058∗∗ -.028 -.094∗∗
(.026) (.036) (.039)
Hours -.008∗∗∗ -.006∗∗∗ -.010∗∗∗
(.001) (.002) (.002)
Tenure -.007∗∗∗ -.005∗ -.008∗∗∗
(.002) (.003) (.003)
Education dummies yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Constant -.634∗∗∗ -.574∗∗ -.748∗∗∗
(.202) (.288) (.286)
Log likelihood -8901.041 -4936.736 -3935.847
No of obs 40152 21196 18956
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is Mt flexitime, which takes value 1 if workers’ flexitime status
changes from no-flexitime to flexitime, and 0 otherwise. Equation (4.13) is estimated by a
probit model with random effects.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at 1% level.
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evidence showing that workers are getting more flexible working than before.
Results in table 4.8 suggest that quitting is one of the most powerful predictors
of the changes in workers’ flexitime status. This could imply that it is difficult for
workers to have their requests for flexible working (flexitime here) granted from
their own employers, or that they face large costs of shifting to flexitime jobs
within the same employer. Therefore, they need to move to other jobs if they
want to work with flexitime. If there is not any flexitime constraint existing in
the labour market, we will expect the coefficient associated with variable quit in
equation (4.13) (i.e.ϕ2) to be insignificantly different from zero, which could mean
workers who do not work with flexitime have equal chances of getting flexitime
staying with the same job or moving to another job. However, the results show
that workers who quit are much more likely to move from jobs without flexitime
to jobs with flexitime.
Apart from moving from a job without flexitime to a job with flexitime, there
are another three possible states of workers’ flexitime status evolution between
two consecutive years, i.e.: moving from a job with flexitime to a job without
flexitime, staying as a flexi-timer, staying as a non-flexi-timer. In the following, I
estimate different versions of equation (4.13) with the other three possible states
named above as the dependent variable, and the estimation results are reported
in tables 4.9 to 4.11.
The estimation results displayed in table 4.9 show the effect of quitting on
workers’ probability of moving from flexitime to non-flexitime status. The de-
pendent variable is Mt non flexitime, which takes value 1 if workers’ flexitime
status changes from flexitime to non-flexitime, and 0 otherwise. From table 4.9,
it can be seen that quitting is positively associated with both genders’ probability
of experiencing a downward mobility in their flexitime status (i.e. from flexitime
to non-flexitime), though in male workers’ flexitime status change equation, the
variable Quit is jointly significant with the interaction term Quit ∗ Children at
a 10% level 9. Combined with the findings from table 4.8, a tentative conclusion
is that quitting may lead to changes in workers’ flexitime status in either direc-
tion. Workers who quit their jobs are more likely to experience a change in their
flexitime status than workers who stay with their original employers. A possible
explanation for this result might be that a change in the employer may be accom-
9I also estimate male workers’ flexitime status change equation (the dependent variable
is moving from flexitime to non-flextime), with the variable Quit as a control but not the
interaction term Quit∗Children, then the coefficient of Quit is significantly positive, suggesting
that male workers who quit their jobs are more likely to move from flexitime to non-flexitime
than workers who do not quit.
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panied with changes in other job dimensions, including flexitime status (in either
direction). Voluntary job mobility is an important mechanism in that workers
adjust their flexible working arrangements to the desired level. In the second
column, where all workers are kept in the sample, we can see that the coefficient
of Female is significantly negative, suggesting that female workers are less likely
to move from flexitime to non-flexitime than male workers. This may provide
some suggestive evidence on the importance of flexitime in female workers’ lives.
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 report the effect of quitting on the probability of stay-
ing as flexi-timers and non-flexi-timers respectively. In both tables, quitting is
negatively associated with the dependent variables. This suggests that quitting
decreases the probabilities of having flexitime status unchanged. In other words,
if workers quit their jobs, they are less likely to keep their original flexitime status
than workers who stay with their original employers. Since according to tables
4.8 and 4.9, quitting is always accompanied by a change in workers’ flexitime
status, it is not surprising to find that workers who do not change employers
are more likely to have their flexitime status remain unchanged compared with
workers who quit their jobs. In table 4.10, the interaction term Quit ∗ Children
is negatively associated with male workers’ chances of remaining as flexi-timers,
suggesting that when working fathers quit their jobs, they are less likely to re-
main as flexi-timers. A possible explanation for this might be that most working
fathers need to support the family financially. If flexitime is costly to them, they
are less willing to remain as flexi-timers when they leave for better jobs. However,
this negative relationship does not show up in female workers’ flexitime status
change equation. In table 4.10 column 3, I also find that having children at home
significantly increases female workers’ chances of staying as flexi-timers, but has
little effect on male workers’ probability of remaining as flexi-timers. Similarly,
as suggested by the third column of table 4.11, children also decrease female
workers’ probability of remaining as non-flexi-timers.
In summary, combining all four tables that describe the effects of quitting on
workers’ flexitime status evolution, I find that quitting is positively associated
with changes in workers’ flexitime status in either direction. Workers who leave
their employers are more likely to experience a change in their flexitime status
than workers who stay with the same employers. Similarly, workers who quit
their jobs are less likely to remain in the same flexitime status than workers who
do not quit. All these suggest that quitting helps workers adjust their flexitime
status to the desired level.
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Table 4.9: The Effect of Quitting on Moving From Flexitime to Non-Flexitime
All workers Female workers Male workers
(1) (2) (3)
Quit .136∗∗∗ .202∗∗∗ .058a
(.045) (.061) (.067)
Quit*Children .009 -.061 .110
(.074) (.101) (.108)




Children .058∗∗ .075∗∗ .027
(.025) (.035) (.038)
Married -.016 -.016 -.005
(.024) (.031) (.037)
Age -.019∗∗∗ -.017∗ -.018∗
(.007) (.009) (.010)
Age squared .0002∗∗∗ .0002∗ .0002∗∗
(.00008) (.0001) (.0001)
ln(wage) -.036 .014 -.078∗∗
(.024) (.034) (.035)
Hours -.007∗∗∗ -.009∗∗∗ -.006∗∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.002)
Tenure -.003 -.004 -.001
(.002) (.003) (.002)
Education dummies yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Constant -.681∗∗∗ -.602∗∗ -.875∗∗∗
(.183) (.676) (.251)
Log likelihood -10024.997 -5400.9129 -4588.789
No. of obs 40152 21196 18956
a The variable Quit is jointly significant with the interaction term Quit ∗ Children at 10%
level.
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is Mt non flexitime, which takes value 1 if workers’ flexitime
status changes from flexitime to non-flexitime, and 0 otherwise. The model is estimated by
a probit model with random effects.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at 1% level.
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Table 4.10: The Effect of Quitting on Staying as Flexi-timers
All workers Female workers Male workers
(1) (2) (3)
Quit -.248∗∗∗ -.259∗∗ -.236∗
(.091) (.119) (.143)
Quit*Children -.309∗ -.092 -.629∗∗
(.159) (.203) (.260)




Children .130∗∗ .212∗∗ .089
(.062) (.083) (.096)
Married -.065 -.016 -.100
(.061) (.077) (.103)
Age .033∗ .022 .056∗
(.019) (.025) (.029)
Age squared -.0003 -.0002 -.0005
(.0002) (.0003) (.0003)
ln(wage) .044 .155∗∗ -.131
(.054) (.074) (.083)
Hours -.007∗∗∗ .003 -.022∗∗∗
(.003) (.003) (.005)
Tenure -.012∗∗∗ -.006 -.017∗∗∗
(.004) (.006) (.006)
Education dummies yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Constant -2.746∗∗∗ -2.622∗∗∗ -2.736∗∗∗
(.488) (.663) (.736)
Log likelihood -7536.948 -4240.433 -3245.275
No. of obs 40152 21196 18956
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is Stay flexitime, which takes value 1 if workers stay as flexitimers,
and 0 otherwise. The model is estimated by a probit model with random effects.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at 1% level.
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Table 4.11: The Effect of Quitting on Staying as Non-flexi-timers
All workers Female workers Male workers
(1) (2) (3)
Quit -.230∗∗∗ -.299∗∗∗ -.149∗
(.054) (.073) (.082)
Quit*Children .094 .062 .119
(.089) (.119) (.136)




Children -.096∗∗ -.155∗∗∗ -.068
(.043) (.058) (.065)
Married .046 -.036 .129∗
(.043) (.056) (.069)
Age -.004 .002 -.020
(.012) (.017) (.019)
Age squared .00002 .00003 .0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
ln(wage) .072∗∗ -.063 .239∗∗∗
(.036) (.048) (.055)
Hours .012∗∗∗ .008∗∗∗ .019∗∗∗
(.002) (.002) (.003)
Tenure .008∗∗∗ .007∗ .008∗
(.003) (.004) (.004)
Education dummies yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Constant .372 .218 .426
(.315) (.453) (.453)
Log likelihood -15442.158 -8395.398 -6977.773
No.of obs 40152 21196 18956
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
The dependent variable is Stay non flexitime, which takes value 1 if workers stay as non-
flexi-timers, and 0 otherwise. The model is estimated by a probit model with random
effects.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:
significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at 1% level.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the relationship between flexitime and workers’ job sat-
isfaction and job mobility decisions. Workers with flexitime report higher levels
of job satisfaction than those who do not have flexitime. There is evidence sug-
gesting that female workers’ attitudes towards flexitime depend on whether they
have children to take care of. Among female workers, flexitime decreases the
chances of voluntary job mobility (quits) if they have young children at home.
I also find significant differences between genders in their responses to flexi-
time. Female workers’ responses to flexitime are closely related to their child care
obligations. Probably this is because in most households mothers are mainly
responsible for child care, and they need flexitime to help them with child care
obligations. Working mothers appreciate flexitime and their job attachments are
to some extent determined by the availability of flexitime. Flexitime also makes
male workers more satisfied with their jobs, but it does not particularly influence
their job mobility decisions.
Since flexitime can induce working mothers stay with their jobs, there may
also be concerns about whether such a decrease in job mobility is desired by
the economy as a whole. Literature on “job lock” points out that some times
workers choose to stay with their original jobs only because they want to enjoy
certain non portable benefits provided by the firms (Madrian, 1994). As a res-
ult, firms attract workers that demand those benefits rather than high quality
workers. However, this may be less of a problem in the case of flexitime. Within
female workers, flexitime is usually observed among highly educated full time
employees, because female workers who do not have good career prospects are
more likely to choose part time jobs or opt out of the labour market. Therefore,
a tentative conclusion may be that flexitime helps the firms to keep and attract
high quality and productive female workers and improves overall efficiency. In
addition, by promoting the job attachment in the current period, flexitime also
helps workers accumulate more firm-specific human capital, which in turn makes
it even less likely that workers will quit their jobs in the future. As a result, firms
providing flexitime may suffer less turnover costs than those who do not provide
flexitime. Given that flexitime reduces the probability of quitting, firms may also
have more incentives to invest in general training activities that increase workers’
general human capital levels. Consequently, both firms and workers may enjoy
the benefits of increased general human capital levels.
Most existing literature on job mobility focuses on the effect of monetary
payoffs and the role of specific human capital accumulation but ignores the im-
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portance of compatibility between work and home production, which is crucial to
female workers especially when they have children. This chapter contributes the
current literature by addressing how a non-pecuniary aspect of a job may affect
workers’ job mobility decisions.
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Appendix C
C.1 Job Satisfaction and Union Membership
Table C.1: Job Satisfaction and Union Membership
Dependent variable: overall job satisfaction
All workers Female workers Male workers
Flexitime .073*** .031 a .128***
(.021) (.029) (.031)




Union -.095*** -.086*** -.083***
(.017) (.024) (.027)
Age -.054*** -.040*** -.081***
(.004) (.006) (.007)
Age squared .0007*** .0005*** .001***
(.00006) (.00008) (.0009)
Children .049** .034*** .054**
(.019) (.026) (.028)
Married .111*** .146*** .050**
(.018) (.024) (.029)
Hours -.006*** -.008*** -.001
(.0007) (.0009) (.001)
ln(wage) .152*** .085*** .261***
(.016) (.022) (.024)
Tenure -.00004*** -.00005*** -.000047***
(3.57e-06) (5.23e-06) (4.92e-06)
Education dummies yes yes yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Log likelihood -71906.622 -37287.557 -34431.892
No.of obs 53430 28243 25187
a Flexitime and Flexitime ∗ Children are jointly significant at the 5% level.
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
Workers’ union membership status is included as an control variable.
The dependent variable is workers’ overall job satisfaction level. Equation
(4.12) is estimated by an ordered probit model with random effects.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is
reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant
at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5%. ***: significant at 1% level.
161
C.2 Job Mobility and Union Membership
Table C.2: Estimation Results of Workers’ Job Mobility Equation (4.8) with
Union Membership
All workers Female workers Male workers
(1) (2) (3)
Flexitime .003 .062 -.072
(.038) (.051) (.058)
Flexitime*Children -.087 -.147∗ -.003
(.061) (.081) (.093)
Union -.215∗∗∗ -.201∗∗∗ -.228∗∗∗
(.029) (.040) (.044)
Children .047 .039 .032
(.030) (.043) (.043)
Married -.091∗∗∗ -.145∗∗∗ -.027
(.028) (.037) (.043)
Age .009 .008 .016
(.008) (.011) (.011)




ln(wage) -.132∗∗∗ -.135∗∗∗ -.155∗∗∗
(.028) (.040) (.039)
Hours .009∗∗∗ .008∗∗∗ .009∗∗∗
(.001) (.002) (.002)
Tenure -.053∗∗∗ -.061∗∗∗ -.048∗∗∗
(.003) (.005) (.004)
Education dummies Yes Yes Yes
Ind & Occ dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Constant -1.381∗∗∗ -1.220∗∗∗ -1.520∗∗∗
(.211) (.313) (.292)
Log likelihood -9196.55 -4665.953 -4502.65
No. of obs 40152 21196 18956
Source: British Household Panel Survey, years 2001-2007.
Workers’ union membership status is included as an control variable.
The dependent variable is Quit. Equation (4.8) is estimated by a probit model with random
effects.
Ind & Occ is short for “Industries and Occupations”.
For each variable, a coefficient is reported, and the robust standard error is reported in
the parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels. *: significant at the 10% level. **:




This thesis explores the relationship between flexitime and workers’ labour mar-
ket outcomes. I find that flexitime is closely related to workers’ compensating
structures, labour supply and job mobility decisions.
The second chapter suggests that a subset of workers (workers with high la-
bour incomes) would like to sacrifice part of their wages in exchange for flexitime.
First, this shows that it is important to take into account the income effect when
estimating the compensating wage differentials associated with flexitime. Though
flexitime might be a helpful family-friendly practice, it might be the case that
only some workers’ are able to “afford” it. This negative compensating wage dif-
ferentials effect also suggests that flexitime is a desirable job amenity to workers.
By offering flexitime to their employees, firms might be able to save certain la-
bour costs, or become more attractive to workers than those who do not provide
flexitime. In addition, it implies that at least some workers need to bear certain
costs in order to work with flexitime. However, I find little evidence suggesting
the existence of compensating wage differentials for flexitime when all workers are
pooled together. A possible explanation for the insignificant relationship between
flexitime and wage might be that the benefits associated with flexitime give firm
incentives to provide flexitime at a low price. Though the descriptive statistics
show that female workers are more likely to have flexitime than male workers,
there is not enough evidence to suggest that female workers and male workers
would like to pay different prices for flexitime. This indicates that flexitime has
little explanatory power with regards to the existing gender wage gap.
The third chapter explores whether flexitime affects workers’ labour supply
decisions. I find that workers will increase their labour supply when working with
flexitime if the benefits derived from flexitime (increased child care production
efficiency) are large enough relative to the costs (wage reduction costs). Flexi-
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time saves time spent on home production so that workers’ can devote more time
to the market work. However, if the wage reduction cost associated with flexi-
time is too high, flexitime may act as a disincentive to market work. Empirical
evidence confirms that flexitime is associated with a higher number of working
hours among working mothers. Since 2003, the British government put forward
legislation that gives workers the right to request flexible working from their em-
ployers. However, the legislation does not specify that workers can enjoy flexible
working schedules without suffering any costs. Over years, the proportion of
workers working with flexible working arrangements did not increase much after
the legislation. In effect, it might be the case that the cost of working with
flexitime is so high that workers are reluctant to request it from their employers.
From the analysis in the third chapter, it can be seen that in order for work-
ers to make full use of the flexible working arrangements to balance their work
and domestic responsibilities, it is important that firms provide those arrange-
ments at a low price. In addition, the provision of flexitime may also increase the
overall economic efficiency by encouraging more female workers to be engaged in
full time work. In the British labour market, a substantial proportion (around
40%) of female workers are working part time. As pointed out by Connolly and
Gregory (2008), many workers who shift from full time jobs to part time jobs end
up in occupations that are below their human capital levels. The provision of
flexitime reduces the conflict between work and domestic responsibilities so that
female workers are more likely to be engaged in full time work when provided
with flexitime. In this case, flexitime may reduce the efficiency loss resulting
from female workers’ moving to part time jobs. When combined with a human
capital accumulation process, flexitime has more profound influence on workers’
labour supply decisions. By encouraging current period labour supply, flexitime
helps workers to accumulate more human capital which will be translated into
higher future wages. In addition, workers may also increase their labour supply
even prior to their access to flexitime because of the human capital accumulation
process. As a result, flexitime may increase workers’ life time labour supply. In
summary, if provided at a low price, flexitime can serve as effective non-monetary
incentive to encourage workers’ labour supply and human capital accumulation.
The effect of flexitime on workers’ labour market decisions is also reflected in
their job mobility decisions. In the fourth chapter, I find that flexitime decreases
the probability of quitting among female workers when they have young children
at home. Flexitime increases workers’ mobility costs, especially when flexitime is
helpful with domestic responsibilities. Therefore, workers who work with flexitime
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are more reluctant to leave their jobs than workers without flexitime. To this
end, this implies that firms compete in both monetary and non-monetary job
dimensions, and they can use flexitime as an incentive to attract good workers
from their competitors1. More importantly, flexitime can help firms reduce their
turnover costs by encouraging long lasting employment relationship with their
current employees (especially working mothers). We can also look this issue in
a dynamic way. Because flexitime encourages workers to stay within the same
firm, workers may also accumulate more specific human capital (such as firm
specific skills). As pointed out by Farber et al. (1999), the accumulated specific
human capital also acts as an incentive for workers to stay within the same
firm. In other words, flexitime reinforces the effect of specific human capital
on workers’ job mobility behaviour. In addition, by reducing the probability
of quitting, flexitime may also give firms additional incentives to provide general
training to workers for them to accumulate general human capital (general skills).
Conventional literature on firm-provided general training argues that firms are
reluctant to provide workers with general training because workers capture the
entire benefits and firms do not if workers leave (Becker, 1975, chap. 2). If the
provision of flexitime can induce workers to stay within the same firm, then firms
may be more likely to invest in general trailing activities. As a result, both firms
and workers can share the returns of increased general human capital.
To conclude, the findings of this thesis suggest that the provision of flexi-
time is beneficial to workers, firms and the economy as a whole. To workers,
flexitime enables them to rearrange their time so that they can balance their
work and home production in a more efficient way. As a result, they may have
more time to participate in the labour market. In addition, flexitime also helps
them accumulate more human capital which could be beneficial to their future
career development. To firms, the provision flexitime may help them attract good
workers and reduce the probability of workers’ quitting their jobs. There is also
evidence suggesting that at least some workers would like to work with flexitime
at the price of reduced wages. Finally, by promoting workers’ labour supply and
job attachments, flexitime may reduce the efficiency loss resulting from downward
occupational mobility.
1The descriptive statistics in chapter 2 show that workers with high human capital levels
(high educational achievements) are more likely to work with flexitime. Combined with the
findings of chapter 4, this may suggest that flexitime can help firms attract (or keep) workers
with high human capital.
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